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THE MARSHALL COURT: NATIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE
RIGHTS AND PERSONAL LIBERTY FROM THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
V. HOWARD MANNt
I. INTRODUCTION
The commerce clause serves a twofold purpose: It constitutes a
direct source for the most significant and extensive general regulatory
power of the national government,' and with the exception of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment it
serves as the most important authority for the imposition of constitu-
tional limitations upon state powers.2 The restrictive nature of the
operation of the commerce clause as a curb upon state powers was long
the more significant aspect in constitutional adjudication.' Its broader
purpose, a source for extending the powers of the national government,
was thought to be limited and generally was not comprehended.' Thus,
legal concepts of "commerce" which had the effect of designating con-
stitutional protections against state invasion and interference have domi-
nated adjudications dealing with the constitutional authority of the com-
merce clause.2 Congress' powers to effectuate national policy through
j Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. THE: CO NSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 118 (Corwin ed. rev. &
anno. 1953).
2. See, e.g., Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI.
L. Rnv. 556 (1936).
3. See, e.g., CoRwIN, THE COMMRacE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS 18-19, 23, 33-
38, 55, 78, 115, 175 (1936).
4. See the argument of Henry Clay in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449,
488-89 (1841), in which he raised the specter of an act of the Congress forbidding trade
and possibly ownership in negro slaves. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AmERICA 163-68 (Ccrwin ed. rev. & anno. 1953) ; Cushman, The National Police Power
Under the Commerce Clause of the Constitutio, (pts. 1-3), 3 MINN. L. REv. 289, 381,
452 (1919) ; Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, x933-1946, (pts.
1-2), 59 HARv. L. REv. 645, 883 (1946).
5. Different views may be reflected as to the relationship of government and law
to existing social and economic conditions, e.g.:
It is all but impossible in our own age to sense fully its eighteenth century
meaning [i.e., the meaning of commerce]. The eighteenth century did not
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regulation remained in the background and were sometimes rejected as
nonexistent.6
The commerce clause has not only been used in constitutional ad-
judication to curb state powers in order to secure the existence of national
powers ;7 it has also served to secure for the Supreme Court the jurisdic-
tional authority to nationalize and enforce private rights and personal
liberty.' And the impact of state powers upon private rights and per-
sonal liberty has often provided the impetus for the nationalization and
enforcement of private rights and personal liberty through constitutional
adjudication.9
separate by artificial lines aspects of a culture which are inseparable. It had
no lexicon of legalisms extracted from the law reports in which judicial usage
lies in a world apart from the ordinary affairs of life. Commerce was then
more than we imply now by business or industry. It was a name for the
economic order, the domain of political economy, the realm of a comprehensive
public policy. It is a word which makes trades, activities and interests an in-
strument in the culture of a people. If trust was to be reposed in parchment,
it was the only word which could catch up into a single comprehensive term all
activities directly affecting the wealth of the nation.
HAMILTON & ADAIR, THE PowER To GOvERN 62-63 (1937).
6. See RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER OvER Co MERcE 156-81 (1937). For
a notable exception to the general failure to see the extent of the national powers caused
by concentration upon state power limitations, see the opinion of Ar. Chief Justice
Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877):
The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of com-
merce . . . known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep
pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new de-
velopments of time and circumstances. They extend from the horse with its
rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing-vessel to the steamboat . . . and
from the railroad to the telegraph, as these new agencies are successively brought
into use to meet the demands of increasing population and wealth. They were
intended for the government of the business to which they relate, at all times
and under all circumstances. As they were intrusted to the general govern-
ment for the good of the nation, it is not only the right, but the duty, of Congress
to see to it that intercourse among the States and the transmission of intelligence
are not obstructed or unnecessarily encumbered by State legislation.
7. The role of the Supreme Court has not been to limit state powers in order to
preserve national powers; and, conversely, it is not an essential function of the Supreme
Court to limit national powers in order to preserve the continued existence of state
powers. See, e.g., POWELL, VAGARIES AND VAiErms IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTEaRErATIoN
142-79 (1956) ; Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. Rxv. 1 (1950).
8. Freedom of movement, freedom of association and other entrepreneurial aspects
may have a close assimilation to the privileges and immunities, due process, and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941) ; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Ward v. Mary-
land, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870) ; Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
9. See Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.D.S.C. 1823);
Freund, Review and Federalism, in SUPREME CoUT AND SUPREME LAW 86, 95 (Calm
ed. 1954). When a problem is thought to extend to "fundamental rights"-beyond the
legal rights drawn from the freedom relating to business or personal associations-it
occasionally is argued that the Supreme Court ought to use a constitutional authority
other than the commerce clause. Compare Douglas, J. in Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 177-81 (1941), with the various opinions in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946). But whatever national policy or social value underlies the use of the commerce
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A study of the Marshall Court must give due weight to the social
and economic conditions which constituted the source of the adjudica-
tions from the commerce clause."0 Further, it may be helpful to preserve
the Marshall Court's understanding of its authority to formulate national
law from the authority of the commerce clause." But not the least im-
portant are studies which pertain to the contributions and failings of the
Marshall Court in law and legal history," and are not necessarily related
to such factors as the social and economic circumstances and theories
relating to the Constitution which may have influenced the particular
adjudications.'
clause or another provision as constitutional authority the complainant must have a pe-
culiar relationship to the policy or social value in order that he may receive remedial
benefits alleviating an injury which constitutes a legal injury. But cf. Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962), where the enforcement of policy or social value was said
not to require the justification of an injury for remedial alleviation, though an injury
possibly existed supporting the use of the freedom of religion clause as constitutional
authority.
10. See 1 DORFMAN, THE EcoNoMIc MIND iN AMERICAN CIVuIzATION, 1606-1865,
472-84 (1946).
11. RIMBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL PowFR OvER COMMERCE 20, 29 (1937).
12. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), is much more than the initial
pronouncement of the Supreme Court upon the scope of the national authority which
the Congress may use to regulate commerce and the limitations which the Court may
impose upon the states by the national law. By comprehending it in its entire historical
and legal setting, one might gain special insight into the pressures of the present. It
was ir. Justice Holmes who said:
[H]istory is the means by which we measure the power which the past has had
to govern the present in spite of ourselves, so to speak, by imposing traditions
which no longer meet their original end. History sets us free and enables us to
make up our minds dispassionately whether the survival which we are enforc-
ing answers any new purpose when it has ceased to answer the old.
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HA~v. L. REv. 443, 452 (1899), reprinted
in HOLUES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 225 (1921). Maitland said that historical
analysis had the job "of explaining, and therefore lightening, the pressure that the past
must exercise upon the present, and the present upon the future. Today we study the
day before yesterday, in order that yesterday may not paralyse today, and today may
not paralyse tomorrow." 3 COLLECTED PAPERS OF FaanFICx WILLIA MAITLAND 439
(Fisher ed. 1911).
13. The great teacher, James Bradley Thayer, has emphasized that whatever one's
approach his constitutional analysis must be tentative:
The study of Constitutional Law is allied not merely with history, but with
statecraft, and with the political problems of our great and complex national life.
In this wide and novel field of labor our judges have been pioneers. There
have been men ... like Marshall, Shaw and Ruf fin, who were sensible of the true
nature of their work and of the large method of treatment which it required,
who perceived that our constitutions had made them, in a limited and secondary
way, but yet a real one, coadjutors with the other departments in the business
of government; but many have fallen short of the requirements of so great a
function. Even under the most favorable circumstances, in dealing with such
a subject as this, results must often be tentative and temporary. Views that
seem adequate at the time, are announced, applied, and developed; and yet, by
and by, almost unperceived, they melt away in the light of later experience,
and other doctrines take their place.
1 THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTioNAL LAW v-vi (1895).
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II. BRIG WILSON
One of the earliest reported cases under the commerce clause was the
brig Wilson case, decided in the May 1820 term of the United States Cir-
cuit Court for Virginia. 4 The Wilson case is significant for showing the
Marshall Court's use of theory about the Constitution, as the basis for
constitutional interpretation and authority for the formulation of na-
tional law. 5 A main function of the administration of the judicial
14. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va. 1820).
The districts of Virginia and North Carolina were included in Chief Justice Marshall's
circuit. See I & II BROCKENBROUGH, REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE HONORABLE
JOHN MARSHALL IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1837). The original
Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat 73, in addition to the creation of
the Supreme Court of the United States and thirteen district courts, created three circuit
courts: the Eastern Circuit consisting of the districts of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut and New York; the Middle Circuit, of the districts of New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia; and the Southern Circuit, of the districts
of South Carolina and Georgia. By the original act the membership of the circuit courts
in each district consisted of "any two justices of the Supreme Court, and the district
judge of such districts, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum." Judiciary Act of
September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73. The original Jay Court found the tasks of
sitting on circuit courts much too burdensome as they stated in an urgent letter addressed
to President Washington, in which it was stated that "the task of holding twenty-seven
Circuit Courts a year, in the different States, from New Hampshire to Georgia, besides
two sessions of the Supreme Court at Philadelphia, in the two most severe seasons of
the year, is a task which, considering the extent of the United States and the small
number of Judges, is too burdensome." 1 AM. STATE PAPERS, Misc., 52, quoted in
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 22 (1928).
In 1793 the original Judiciary Act was amended to provide for circuit courts of
each district to consist of one justice of the Supreme Court together with the judge of
the district, but in the absence of the district judge "such circuit court may consist of
the said judge of the Supreme Court alone." Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat.
333. The Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, created circuit courts with life-
appointed circuit judges. This act was repealed during the Jefferson administration and
the original Judiciary Act reinstated. Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. The
return to circuit riding required the justices of the Supreme Court to man two courts,
the circuit court, essentially a nisi prius court, and the Supreme Court, essentially an
appellate court. This system lasted until the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891
established the circuit court of appeals as an appellate court. See Act of March 3,
1887, ch. 347, 24 Stat. 492; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. See also Stuart
v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1 Cranch) (1803); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF
THE SUPREME COURT, 4-55, 69-77, 86-89, 96-102, 219; HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 42-47, 79-80 (1953) ; 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 29-90, 269-73 (Rev. ed. 1937).
Broadly speaking, the district courts were admiralty courts in their origin with some
criminal jurisdiction, and the circuit courts were diversity of citizenship courts with some
criminal jurisdiction. Judicary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 76, 78. In
addition, the circuit courts were given limited appellate jurisdiction over the district
courts. There could be appeal "from final decrees in a district court in causes of ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value
of three hundred dollars, exclusive of costs" and "in [civil actions in a disttrict court,
where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive of
costs. . . ." Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 1 Stat. 83. The brig
Wilson case obviously was considered an appeal in admiralty jurisdiction.
15. See 4 BEvERiDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 427-29 (1919).
THE MARSHALL COURT
powers in the Marshall Court was to determine where the nation's powers
of government existed. In the performance of this unique function
lawyers had great difficulty finding, and then analyzing, the legal issues
which would assist the Court in making such determinations. The Court's
determinations of constitutional interpretation in support of its formula-
tions of national law made it appear that the Court was allocating govern-
mental authority between the national government and the member states.
While the Court's decrees recognized the necessity for the judicial en-
forcement of private rights, its opinions consisted largely of discussion
on the general subject of the respective powers of government.
The complexities inherent in the administration of the nationalized
judicial authority in the period of the Marshall Court must be appreciated,
yet the Court may be criticized in terms of judicial responsibility for its
extensive failings to restrict the bases of its determinations to intellectual
matters pertinent to principles of law and legal standards. The legal is-
sues which the Marshall Court pretended to adjudicate were more often
drawn from the abstract-and oftentimes mythical-theories and doc-
trines about the Constitution than from the authoritative langnage of the
Constitution and the background circumstances involved in its making.
In its effort to resolve the conflict between the erroneous states' rights
theories about the Constitution (that the member states contained powers
of sovereignty restricting the national government), and the erroneous
assumptions of the federalists (that the various powers and functions of
the national government had to be withdrawn from the member states),
the Court virtually turned the judicial function into an arbitral process
for adjudicating conflicts of state policies with national powers. The
Marshall Court thus initiated a period of judicial administration in which
the Court's pretended function was to make declarations on the division
of authority between the national government and the member states.
An emotional maze of abstract constitutional theories and doctrines under-
standably hung over the work of the Court. Moreover, the abstract
theories about the Constitution soon became influenced by the pressures
of political forces. Such influences gained recognition because of the
Court's failure to restrict the administration of its judicial authority to
the essentials of the legal issues of a particular case. In order to allocate
governmental authority between the national government and the member
states, the Court gave the appearance of involving itself with the various
public policy considerations concerning the national bank, internal im-
provements, slavery and the various social problems.'6 Once this mode
16. E.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How) 393 (1857). In Dred Scott,
the Court attempted an absolution of the great slavery question that had so prostrated
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of adjudication had taken over the judiciary, the abstract theories and
doctrines about the Constitution were easily subject to influence by the
broader social and political issues of the period.
The brig Wilson was libelled in the district court for violation of the
internal revenue act of March 2, 1799" allegedly caused by the captain's
failure to declare the ship's liquor and other stores for the crew and to
pay the statutory duties,"8 and for violation of the act of Congress which
sought to prevent the importation of persons of color into states where
their admission was prohibited by the law of that state."0 While enroute
the weak national government, by pages and pages of pronunciamentoes on constitutional
doctrine. See especially the opinion of the Court, penned by Chief Justice Taney, be-
ginning at page 399. Mr. Justice Curtis' dissenting opinion, which begins at page 564,
was published as an absolutionist pamphlet, certainly an indication that the Court was
thought to be journalizing and not adjudicating. See SwiSiER, ROGER B. TANEY 485-523
passin (1936). Chief Justice Hughes has characterized the Dred Scott case as an ad-
judication by which the Court "suffered severely from self-inflicted wounds." HUGHES,
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1928). See also 2 CURTIS, CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 266-77 (1896); HAINES & SHERWOOD, THE
ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1835-1864, 393-
435 (1957).
17. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627.
18. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 240 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va.
1820) :
The four first counts of the libel, charged, that the said spirits, etc., were im-
ported, and brought into the United States . . . by sea . . . from some foreign
port, unknown, into the port of Norfolk, in Virginia, on board the brig Wilson,
which were not mentioned in the manifest and report made by the commander
of the vessel, but were carefully concealed, for the purpose of evading the
payment of the duty thereon, and were discovered by an agent, specially ap-
pointed by the collector of the port of Norfolk, after diligent search, etc.
19. The Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 205, prohibited the master or
captain of any ship or vessel from importing into any port of a member state "any negro,
mulatto, or other person of colour, not being a native, a citizen, or registered seaman
of the United States, or seamen natives of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope,"
where importation of such persons was prohibited by state law. The penalty for viola-
tion was the forfeiture of $1,000 for each person of color imported in violation of state
law. Section 2 prohibited entry of a ship into any port situated in a state that prohibited
negroes, free or slave. Thus the act of Congress was as applicable to the northern
free states as to the southern slave states. If a ship made an entry in violation of the act
of the Congress the ship was subject to forfeiture to the United States Government,
with one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the ship to go to "such person or per-
sons . . .on whose information the seizure on such forfeiture shall be made."
The act provided further:
That no ship or vessel arriving in any of the said ports or places of the United
States, and having on board any negro, mulatto, or other person of colour, not
being a native, a citizen, or registered seaman of the United States, or seamen
natives of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope as aforesaid, shall be ad-
mitted to an entry. And if any such negro, mulatto, or other person of colour,
shall be landed from on board any ship or vessel, in any ports or places afore-
said, or on the coast of any state prohibiting the admission or importation, as
aforesaid, the said ship or vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, and furni-
ture, shall be forfeited to the United States, and one half of the net proceeds
of the sale on such forfeiture shall inure and be paid over to such person or per-
sons on whose information the seizure on such forfeiture shall be made.
Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, § 2, 2 Stat. 205. The fifth count in the libel, charged:
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from Venezuela to Norfolk the brig Wilson had put in at St. Thomas,
where "the crew . . .was reinforced, by the addition of . . .eighteen
seamen, principally people of colour, and all free."2  The district court
decreed that "the 31 demijohns of brandy, the 13 cases of gin, and
merchandise, according to schedule, were forfeited to the United States"
for not reporting the ship's stores to the port collector for the payment
of duties thereon;2 and that "the said brig Wilson, together with her
guns, stores, tackle, apparel, and furniture" was forfeited to the United
States for having brought persons of color into the United States.22 The
circuit court dismissed the libel charged against the brig Wilson and re-
versed so much of the decree as condemned the ship, with the award of
complete restitution of the ship with all her paraphernalia intact.23
The Marshall Court's usual mold of constitutional interpretation
[T]hat the said brig vlilson . . . had on board three persons of colour, not
being native citizens or registered seamen of the United States, or seamen,
natives of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, the admission or importa-
tion of such persons being prohibited by the laws of Virginia; and that the
said three persons of colour were landed from on board the said brig, con-
trary to the form of the act of congress, whereby the said vessel, her tackle, etc.,
had become forfeited to the United States.
The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 240 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va. 1820).
20. Id. at 241. According to depositions taken from the officers, the brig Wilson:
[T]hen sailed from St. Thomas, on an intended cruise of six months. At this
time, the crew consisted of about eighty or ninety, inclusive, and among them
were many people of colour. During the cruise, two Spanish schooners, and
one English ship, having Spanish property on board, were captured. The ship,
and one of the schooners, were sent under prize masters to Marguerita, and
the other schooner was abandoned, after some mutineers from the Wilson were
put on board. From this schooner, they took on board of the Wilson, as prize,
various articles, among them, demijohns of brandy, cases of gin, etc. The
brandy and gin, and other small articles, were added to the stock of stores for
the crew, and some of the gin was repeatedly afterwards served out to the
crew. Several days before they reached the United States, when the Wilson
was on the outer edge of the Gulf Stream, she fell in with an American
schooner, called the Wasp, bound for Baltimore, and put on board of her sev-
eral articles of merchandise, which were captured from the Spanish schooner,
and Thomas B. Grey, of the Wilson, was sent in with the goods to Baltimore.
The Wilson arrived at Norfolk, on the 27th of October, 1819, having put in to
refit, with intent to depart and resume her cruise in a short time.
Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. The decree of the district court had followed the form of the statute as
set forth in the fifth count of the libel, by finding that the persons of color were "landed
from the said brig Wilson." The circuit court showed, however, that "the forfeiture is
not incurred by a person of colour coming in as a part of a ship's crew, and going on
shore." The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 245 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va.
1820).
23. The court also determined that the captain of the brig Wilson had not violated
the revenue act by failing to report the ship's stores for the crew. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the district court's decree of forfeiture for the liquor and other stores
was reversed and restitution made, though such reversal and restitution would appear
to follow from the court's opinion. Id. at 241-42.
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was to determine an act of the Congress valid by declaring an alienation
of like powers of government from the member states. But where the
revenue act was concerned 4 the Constitution had provided for the requi-
site alienation from the states by the prohibition of state duties on im-
ports and exports.2 As the Constitution by this prohibition had promul-
gated the necessary exclusive authority in the national government to im-
pose import and export duties, the circuit court was able to move directly to
questions of interpretation and application of the act to the circumstances
of the case. Ships or vessels of war were exempt from making a report
and entry of their stores for import duties.2" The armed privateer was
held to be within the exemption, so long as not engaged in the importation
of goods or persons, and the forfeiture of the ship's liquor stores for fail-
ure to report and enter was not authorized by the statute.27
The legality of the forfeiture of the ship and her paraphernalia,
under the authority of the Act of February 28, 1803-forbidding the
importation of "negroes, mulattoes, or other persons of colour" into
ports where the importation of such persons was prohibited by state
law-moved to the crux of the difficulties the Marshall Court had with
the process of adjudication under the authority of the Constitution.2
The persons of color on board the brig Wilson were free citizens of a
24. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 627.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United
States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the
Congress.
26. And be it further enacted, That it shall not be necessary for the master,
or person having the charge or command of any ship or vessel of war, or of
any ship or vessel employed by any prince, or state, as a public packet for the
conveyance of letters and dispatches, and not permitted by the laws of such
prince or state, to be employed in the transportation of goods, wares, or mer-
chandise, in the way of trade, to make such report and entry as aforesaid.
Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 31, 1 Stat 651.
27. The Court also expressed a policy ground for its decision:
It is also an argument, which deserves consideration, that the policy of the
United States has been unfriendly to the sale, in our ports, of prizes made by
foreign privateers, on nations with whom we are at peace. Some of our
treaties contain express stipulations against it; and the course of the govern-
ment has been to prohibit the practice, even where no specific engagements
bind us to do so. Were the revenue laws, applicable to privateers, and to their
prizes and prize goods, they would give a right to introduce those goods in
opposition to the avowed and uniform policy of the government. The doctrine,
that the validity of prizes could not be adjudged in our ports, would be of little
importance, if they could be brought in and sold.
The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 242 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va. 1820)
28. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 241, 244-45 (No. 17846) (C.C.D.
Va. 1820).
THE MARSHALL COURT
foreign state. They had not been landed for importation into Virginia
and thus the act of the Congress had not been violated. Notwithstand-
ing, the circuit court made a determination of the constitutional validity
of the act prior to the judicial function of construing the statute and for-
mulating national law therefrom. In turn, the constitutional validity of
the act had to be posited upon the alienation of authority from the mem-
ber states under the Constitution. The ultimate question, therefore, was
how the court could follow this usual mode of adjudication, basing Con-
gress' authority to prohibit importation of persons of color upon the
alienation of the governmental authority from the member states.
The Constitution had denied the Congress the power to prohibit "the
Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now ex-
isting shall think proper to admit."29  This prohibition was to last for
twenty years after the adoption of the Constitution-until the year 1808.
The act of 1803 was in compliance with the limitation on Congress'
powers, having provided that the act was applicable solely as an aid to the
enforcement of a state enacted policy."0 Valid application of the act of
the Congress thus was dependent on the state act being valid. The circuit
court, Marshall presiding, faced a conflict with the usual mode of con-
stitutional adjudication by which powers in the Congress over subjects
of government policy required a prerequisite or simultaneous finding that
the subject or object of government had been alienated from the member
states. Marshall overcame this state-of-mind conflict which the court
had created for itself by giving no legal effect to the 1808 dosing date
for limitations upon Congress' powers. The importation of persons of
color limitation on Congress' otherwise exclusive powers was held to
continue subject to Congress' authority to remove it. Thus, alienation
of the states' powers to control importation of persons was avoided.
There remained, however, the supposed necessity of validation of the
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9:
The Migration or Importation of Such Persons as any of the States now exist-
ing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be im-
posed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
30. The act clearly established a national antislave policy by providing that
federal revenue officers assist in maintaining similar policies of the particular states:
And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the collectors and other
officers of the customs, and all other officers of the revenue of the United
States, in the several ports or places situated as aforesaid, to notice and be
governed by the provisions of the laws now existing, of the several states pro-
hibiting the admission or importation of any negro, mulatto, or other person
of colour, as aforesaid. And they are hereby enjoined vigilantly to carry into
effect the said laws of said states, conformably to the provisions of this act;
any law of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, § 3, 2 Stat. 206.
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federal act, with concurrent alienation of state powers. Marshall began
with the broad generalization that "the whole power of commerce" was
comprehended in the commerce clause, which thereby had removed all
the subjects of commerce from the states' police powers. "  His chief
concern was to show that the regulation of vessels and the imports of
those vessels entering American ports, whether from foreign countries
or from ports within the United States, were matters exclusively within
the authority of the national government and completely outside the
pale of the member states. The commerce clause was essential to the
nation's sovereign powers to the degree that it gave the national govern-
ment the single, unitary hand required for dealing with other nation-
states. "It will readily be admitted," Marshall commenced his teachings
on the Constitution, "that the power of the legislature of the Union, on
this subject, is derived entirely from [the commerce clause]."" He fol-
lowed with his accustomed series of rhetorical questions, appropriately
placed in a logical sequence and intermixed with conclusive declarations,
in order to leave no doubt that the writing of the Constitution required
those particular declarations that were to constitute the legal formula-
ions of the case:
What is the extent of this power to regulate commerce? Does
it not comprehend the navigation of the country? May not the
vessels, as well as the articles they bring, be regulated? Upon
what principle is it, that the ships of any foreign nation have
been forbidden, under pain of forfeiture, to enter our ports?
The authority to make such laws has never been questioned;
and yet, it can be sustained by no other clause in the constitu-
tion, than that which enables congress to regulate commerce.
If this power over vessels is not in congress, where does it re-
side? Certainly it is not annihilated; and if not, it must reside
somewhere." Does it reside in the states? No American poli-
31. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 243 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va.
1820).
32. Id. at 242.
33. The constitutional patriots-including those who became judges-were prone to
assimilate sources of power as applications of the location of sovereignty. The fact that
the Congress was constituted with powers to regulate ships and goods and passengers, as
well as the perils of navigation, would not, and actually did not, prevent the states in
their general welfare and police powers from regulating the same subjects. But in
abstract constitutional theory and structure the justices of the Marshall Court never
understood how this could be so. Powers of government had to be unitary, and all
subjects and objects of government that fell within such powers likewise had to be uni-
tary. They could exist in but one government, as if governments were like a potentate,
a sovereign. Such were the confusions derived from the abstractions of constitutional-
ism. See, e.g., BAUmR, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 1790-1860, 212-52 (1952).
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tician has ever been so extravagant as to contend for this. No
man has been wild enough to maintain, that, although the power
to regulate commerce, gives congress an unlimited power over
the cargoes, it does not enable that body to control the vehicle in
which they are imported; that, while the whole power of com-
merce is vested in congress, the state legislatures may confiscate
every vessel which enters their ports, and congress is unable
to prevent their entry.3"
Thus, Marshall turned from the substance of the statute (control
over the importation of persons) to the means used by Congress (its
powers over commerce). The commerce powers belonged exclusively to
the national government, Marshall said, and the regulation of vessels was
necessarily a part of those powers. The Congress had determined a
national policy, and in turn had selected and exercised whatever of its
delegated powers it considered the most appropriate to an effectual ex-
ecution of such policy.3" It was not the court's function to act in an ad-
visory capacity on the general meaning of Congress' powers to regulate
commerce. Congress' authority to regulate the navigation and docking
of ships, and other aspects of commerce, was the means to effectuate
a national policy to prevent the importation of persons of color. But it
did not follow that because the Congress used the various ingredients of
commerce so as to execute an antislave policy that the navigation or the
docking of ships, or regulating the importation of persons of color, were
outside the police and general welfare functions of the nation's member
states. When Marshall alienated the same or like powers and functions
of government from the member states in order to formulate the na-
tionalized law of a particular case, he intermixed an accurate construction
of the political and legal foundations of the Constitution with an abstrac-
tion about the Constitution that was erroneous in theory and impossible
of fulfillment.
Marshall assumed, at least for the sake of argument, "that a law,
forbidding a free man of any colour, to come into the United States,
would be void, and that no penalty, imposed on him by congress, could
34. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 242-43 (No. 17846) (C.C.D.
Va. 1820).
35. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), in which a national anti-
lottery policy, effectuated by the mechanics and ingredients of commerce, was validated;
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), in which a national labor-
management relation policy was validated; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941),
in which a national policy of minimum wages and hours and anti-child labor was vali-
dated. See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942).
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be enforced."36  By this, he presumed the possible judicial authority to
impose fundamental law and fundamental right limitations upon par-
ticular applications of Congress' power to regulate commerce. Marshall
apparently did not conceive of judicially-enforced limitations on Con-
gress' powers from the authority of a legal definition of what was or
was not commerce." According to his thinking, the meaning of com-
merce in terms of national power was a matter of legislative policy, not
of legal principle: "From the adoption of the constitution . . . the uni-
versal sense of America has been, that the word 'commerce,' as used in
that instrument, is to be considered a generic term, comprehending navi-
gation, or, that a control over navigation is necessarily incidental to the
power to regulate commerce."3 8  Nevertheless, Congress' authority to use
the regulation of navigation to effectuate the antislave policy would
have been valid even if the migration and importation of persons clause
had been omitted from the Constitution. The migration and importa-
tion of persons clause was construed as a limitation upon Congress' other-
wise complete and exclusive power to regulate commerce.3"
After validating the act of the Congress under the authority of the
Constitution, by limiting state authority over commerce, Marshall turned
finally to the only substantial legal question presented in the brig Wilson
case: "Is this case within the act of congress, passed the 28th of Febru-
ary 1803 ?"4' The act provided:
[N]o master or captain of any ship or vessel . . . shall import
or bring, or cause to be imported or brought, any negro, mulatto,
or other person of colour, not being a native, a citizen, or regis-
tered seaman, of the United States, or seamen natives of coun-
tries beyond the Cape of Good Hope, into any port or place of
the United States, which port or place shall be situated in any
36. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 243 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va.
1820).
37. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824), Chief Justice
Marshall discusses the nationalization of the powers of commerce:
It is the power to regulate, that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is
to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution. . . . The wisdom and the discre-
tion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that,
for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied to
secure them from their abuse. They are the restraints on which the people
must often rely solely in all representative governments.
38. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 243 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va.
1820).
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
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state, which, by law, has prohibited, or shall prohibit, the ad-
mission, or importation of such negro, mulatto, or other per-
son of colour.4 '
The crew of the Venezuelan armed privateer, many of whom were
taken on board at St. Thomas, and others from Spanish and British ships
captured as prizes on the high seas, did not come within the language of
the exemption of the act as being "seamen [who were] natives of coun-
tries beyond the Cape of Good Hope." The court had to admit that the
crew were not "natives of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope."42
But it would have constituted an unfriendly act to a foreign power, in-
deed, almost an act of war, to have enforced a forfeiture against the
armed privateer of a foreign state. Likewise it would have constituted
an unfriendly act to a foreign state, and a violation of the law of na-
tions, to have refused entry of the brig Wilson into the port of Norfolk
on account of the colored crewmen.43 Thus for reasons of sound policy,
drawn from the law of nations, the circuit court rejected the administra-
tive construction which had been given the act and reversed the forfei-
ture, thus awarding restitution of the brig Wilson to its captain.
The court's exercise of judicial discretion-in the recognition of the
law of nations as a part of the laws of the United States-did not conflict
with Congress' general policy incorporated in the act. Marshall empha-
sized that although the act was not applicable to the free negro crew
aboard the brig Wilson because it would have resulted in an unfriendly
act toward a foreign state, such an exercise of power was not necessarily
beyond the authority of the Congress."' It was the court's prerogative
41. Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 205.
42. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 244 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va.
1820). The Court found that the wording of the exemption was counterbalanced by the
language of the act which required forfeiture of the ship only "if any such negro,
mulatto, or other person of colour, shall be landed from on -board any ship, or vessel, in
any of the ports . . .or on the coast of any state prohibiting the admission or importa-
tion. . . ." Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, § 2, 2 Stat. 205. (Emphasis added.) The
Court construed this language as not applicable to the colored crewmen who came ashore
temporarily but were to leave the Virginia port with the ship.
43. It would also have conflicted with commercial treaties with foreign powers and
especially with the recent treaty between the United States and the Barbary powers.
For this reason, in the judicial construction of the act, Congress could not have intended
"to refuse an entry to a French, a Spanish, an English, or a Portugese merchant vessel,
in whose crew there was a man of colour." The Wilson v. United States, supra note 42.
44. Authority in the Congress to repeal or amend portions of existing treaties has
been recognized elsewhere. See, e.g., legal opinion of Attorney General Caleb Cushing
to Jefferson Davis, the Secretary of War (with reference to the Act of July 7, 1798, ch.
67, An Act to declare the treaties heretofore concluded with France, no longer obligatory
on the United States, 1 Stat. 578, 6 Ops. ATr'Y GENm. 291, 296-97 (1854) ; the opinion of
Mr. Justice Curtis in Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784, 785-88 (No. 13799) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 431 (1862) ; and the Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-11 (1889).
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to determine what aspects of the law of nations, being a part of the law
of the United States, constituted limitations upon Congress' powers
under the Constitution. It was held that the act of the Congress should
not be construed and enforced to have the effect of an unfriendly act,
and to be in conflict with the law of nations, "unless the words be such
as to admit of no other rational construction."4  Marshall emphasized
that Congress' powers to regulate commerce "warrants every act of na-
tional sovereignty, which any other sovereign nation may exercise over
vessels, foreign or domestic, which enter our ports."4  The power to
regulate the means of national commerce, in order to effectuate a na-
tional antislave policy, was recognized as being complete and indivisible
as that of any other nation-state. It was not subject to any constitu-
tional limitations by the powers of the member states.
In summary, the Marshall Court's mode of adjudication under the
authority of the Constitution, which recognized national authority by the
alienation of state powers, would have required the invalidation of the
act of Virginia "to prevent the migration of free negroes and mulat-
toes." Marshall avoided the result by determining that the validity of
the state act did not end with the expiration of the importation of persons
limitation on Congress' powers. By this construction, the alienation of
state powers over the subject of importation of persons was avoided."8
The existence of state powers over the subject of the importation of
negroes as slave or free persons continued, and the circuit court did not
actually stir the question of whether the continuance of state powers over
the subject was at Congress' discretion or was independent of it. The
state act then was valid because of the importation of persons limitation
45. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas. 239, 245 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va.
1820).
46. Ibid.
47. Act of Dec. 12, 1793, ch. 23, § 2, 1 Va. Stat. 239, provided:
Every master of a vessel, or other person who shall bring into'this common-
wealth by water or by land, in any vessel, 'boat, land carriage or otherwise, any
free negro or mulatto, shall forfeit and pay for every person so brought, the
penalty of one hundred pounds lawful money; one half to the commonwealth,
and the other half to the person who shall inform thereof; to be recovered in
an action in debt or information in any court of record, and the defendant in
every case shall be ruled to give special bail.
The statute was reenacted on March 2, 1819, by An act reducing into one, the several acts
concerning Slaves, Free Negroes and Mulattoes. 1 VA. Rzv. CODE OF LAws, 438, ch. 111,§ 65 (1819).
48. In the course of writing to Mr. Justice Story about the excitement over the
circuit court opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson, in Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493,
(No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823), Marshall wrote that he had purposely avoided constitu-
tional invalidity of the Virginia statute because, as he stated it: "As I am not fond of
butting against a wall in sport, I escaped on the construction of the act." Quoted in 1
WARREN, THE SUPREME CoURT IN UNITED STATES HisToRY 626 (Rev. ed. 1947).
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upon the national power. The court declared accordingly:
The language, both of the constitution and of the act of con-
gress, shows, that the forfeiture was not intended to be in-
flicted in any case but where the state law was violated ...
This is not inflicting a penalty for the violation of a state law,
but is limiting the operation of the penal law of the United
States, by a temporary demarcation given in the constitution.
The power of congress to prevent migration or importation,
was not to be exercised prior to the year 1808, on any person
whom any of the states might think proper to admit. All were
admissible who were not prohibited. It was proper, therefore,
that the act of congress should make the prohibitory act of the
state, the limit of its own operation.49
Presumably the Congress could act at any time to remove the im-
portation of persons limitation on its powers. Congress was recognized
as retaining those supreme powers of sovereignty over the means to ef-
fectuate a national antislave policy, and the court was saved from the
necessity of alienating those subjects of the national policy from the
states' police and welfare powers.
III. ELcISON v. DELIESSELINE
Elkison v. Deliesseline further illustrates the Marshall Court's use of
the commerce clause as authority for the judicial enforcement of the tra-
ditional legal principles of private rights and individual liberty."0 The
various aspects of commerce in the case were incidental to the more es-
sential legal issues of fundamental liberty. The case arose in 1823, just
prior to Gibbons v. Ogden,"' when the officialdom of Charleston, South
Carolina, seized for sale into slavery the crews of the British merchant
ships anchored in the Charleston harbor. 2  The powers of the national
government to regulate commerce were brought in issue solely because
they provided the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina with
the requisite constitutional authority for decreeing the state acts void.
The court's authority to declare the state's free negro acts void was in
turn a prerequisite to the court's exercise of its jurisdictional authority
49. The Wilson v. United States, 30 Fed. Cas., 239, 245 (No. 17846) (C.C.D. Va.
1820).
50. 8 Fed. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823).
51. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)
52. The action was taken under the act of the South Carolina legislature, Al ACT
for the better regidation and govenment of Free Negroes and Persons of Colour, and
for other pnrposes, No. 2277, 7 S.C. Stat. 461 (McCord 1840).
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to formulate the national law essential to the judicial enforcement of
private rights and personal liberty.
Elkison v. Deliesseline involved the most fundamental aspects of the
general law of England and the United States, under which the indi-
vidual's natural rights of life and liberty could not be denied except
through a court decree.5" Since enslavement and forfeiture of a free-
man conflicts with the natural rights of man, a court order decreeing the
enslavement of a free citizen could not have been based upon any ac-
ceptable legal principle. The problem had arisen when South Carolina,
by various acts of its legislature, had authorized and directed the seizure
and incarceration of free citizens of color and the sale of free citizens
of color into slavery.
South Carolina's free negro acts grew out of a near panic resulting
from the revelation of a plot for a slave uprising allegedly instigated by
a free negro carpenter named Denmark Vesey.54 Because Denmark Ve-
53. The Constitution by reference, so to speak, embodied those principles of the
common law which in turn were drawn from the fundamental documents of the consti-
tutional history of England. For a court of the United States to refuse to recognize
those basic principles of the natural rights of a free man would have constituted a
failure to recognize the Constitution of the United States. The new nation incorporated
into the legal structure (or the judicial powers) those principles of law that reflected
man's eternal quest for freedom, whether it be from his God, his state or sovereign, or
an institutionalized patriarch.
The second part of the first book of BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, titled "Of the
Rights of Persons," and especially chapter I, "Of the Absolute Rights of Individuals,"
constituted the essential authority and source for the law as formulated in Elkison 'z.
Deliesseline. Blackstone spoke of the law "Of Persons" as connoting that ". . . the
principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute
rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature. . . . Hence it
follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate those
absolute rights of individuals." BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES Bk. 1, 1 124. The primary
articles or branches of absolute rights were "the right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty, and the right of private property." Id. at 1 129. In "the language of
the great charter . . . no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, but by the lawful
judgment of his equals, or by the law of the land." Id. at 1 135. In addition to the
enactment of the great charter, 25 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1297) the petition of right, 3 Car. 1,
c. 1 (1627) provided that "no freeman shall 'be imprisoned or detained without cause
shewn, to which he may make answer according to law." By 16 Car. 1, c. 10 (1640)
and 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679) the habeas corpus act which Blackstone referred to as "that
second magn u carta, and a stable bulwark of our liberties" the prisoner was entitled, as
a matter of absolute right to review of his detention in order that no one be detained
in prison except in compliance with law. BLACKSTONE'S COmMENTARIES Bk. 1, 1111 135-38.
54. See APTHEKER, A ERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS 268 (1943) ; CARROLL, SLAVE
INSURRECTIONS IN THE UNITFI STATES 1800-1865 12 (1938). The Denmark Vesey re-
volt had been well organized; the plan was for a Sunday insurrection on July 14, 1822.
The arsenal and guardhouse were to be seized, Charleston was to be burned and white
citizens were to be shot on sight, as were negroes who did not participate in the uprising.
The negroes who informed were to be sought out and shot. Following annihilation of
the white population, Vesey and his leaders planned to seize enough ships standing in
the harbor to escape to asylum in Santo Domingo. Available statistics show that the
population of the Charleston district in 1820 consisted approximately of 106,616 persons,
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sey was a free negro and was not a native of South Carolina, it was
apparently assumed that any person having the status of a free negro
endangered the security of the white citizens of the state. The security
of white citizens living in and around Charleston was thought to be en-
dangered most of all by the entry of free negroes on board trading
ships." The act of the state, "for the better regulation and government
of free negroes and persons of color," sought to effectuate a statutory
prohibition against the entry of free negroes into the state, whether for
a temporary stay as a member of a ship's crew or for permanent resi-
dence." Negroes and presumably all persons of color employed on ships
of which 82,899 were negroes and the population of the city proper was 24,780, of which
15,750 were negroes.
When information of the planned uprising of the negro population had been re-
ceived, a special court of two magistrates and five freeholders sat in secret proceedings
for several weeks. At the close of the proceedings in August, 1822, a total of 131
negroes had suffered arrest as participants in the planning of the uprising; of these,
35 were executed and 32 were deported. See MORGAN, JUSTIc E WILLIAM JOHNsON 126-
46 (1954); HENRY, THE POLICE CONTROL OF THE SLAVE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 148-54
(1914); Lofton, Demnark Vesey's Call to Armns, 33 J. NEGRO HIsToRY 395 (1948);
Phillips, The Slave Labor Problem in the Charleston District, 22 POL. Sci. Q. 416, 429-
33 (1907).
55. In the fall of 1822, just after the trials following the Vesey plot, white resi-
dents of Charleston humbly memorialized the legislature of South Carolina:
To send out of our state, never again to return, all free persons of color....
They form a third class in our society, enjoying more privileges than slaves,
and yet possessing few of the rights of the master; a class of persons having
and exercising the power of moving unrestrained over every part of the State;
of acquiring property, of amassing wealth to an unlimited extent, of procuring
information on every subject, and of uniting themselves in associations or so-
cieties-yet still a class, deprived of all political rights, subjected equally with
slaves to the police regulations for persons of color, and sensible that by no
peaceable and legal methods can they render themselves other than a degraded
class in your society. Thus it appears that they have sufficient of liberty to
appreciate the blessings of freedom; and are sufficiently shackled to be sensible
they enjoy comparatively few of those blessings.
II DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCmTY 105-06 (1907). Because
freed persons of color threatened the security of the institution of slavery, it was held
by the white citizens that "the residence of free negroes among us, is pregnant with evils,
evils arising from the influence which the existence of such a class of persons must have
upon our slave system," and because "the existence of this class among us, is in the
highest degree detrimental to our safety," id. at 108, the white citizens ("however pain-
ful it may prove to sacrifice feeling to reason, and mistaken compassion to stern policy,"
id. at 110) nevertheless humbly memorialized the legislature to "expel from our terri-
tory every free person of color, that we may extinguish at once every gleam of hope
which slaves may indulge of ever being free-and that we may proceed to govern them
on the only principle that can maintain slavery, the 'principle of fear.'" Id. at 110. The
memorialists also recommended that free persons of color be prohibited from owning
property in order that they would not become rich, buy plantations, and harbor slaves,
runaways from their masters. The legislature was asked to prohibit the education of
all persons of color, and to prohibit the masters of slaves from teaching them to read
and write. Id. at 114-15. See Phillips, The Slave Labor Problem in the Charleston Dis-
trict, 22 POL. Scr. Q. 416, 432 (1907).
56. The essence of the statute in issue was contained in the third section:
That if any vessel shall come into any port or harbour of this State, from any
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were subject to seizure and confinement in jail during the period the ship
was in the harbor.57 When the ship was readied for sail the captain was
required to make restitution for the expense involved in the seizure and
detention of his crew. If he failed to pay the expense for the seizure
and detention of his crew, the captain was subject to indictment and up-
on conviction to fine and imprisonment. The free negroes or persons of
color who had been seized from the ship's crew were "deemed and taken
as absolute slaves," without a trial or a scintilla of due process.
State officials understandably approached, with some hesitation, the
complete enforcement of such an extreme statute."8 In order to over-
other State or foreign port, having on board any free negroes or persons of
color, as cooks, stewards, or mariners, or in any other employment on board of
said vessel, such free negroes or persons of color shall be liable to be seized and
confined in gaol until said vessel shall clear out and depart from this State;
and that when said vessel is ready to sail, the captain of said vessel shall be
bound to carry away the said free negro or free person of color, and to pay the
expenses of his detention; and in case of his neglect or refusal so to do, he
shall 'be liable to be indicted, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined in a sum
not less than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not less than two months;
and such free negroes or persons of color shall be deemed and taken as abso-
lute slaves, and sold in conformity to the provisions of the Act passed on the
twentieth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and twenty, aforesaid.
Act of Dec. 21, 1822, No. 2277, 7 S.C. Stat 461, (McCord 1840).
57. Justice Johnson made pointed comments about the applicability of the statute
to free negroes or persons of color:
[I]f this state can prohibit Great Britain from employing her colored subjects
(and she has them of all colors on the globe), or if at liberty to prohibit the
employment of her subjects of the African race, why not prohibit her from
using those of Irish or of Scottish nativity? If the color of his skin is to
preclude the Lascar or the Sierra Leone seaman, why not the color of his eye
or his hair exclude from our ports the inhabitants of her other territories? In
fact it amounts to the assertion of the power to exclude the seamen of the terri-
tories of Great Britain, or any other nation, altogether. With regard to various
friendly nations it amounts to an actual exclusion in its present form. Why
may not the shipping of Morocco or of Algiers cover the commerce of France
with this country, even at the present crisis? Their seamen are all colored, and
even the state of Massachusetts might lately, and may perhaps now, expedite to
this port a vessel with her officers black, and her crew composed of Nantucket
Indians, known to be among the best seamen in our service. These might all
become slaves under this act.
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 494-95 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823).
58. Soon after the act was passed, free colored crewmen were taken from ships
standing in the waters of Charleston and held in jail. The captain of one of the Ameri-
can ships petitioned the state courts for a writ of habeas corpus for his crew held injail on the ground that the act of December, 1820, violated the Constitution of the
United States. The state courts upheld the validity of the act and refused the writ.
The masters of several American ships memorialized the Congress unsuccessfully for
relief. See Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, r822-
-r848, 1 J. SOUTHERN HISToRY 3, 4 (1935).
In January, 1823, the mate and four crewmen were removed from a British ship
and confined in jail. This seizure Justice Johnson said was "very remarkable for not
having left a single man on board the vessel to guard her in the captain's absence." Elki-
son v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823). The captain of the
British ship secured release of his crewmen from the Charleston jail with great diffi-
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come the official reluctance a private group known as the South Carolina
Association was formed in order to effectuate the more vigorous enforce-
culty and only upon payment of the expenses caused the state -by the confinement.
Hamer, supra at 4, n.6. Justice Johnson referred to the fact that applications for habeas
corpus were immediately made to him by the captains of American and British ships
"for the protection of the United States authority, in consequence of which I called
upon the [U.S.] district attorney for his official services." Elkison v. Deliesseline, supra.
Johnson instructed the district attorney to bring the matter to the attenion of the state
judiciary:
Whether I possessed the power or not to issue the writ of habeas corpus, it was
unquestionable that the state judges could give this summary relief, and I
therefore instructed Mr. Gladsden to make application to the state authorities,
and to do it in the manner most respectful to them. . . . The application was
made to the state authority, and the men were relieved; but the ground of
relief not being in its nature general or permanent, Mr. Moody [the British
counsul at Charleston] made his representations to Mr. Canning [the British
ambassador at Washington] and the northern captains . . . did the same to
congress, or to the executive.
Elkison v. Deliesseline, supra at 494.
President Monroe referred the question of constitutional structure to the Attorney
General of the United States, Mr. William Wirt. The opinion of the Attorney General
was handed down on May 8, 1824, some months after Justice Johnson's opinion in
Elhison v. Deliesseline in August, 1823. While Mr. Wirt made no reference to Justice
Johnson's decree he nevertheless followed closely the latter's reasoning and analysis as to
the basis for the opinion that § 3 of the South Carolina free negro act was constitu-
tionally null and void, and thus should not be given effect by the national government
in its foreign relations:
By the national constitution, the power of regulating commerce with foreign
nations and among the States is given to Congress; and this power is, from its
nature, exclusive. This power of regulating commerce, is the power of pre-
scribing the terms on which the intercourse between foreign nations and the
United States, and between the several States of the Union, should be carried on.
Congress has exercised this power; and among those terms there is no requisi-
tion that the vessels which are permitted to enter the ports of the several States
shall be navigated wholly by white men. All foreign and domestic vessels com-
plying with the requisitions prescribed by Congress have a right to enter any port
of the United States, and a right to remain there, unmolested in vessel or crew,
for the peaceful purposes of commerce. No State can interdict a vessel which
is about to enter her ports in conformity with the laws of the United States;
nor impose any restraint or embarrassment on such vessel, in consequence of
her having entered in conformity with those laws. For the regulations of
Congress on this subject being both supreme and exclusive, no State can add
to them, vary them, obstruct them, or touch the subject in any shape what-
ever, without the concurrence and sanction of Congress. By the regulations
of Congress, vessels navigated by black or colored men may enter any port
of the Union for the purposes of commerce, without any molestation or re-
straint in consequence of having so entered; but the section of the law of
South Carolina which we are considering . . . is a regulation of commerce, of
a highly penal character, by a State, superadding new restrictions to those
which have been imposed by Congress; and declaring, in effect, that what
Congress has ordained may be freely and safely done, shall not be done but
under heavy penalties.
It seems very clear . . . that this section of the law of South Carolina
is incompatible with the national constitution and the laws passed under it,
and is, therefore, void. All nations in amity with the United States have a
right to enter the ports of the Union for the purposes of commerce. . . . And
inasmuch as this section of the law of South Carolina is a restriction upon
this commerce, it is incompatible with the rights of all nations which are in
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ment of the free negro acts."0 The sheriff accompanied various members
of the South Carolina Association in the forcible entry on board trading
ships standing in the harbor, including the British ship Homer, and seized
and incarcerated all members of the crews.
The captain of the British ship Homer retained counsel to secure the
release of Elkison, a person of color and a member of the crew, who had
been forcibly seized on board his ship and confined in jail. According to
the shipping articles, Elkison was born in Jamaica and was a free British
national residing in Liverpool, England, the ship's sailing port."0 In
order to secure Elkison's release from the state jail under the laws of the
United States, counsel applied to Mr. Justice Johnson in the circuit court
for a writ of habeas corpus and, in the alternative, for a writ de ho mine
replegiando.0' Counsel alleged that the administrative enforcement of
amity with the United States.
1 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 659-61 (1824).
Mr. Wirt stated that in his view the act of South Carolina also was in conflict with
the treaty-making power of the national government and with the treaty then in use
between England and the United States:
By the national constitution, the power of making treaties with foreign na-
tions is given to the general government: and the same constitution declares
that all the treaties so made shall constitute a part of the law of the land ...
We have treaties subsisting with various nations, by which the commerce of
-such nations with the United States is expressly authorized, without any re-
striction as to the color of the crews by which it shall be carried on. We have
such a treaty with Great Britain, as to which nation this question has arisen.
This act of South Carolina forbids (or, what is the same thing, punishes)
what this treaty authorizes.
Id. at 661. Therefore the act of South Carolina was void "as being against the consti-
tution, treaties, and laws of the United States, and incompatible with the rights of all
nations in amity with the United States." Ibid.
59. See MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 197 (1954). Justice Johnson stated
in a letter to John Quincy Adams, dated July 3, 1824, that there existed a South Carolina
Association that pressed for the enactment of these laws and was providing for their
enforcement. House Committee on Commerce, Free Colored Seamen, H.R. REP. No. 80,
27th Cong., 3d Sess. 14-15 (1843).
60. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823).
61. The slavish effort of the present day to make remedy as well as substance
matters of federal question, and the effort to build a workable legal structure upon the
case of Erie R.R. v. Tompklns, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), has tended to becloud an under-
standing of the sources for the remedial processes in the beginnings of the Supreme
Court and the inferior federal courts. Initially, the common law provided much of the
source for the courts' lawmaking authority. Following the English example, habeas
corpus was both a remedy within the inherent powers of the courts and part of the
basic rights of every American. Much of the Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
1 Stat. 73, reflected the common law, recognizing that the courts would turn to the com-
mon law for the law of the United States. The "all writs" section of the act provided:
That all the before mentioned courts of the United States, shall have power to
issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially pro-
vided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respec-
tive jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that
either of the justices of the Supreme Court, as well as judges of the district
courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of an
enquiry into the cause of commitment.
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South Carolina's seamen acts violated Elkison's basic and fundamental
rights under the laws of the United States. He argued that the state's
abridgment of those basic rights necessitated the formulation of the law
of the United States for which the writ of habeas corpus was sought. But
according to the Marshall Court's theory of absolute division of powers,
constitutional invalidation of the state acts had to precede the judicial
enforcement of the national law for preserving personal liberty through
the judicial prerogative. The state law was null and void, counsel argued,
for it was in direct conflict with powers of the Congress to regulate com-
merce, and specifically with the commercial agreement treaty of 1815
between the United States and Great Britain.62 Thus, according to the
Acts of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82.
At this point, however, the Congress, in order to placate Richard Henry Lee and
his colleagues, who embraced the states' rights-independent sovereignty political phi-
losophy, placed some limitations upon the common law sources of law. The Congress
enacted a proviso restricting the jurisdiction of the courts in habeas corpus to the re-
view of detention by the national government. The proviso stated: "That writs of
habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in cus-
tody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for
trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify."
Ibid.
The writ de homine replegiando is described in BLACK TONE'S COMMENTAMES, Bk.
3, 11[1 128-29, as one of the legal means "of removing the actual injury of false imprison-
ment. . . . The writ de hombre replegiando lies to replevy a man out of prison or out of
the custody of any private person (in the same manner that chattels taken in distress
may be replevied . . .) upon giving security to the sheriff that the man shall be forth-
coming to answer any charge against him." Blackstone noted that because the writ
de howhne replegiando was guarded with so many exceptions, especially where the crown
was concerned, it became ineffectual for the granting of complete relief for the release
of persons illegally detained. But see FiTz-HERBERT'S NATURA BRnvium 11 66-68 (1755).
In England, the writ de homine replegiando had been superceded to a large extent by the
various forms of the writ of habeas corpus. But the writ de homine replegiando was
revived in the United States for use in fugitive slave cases, and in cases in which the
writ of habeas corpus was not available for reasons similar to that created by the pro-
viso in § 14 of the Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 82. See 1 KENT'S
COMMENTARIES ff 404 at 474, n. (d).
62. In support of his demand of the protection of the laws of the United States,
counsel for Elkison presented the court with a copy of a letter of June 17, 1823, from
Mr. John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State under President Monroe, written to Mr.
Stratford Canning, His Majesty's minister to the United States, in answer to Mr.
Canning's remonstrance against the South Carolina's seizure of British subjects from
British ships. Mr. Adams wrote with undue confidence: "With reference to your letter
of the 15th February last, and its enclosure, I have the honor of informing you that
immediately after its reception measures were taken by the government of the United
States for effecting the removal of the cause of complaint set forth in it, which, it is
not doubted, have been successful, and will prevent the recurrence of it in the future."
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823). Apparently,
the Adams letter was "considered 'by the counsel [sic] as a pledge, which this court is
supposed bound to redeem." Ibid.
It may be surmised that Mr. Adams had communicated with the South Carolina
delegation in the House of Representatives, consisting of Messrs. Joel R. Poinsett (an
intimate of Justice Johnson) and James Hamilton, and had received from those gentle-
men what Secretary Adams took to be a pledge that the free negro act would not be
enforced against foreign ships in the harbor. This had been the attack Justice Johnson
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usual mold of adjudication, once the legal authority had been formulated
to declare the state law null and void, the case would become an action
in habeas corpus to secure the release of a freeman who was confined in
the state jail in violation of his basic rights under the laws of the United
States.
The South Carolina Association was represented by counsel as the
apparent party in interest in defense of the sheriff's authority. Counsel
for the Association questioned the court's jurisdictional authority to ap-
ply the laws of the United States in an action of habeas corpus initiated
by a complainant held in jail by one of the nation's sovereign states.
Counsel adopted the basis of the states' rights theories-that the powers
of the nation's member states continued to be unlimited under the Con-
stitution to the same extent as under the Articles of Confederation."
The powers of the member states collectively embodied the nation's
sovereignty.6" The enforcement of South Carolina's free negro acts was
had taken in the previous summer because "the act had been passed hastily, and without
due consideration." Also Justice Johnson had relied upon Thomas Bennett, the Governor
of South Carolina, and Johnson's friend and brother-in-law, to act propitiously in the
circumstances. Counsel for the South Carolina Association, Messrs. I. E. Holmes and
B. F. Hunt, who also represented what was assumed to be the state's interest in the case,
had also been in contact with South Carolina's Representative Hamilton, and they stated
that they were authorized to deny that "Mr. Adams was sanctioned by anything that
transpired between himself and any member of the state delegation to give such a
pledge." Elkison v. Deliesseline, supra at 494.
Justice Johnson intimated that he had reliable information as to what had trans-
pired between Mr. Adams and the South Carolina delegation in the Congress but that
he did not think it proper to rely upon it. In answer to the Association's counsel, John-
son noted that thereafter the state had not enforced the act and that the state was not
represented by the attorney general in the case, intimating that the enforcement of the
act had been taken up by the Association. Thus Johnson stated "that pressing the ex-
ecution of the law at this time is rather a private than a state act." Ibid. But Johnson
realized that he could not take judicial notice of the letter of Secretary Adams to fr.
Canning, because the letter could not be taken as the kind of an official act of the
United States that was subject to judicial enforcement. See also MORGAN, JUSTICE WIL-
LIAM JOHNSON 193 (1954); Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro
Seamen Acts, 1822-1848, 1 J. SOUTHERN HISTORY 4 (1935).
63. See BAUER, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1790-1860, 168-207 (1952);
Tucym, View of the Constitution of the United States, in BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES,
Bk. 1, App. D, at 140-377 (Tucker ed. 1803). According to St. George Tucker the
Constitution created a federal compact-in effect a treaty, a contract, or alliance be-
tween independent, sovereign states who retained their sovereignty and independence.
Id. at 141.
64. In his law lectures given at the College of William and Mary, Mr. St. George
Tucker discussed the supremacy of collective state sovereignty vis-A-vis the national
government: "[I]t is . . . a maxim of political law, that sovereign states cannot be
deprived of any of their rights by implication; nor in any manner whatsoever but by
their own voluntary consent, or by submission to a conqueror." Id. at 143. The national
government was viewed as an agent of the sovereign states. "The federal government
then," Tucker lectured,
[A]ppears to be the organ through which the united republic communicate with
foreign nations, and with each other. Their submission to its operation is volun-
tary: its councils, its engagements, its authority are theirs, modified, and
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authorized in the unlimited police powers reserved in one of the nation's
member states. The reserved powers of the member states were those
powers not alienated to the national government by the adoption of the
Constitution. By authority of its reserved powers, South Carolina had
retained complete and unlimited powers over its own internal security."5
united. Its sovereignty is an emanation from theirs, not a flame by which
they have been consumed, nor a vortex in which they are swallowed up. Each
is still a perfect state, still sovereign, still independent, and still capable, should
the occasion require, to resume the exercise of its functions, as such, in the
most unlimited extent.
Id. at 187.
65. Mr. St. George Tucker saw the Constitution as having created "a confederate,
or federal, republic, [which] was probably borrowed from Montesquieu, who treats of
it as an expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling in-
ternal freedom with external security. . . ." TUcKER, View of the ConStitution of
the United States, in BLACKSTONe'S CommENTAnas, Bk. 1, App. D, at 140 (Tucker
ed. 1803). Mr. Tucker believed the Constitution to be only an extension of the Articles
of Confederation:
[I]t was said that the principles of the . . . constitution were to be considered
less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of the principles contained in the
articles of confederation; that in the latter those principles were so feeble and
confined, as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which had been urged
against it; that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are
limited, and the states, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of
their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. This construction has since been
fully confirmed by the twelfth article of amendments, [sic, the tenth article]
which declares, "that the powers not delegated to the United States by the con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively,
or to the people." This article was added "to prevent misconstruction or abuse"
of the powers granted by the constitution, rather than supposed necessary to
explain and secure the rights of the states, or of the people. The powers dele-
gated to the federal government being all positive, and enumerated, according to
the rules of construction, whatever is not enumerated is retained; for, expressim
facit tacere taciturn is a maxim in all cases of construction: it is likewise a
maxim of political law, that sovereign states cannot be deprived of any of their
rights by implication; nor in any manner whatever but by their voluntary
consent, or by submission to a conqueror.
Id. at 142-43.
It was assumed by counsel for the South Carolina Association that the court's law-
making functions through the process of adjudication were limited to the powers granted
in the Constitution, and that the powers of government in the member states lay "out-
side the constitution" and thus outside the jurisdictional authority and control of the
laws formulated by the court. The notion of the independence of the collective sov-
ereignty of the member states was the foundation of the inferential assumption as to
the restrictive limits of the court's law-formulation role. This was an invalid assump-
tion. It was the function of the Congress, and not of the national courts, to make the
initial determination of the constitutional powers of the national government, with
reference to the needs which called those powers into legislative exercise. Jefferson
was only partially right, however, when he said it was the business of each branch of
the government to determine its constitutional powers. It was finally within the judicial
powers created in the Constitution and by the creation of the Supreme Court-except
perhaps as limited by the Congress-for the Court to formulate the law of the United
States. The procedure of the common law was the means by which the Court adjudi-
cated cases presented to it for the formulation of legal principles. Since these legal
principles were based upon natural reason, which was developed and expounded from the
collective wisdom gained from the experience of mankind, the common law contained
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This concept of reserved powers had an eleventh amendment effect, i.e.,
removal of the state from the jurisdiction of a court of the national
government in a case based upon habeas corpus.
Mr. Justice Johnson thought the form-of-government arguments of
the South Carolina Association to be a complete rejection of the Constitu-
tion, "a direct attack upon the sovereignty of the United States" and, if
accepted, would lead "to a dissolution of the Union."6  He summarized
the arguments of the Association's counsel as contending: "South Caro-
lina was a sovereign state when she adopted the constitution; . . . South
Carolina, therefore, either did not surrender this right, or still possesse[d]
the power to resume it, and whether it is necessary, or when it is neces-
sary to, resume it, she [was] herself the sovereign judge. 6 7
Johnson formulated the law of the United States as constituting a
prohibition upon the state's effort to exercise the powers of government
that the Constitution had made exclusive in the general government.
Recognition of powers in the national government was thought to re-
quire the alienation of state powers to the degree that the national powers
were to be extended over the subject matter of the case. In order to give
adherence to the fundamental legal principles of the basic rights of a free
citizen, universally recognized in the remedy of habeas corpus, the court
first had to declare:
. . .[that] the right of the general government to regulate
commerce with the sister states and foreign nations is a para-
mount and exclusive right; and this conclusion we arrive at,
whether we examine it with reference to the words of the con-
stitution, or the nature of the grant. That this has been the
received and universal construction from the first day of the
the duo-quality of "positive" law and "higher" law. A court created in the tradition of
Coke and Blackstone was not limited by the words of the Constitution in the formulation
of the law of the United States. The "higher" law quality of legal principles formu-
lated by the Court bound the states as the law of the national government unless and
until changed by the Congress.
66. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 494 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823).
According to Justice Johnson, Mr. Isaac E. Holmes, counsel for the South Carolina
Association, argued that as a sovereign state, South Carolina could not give over its
powers of self-preservation to the national government. Mr. Holmes concluded his
argument with the declaration that he preferred a dissolution of the Union to the state's
surrender of powers which he thought were necessary for self-preservation. This sug-
gestion so shocked Justice Johnson that, as he later described it: "Everyone saw me
lay down my pen, raise my eyes from my notes, and fix them on the speaker's face. He
still proceeded, and in a style which bore evidence of preparation and study." Quoted
in MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 193-94 (1954), from "Letter signed 'William
Johnson,' dated Aug. 20, 1823, in the Charleston Mercury, Aug. 21, 1823." See also the
reference in Johnson's opinion, Elldson v. Deliesseline, supra.
67. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 494 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823).
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organization of the general government is unquestionable; and
the right admits not of a question any more than the fact....
It is true that . . . [the constitution] contains no prohibition
on the states to regulate foreign commerce. Nor was such a
prohibition necessary, for the words of the grant sweep away
the whole subject, and leave nothing for the states to act upon.
Wherever this is the case, there is no prohibitory clause inter-
posed in the constitution. Thus, the states are not prohibited
from regulating the value of foreign coins or fixing a standard
of weights and measures, for the very words imply a total, un-
limited grant. The words in the present case are, "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes." If congress can regulate com-
merce, what commerce can it not regulate? And the navigation
of ships has always been held, by all nations, to appertain to
commercial regulations.8
The court's authority had to be grounded in the satisfying formal-
ism that the Constitution, as the fundamental law, required the declara-
tion that the act of the state was null and void.69 An acceptable jurisdic-
tional authority was thereby established for determining the legality of
the exercise of state powers over the life and liberty of a free citizen.
This final issue was determined on the basis of general legal principles
so universal that no citation was necessary. It was not legal and valid
to forfeit the liberty of a free man unless such forfeiture was in com-
pliance with a valid decree under the fundamental law of a free nation.
Thus the authority for the court's decision in Elkison v. Deliesseline came
from sources that were older and more universal, and more fundamental
than the Constitution.
"Let it be observed," Johnson wrote in his opinion,
[T]hat the law is, "if any vessel (not even the vessels of the
United States excepted) shall come into any port or harbor of
this state" . . . bringing in free colored persons, such persons
are to become "absolute slaves," and that, without even a form
68. Id. at 495
69 Professor T. R. Powell has often commented on the formalism in constitu-
tional adjudication; for example:
I think that what I most object to in many Justices is something that springs
from a feeling of judicial duty to try to make out that their conclusions come
from the Constitution. True it is that so far as state laws are involved, the
task of passing on them in the field of commerce comes from the Constitution.
The performance, however, comes mainly from the judges, and on the whole it
has created for us a fairly well balanced constitutional federalism.
POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 179 (1956).
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of trial, as I understand the act, they are to be sold. By the
next clause the sheriff is vested with absolute power, and ex-
pressly enjoined to carry the law into effect, and is to receive
the one half of the proceeds of the sale. The object of this
law . . . is to prohibit ships coming into this port employing
colored seamen, whether citizens or subjects of their own gov-
ernment or not. But if this state can prohibit Great Britain
from employing her colored subjects (and she has them of all
colors on the globe) . . . why not prohibit her from using
those of Irish or of Scottish nativity?"0
Continuing, Johnson entwined considerations of due process of law with
subjects of trade and commerce:
The offense . . . for which this individual is supposed to for-
feit his freedom, is that of coming into this port in the ship
Homer, in the capacity of a seaman. . . The seamen's of-
fense, therefore, is coming into the state in a ship or vessel ...
Now, according to the laws and treaties of the United States,
it was both lawful for this seaman to come into this port, in
this vessel, and for the captain to bring him in the capacity of
a seaman; and yet these are the very acts for which the state
law imposes these heavy penalties. Is there no clashing in this?
It is in effect a repeal of the laws of the United States, pro
tanto, converting a right into a crime.7'
No matter what the social and political tremors, the circumstances
of the case made it impossible for the court to set the case aside as being
outside its authority to formulate national law. Because the court's juris-
dictional authority was not understood to have reached directly to the
traditions and principles of the common law, it was required to engage
in the legerdemain of constitutionalism. The basic and natural rights of
free men had to be transformed from the traditional legal principles of
private and vested rights into questions of constitutional structure involv-
ing the national power to regulate commerce. The constitutional author-
ity would have come more aptly from the general law of habeas corpus,
or from the general authority of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, than from the commerce clause."2 However, in light of the
70. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 494 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823).
71. Id. at 495.
72. The national powers under habeas corpus were not made applicable to the
states until 1833 :
[E]ither of the justices of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any district court
of the United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall
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court's limited capacity to enforce its formulations of law against the
fierce powers of the member states, the due process clause was not equal
to the task of enforcing the national law against the member states. A
long time was required, in the evolution of the judicial powers, before
the Supreme Court more properly determined that the state had exercised
its powers of government in such an extreme manner that its action
violated basic rights of personal liberty. The due process and other bill
of rights clauses were then used as the more appropriate authority for the
formulation of national law in the nationalization of private rights and
personal liberty. Before substantive due process and other bill of rights
clauses were used, the commerce clause constituted an appropriate source
of judicial authority for the enforcement of personal liberty and private
rights.
But after such an adjudication under the commerce clause, the prin-
ciples of basic rights had too limited an application, because those basic
rights were limited to circumstances containing elements of commerce, as
ships, navigation, and the like. On the other hand, the limitations on
state powers which did arise out of the commerce clause-formulated as
legal principles-were too broadly drawn and were never capable of ap-
plication as formulated. South Carolina and other states out of neces-
sity continued to regulate pilots and the navigation of ships in their-
harbors as well as numerous other aspects of foreign and domestic com-
merce.73 Thus, it was more than a little confusing for the court in Elki-
son v. Deliesseline to be first required to determine that state powers were
withdrawn from regulating the elements of commerce, before the court
was able to exercise its jurisdictional authority over habeas corpus in re-
view of the legality of Elkison's detention in a state jail.
The courts of the United States were also subject to inappropriate
legislative limitations in the use of their inherent judicial authority to
issue the remedy of habeas corpus. In its early history the Supreme Court
and the other federal courts exercised an independent discretion to deter-
mine the law of the Constitution as the law of the United States. For
jurisdictional authority to formulate the appropriate remedy, the courts
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or
prisoners, in jail or confinement, where he or they shall be committed or con-
fined on, or by any authority or law, for any act done, or omitted to be done,
in pursuance of the law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree,
of any judge or court thereof, anything in any act of Congress to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 52, § 7, 4 Stat. 634. The Bill of Rights was determined not to
be applicable to the states in Barran v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
73. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
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generally relied on the Judiciary Act of 1789."4 In practice, some of the
justices considered that jurisdictional authority over the appropriate
remedy was derived solely from acts of the Congress."M In consequence,
the independent authority for the formulation of substantive law and the
statutory authority for formulating the appropriate remedy required the
federal courts to consider their jurisdiction to determine the law of the
United States as being separate from their jurisdiction to select the ap-
propriate remedy. In those cases in which a court determined the sub-
stantive law without jurisdictional authority over the appropriate remedy
it engaged in a process which was only advisory.
Understandably, Mr. Justice Johnson was aggrieved by the end re-
sult of his judicial performance in Elkison. The British national Elki-
son had basic rights under the law of the United States, which had been
abridged by the South Carolina Association in administering the ap-
parent authority of the state. The remedy to which Elkison was entitled
was freedom by removing him from the state jail. But this remedy to
which Elldson was entitled was not possible because Congress by the
Judiciary Act had withdrawn the judicial authority to remove a prisoner
illegally confined in a state jail. The circuit court had been denied its
74. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. By this act the Supreme Court was
composed of a chief justice and five associate justices, § 1; thirteen district courts were
created, §§ 2, 3; three circuit courts were created, each to consist of two justices of
the Supreme Court and one district judge, §§ 4, 5; the district courts were granted ex-
clusive jurisdiction over minor crimes cognizable under the authority of the United
States and over admiralty and maritime, and were also granted concurrent jurisdiction
with the states and circuit courts over other matters, §§ 9, 10; the circuit court was
granted general diversity and criminal jurisdiction, §§ 11, 12; the Supreme Court was
granted exclusive jurisdiction in accord with Article III of the Constitution, appellate
jurisdiction from the district and circuit courts, and appellate jurisdiction from the final
judgment or decree from a state court, §§ 13, 25. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 4-30 (1928).
The judiciary Act of 1789 was created out of a severe conflict in constitutional
theory. The states' rightists attempted to rewrite the Constitution and revert to a con-
federation in which the judicial power enunciated in Article III would be controlled and
administered by the judiciary of the respective states, subject to ultimate review in the
Supreme Court. It has been said about the act that it was "the most important and the
most satisfactory act ever passed by Congress" and that "the wisdom and forethought
with which it was drawn have been the admiration of succeeding generations." Mr.
Justice Brown in his address before the American Bar Ass'n, Aug. 20, 1911, and Mr.
Justice Miller in United Statesv. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 414 (1865), quoted
in Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L.
REv. 49, 52 (1923). However, the criticisms of Attorney General Edmund Randolph in
his voluminous report made to the Congress in December of 1790, in which he recom-
mended many radical changes, presented a more accurate picture of the confusion which
existed. See 1 AMtmmCAN STATE PAPERS No. 17 (1817) ; and the urgent letter of Aug.
19, 1792, by the Jay Court to President Washington, 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS No. 32
(1817). See also, 1 CROSsNEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 610-74 (1953).
75. Cf. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HAmv. L. REv. 49, 67-69 (1923).
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independent authority to use the remedy of habeas corpus after it had
determined the illegality of the imprisonment and other denial of liberty."8
By denying the national judiciary its prerequisite authority to issue the
writ of habeas corpus, the Congress had in effect authorized the states
to violate the laws of the United States formulated from the authority
of the Constitution.
Mr. Justice Johnson was unduly helpless on the question of the
remedy, as compared with the breadth of his exercised prerogative in de-
termining the substantive law. Substantively the court had determined
that the state act was null and void and that Elkison's deprivation of
liberty was in violation of the law of the United States. "That a party
should have a right to his liberty, and no remedy to obtain it, is an ob-
vious mockery," Johnson wrote, "but it is still greater to suppose that he
can be altogether precluded from his constitutional remedy to recover his
freedom." ' The prisoner's predicament he described in light of his own
helplessness: "By giving it the form of a state prosecution the prisoner is
to be deprived of the summary interference of the United States author-
ity.. . ,.8 These circumstances made it "impossible to conceal the
hardships" of the prisoner's case or to "deny his claim to some remedy."79
Notwithstanding, Johnson justified his refusal to grant the prisoner's
sole remedy under the law of the United States with the face-saving com-
ment: "As far as congress can extend and shall extend the power to
afford relief by this writ, I trust I shall never be found backward to grant
it. At present I am satisfied that I am not vested with that power in this
cae.))80
Counsel for Elkison presented Johnson with an escape from the dif-
ficulty the court had created for itself. Counsel contended that the act
of the Congress which denied the court jurisdiction over habeas corpus
was void. The proviso of section fourteen of the Judiciary Act of
1789--"that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners
in gaol, unless where they are in custody under or by color of the author-
ity of the United States" 8 -- was said to conflict with the prohibition in
the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
76. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 497 (No. 4366) (C.C.D. S.C. 1823).
77. Id. at 496.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Id. at 497.
81. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73.
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safety may require it." 2  The constitutional provision contemplated a
general application of habeas corpus, not a limited, restrictive application
resulting in a substantial suspension of the writ.
Johnson, however, did not consider the point. First, he assumed
that the constitutional authority over judicial remedies was to be found
in the powers delegated to the Congress. To Johnson this meant that a
court of the United States was restricted to the Judiciary Act and to
other acts of the Congress for its authority to select and use an appro-
priate remedy to enforce its formulations of substantive law. Johnson
did not comprehend that the Congress was able to deny basic and fun-
damental rights under the language and spirit of the Constitution in enact-
ments having to do with legal remedies."3 A general practice of looking
to an act of the Congress for the selection of an appropriate judicial
remedy did not mean to Johnson that the court was thereby restricted in
its jurisdictional authority. The practice could not result in a denial of
the constitutional judicial prerogative to enforce basic and fundamental
rights.
82. U.S. Co.Nsr. art. I, § 9. Habeas corpus was considered as basic and funda-
mental as trial by jury, and so commonly accepted that there was no necessity of af fir-
mation in the Bill of Rights. Professor Chafee has written about the historic writ as
the most important human right in the Constitution:
The most important human rights provision in the Constitution, as I look at it,
is in Article I, section 9. . . . Perhaps Dr. Johnson went too far in telling
Boswell, "The Habeas Corpus is the single advantage our government has over
that of other countries." [Boswell's Life of Johnson, narrative for Sept. 1769].
Still, such great liberties as worship and speech will go on somehow, despite
laws, but not the liberty of person. Censorship can be evaded; prosecutions
against ideas may break down; a prison is there. Only habeas corpus can pene-
trate it. When imprisonment is possible without explanation or redress, every
form of liberty is impaired. A man in jail cannot go to church or discuss or
publish or assemble or enjoy property or go to the polls.
Chafee, The Ml1ost Important Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. Rav. 143 (1952). See
also 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 625 (1953), for the view that in terms of constitutional theory and structure,
Article I, § 9 contemplated the existing common law as the national law on the subject.
The provision recognized the writ as a basic right of national law, not to be suspended-
even partially--except "in cases of rebellion or invasion" and only then "when the public
safety may require it." The restrictive proviso of § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
withdrawing federal jurisdiction when the prisoner was held by state courts, was in
violation of the Constitution. Section 14 was enacted under the erroneous principle,
later enunciated in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1832), that the Supreme
Court's lawmaking functions under the Bill of Rights were not nationalized to the extent
of enforcing limitations upon the states.
83. Johnson's difficulties with this problem exemplified the existing confusion over
the characteristics and role of the independent judiciary, and over the relationship of the
judiciary to the powers of the Congress to create the courts and to provide for judicial
enforcement of the policies of government. Also involved were the various conflicting
theories about the character of the national government created under the written Con-
stitution. For example, Justice Johnson's dissent in Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
75, 101-07 (1807), was posited upon the surprising ground that § 14 of the Judiciary Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 81, which provided that "All the before-mentioned courts
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Similarly, Mr. Justice Johnson unduly restricted the authority of the
court to review the power of the Congress to suspend the remedy of
habeas corpus. In the Constitution Congress was recognized as having
the power to suspend the remedy "when . . . the public safety may re-
quire it." 4  But this did not mean that an effort by the Congress to
suspend the remedy of habeas corpus was not subject to judicial review in
shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not
specifically provided by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law," was not
sufficient to authorize the Supreme Court to exercise its jurisdiction in habeas corpus
to review the legality of the commitment of Bollman and Swartwout for high treason
without the allowance of bail. Section 14 did not satisfy Johnson's restrictive standard
that the court possessed "no other jurisdiction or power than what is given it by the
constitution and laws of the United States, or is necessarily incident to the exercise of
those expressly given." Id. at 102. The independence of the judiciary was not of suf-
ficient concern to Justice Johnson.
However, Johnson was soon to face the injustice of so hobbling the independence of
the national courts to the Congress. In December, 1807, the Jefferson administration
secured passage of the historic Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and in
the following year the Congress authorized port collectors "to detain any vessel os-
tensibly bound with a cargo to some other port of the United States, whenever in their
opinions the intention is to violate or evade any of the provisions of the acts laying an
embargo, until the decision of the President of the United States be had thereupon."
Act of April 25, 1808, ch. 66, § 11, 2 Stat. 501. President Jefferson, in his usual ex-
uberance in matters that pertained to the powers of the presidency, issued a directive
through the Department of the Treasury that ships were to be embargoed when loaded
by cargoes "for a place where they cannot be wanted for consumption ... " Directive
quoted in MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 58 (1954).
Soon thereafter Justice Johnson entered a decree in a petition for a writ of man-
damus directing the collector of the port at Charleston to grant clearance to vessels
loaded with rice and cotton where there could be no intentions to evade the Embargo
Act, an effective invalidation of the President's order. Justice Johnson wrote that:
"The officers of our government, from the highest to the lowest, are equally subject to
legal restraint; and it is confidently believed that all of them feel themselves equally
incapable, as well from law as from inclination, to attempt an unsanctioned encroach-
ment upon individual liberty." Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 Fed. Cas. 355,
356, (No. 5420) (C.C.D. S.C. 1808).
In a letter to Justice Johnson, President Jefferson's Attorney General, Mr. Caesar
A. Rodney, attacked the exercise of general discretion by the circuit court in the use
of mandaraus without an explicit congressional authority to use the remedy in the par-
ticular statutory circumstances. Id. at 357-59. In his reply, Justice Johnson wavered
on the question of jurisdiction, stating that:
[I]t is very possible that the court may have erred in their decision. .
Though the laws had not vested the power, the submission of the officers of
government would, at least, excuse the act of the court. There never existed
a stronger case for calling for the powers of a court; and whatever censure
the executive sanction may draw upon us, nothing can deprive us of the con-
sciousness of having acted with firmness, impartiality of an honest intention
to discharge our duty.
Id. at 366. As Johnson noted, if it were true that the court were lacking in jurisdiction
to issue the writ, this did not validate the President's order which was not authorized
by the statute. Doubtless, high motives did not satisfy the President; nevertheless he
followed the suggestion of Justice Johnson and submitted to a statutory amendment
which provided for such action by the President. Act of Jan. 9, 1809, ch. 5, § 10, 2 Stat.
509.
84. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
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the process of enforcement of basic and fundamental rights. The privi-
lege of habeas corpus constituted a fundamental substantive right, in
addition to its being a judicial remedy to determine the legality of a denial
of one's liberty. 5 Therefore, Johnson's assumption that exclusive and
nonreviewable authority to suspend the remedy of habeas corpus lay in
the Congress was surprising indeed, in the face of the proviso of section
fourteen which constituted an extreme invasion of the legitimate judicial
authority of the courts of the United States, and in this case an abridg-
ment of basic rights of personal liberty.
The proviso of section fourteen of the Judiciary Act, which denied
the use of the remedy of habeas corpus in the courts of the United States
to review the legality under national law of detention in a state jail, did
not conflict with basic rights in normal circumstances. The validity un-
der the national law of detention in a state jail was generally reviewable
under section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act.8 However, Elkison v.
Deliesseline presented special circumstances in this regard. The sheriff's
execution of South Carolina's free negro acts by seizure, detention, and
sale into slavery was not subject to review in the state courts. Therefore
section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act was not available to bring the
case to the Supreme Court for review of the legality of Ellison's deten-
tion under the laws of the United States. Johnson did not comprehend
the difference between a total invalidity of the proviso in section four-
teen and a partial invalidation according to the particular circumstances.
The court should have decreed a partial invalidation, when withdrawal
of the jurisdiction in the courts of the United States to grant the remedy
of habeas corpus constituted an actual suspension of the remedy and a
denial of fundamental rights.
It was a sad ending to a great judicial performance. It was a great
judicial performance notwithstanding the confused state of the sources
for the formulation of national law. The court's jurisdictional authority
to enforce the basic rights of a free citizen had to be found in the legis-
lative powers of the Congress to regulate commerce and had to be stated
85. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807) ; Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S.(3 Cranch) 447 (1806); Chaffee, The Most Important Right in the Constitution, 32
B.U.L. REv. 143 (1952).
86. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85-86:[A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity
of a State in which a decision could be had . . . where is drawn in question
the validity of a treaty or a statute of, or an authority exercised under any
State, on ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity . . .
may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the
United States on writ of error. . -.
THE MARSHALL COURT
in the legal formalism of an absolute division of powers between the na-
tional and state govenunents. Notwithstanding such diverting com-
plexities of a written constitution, the substantive law of the United
States was formulated to secure the fundamental liberty of a free per-
son, against abridgment by one of the nation's member states.
IV. LIVINGSTON V. VAN INGEN
Robert Fulton's promotion of the steamboat brought to the Ameri-
can community more than a swift and convenient mode of transportation.
That swift and convenient mode of transportation soon out-distanced the
legal system operating under the constitutional authority of a member
state. The steamboat did not respect political boundaries, and private
rights in the use and enjoyment of the new technology could hardly be
restricted to the laws of the various states. The exciting social implica-
tions in the freedom of movement and association among the people of
the different states and foreign countries also demanded recognition.
These circumstances made it inevitable that the Supreme Court would be
called upon to formulate national law as the judicial authority for en-
forcement of private rights in the use and enjoyment of the steamboat.8"
The new nation of member states needed for its preservation a high
court as a functioning authority in the national government. But in the
historic setting under review, establishing the Supreme Court required
a long process of evolution, a conditioning process for the experiment in
representative government. The Marshall Court can be judged as hav-
ing made a significant beginning, when it is recognized that its legal
formulations were made to overcome the fierce obstacles imposed not
only by the state of mind which appeared to classify the nation's member
states as independent sovereignties, but also by the political and adminis-
trative strength of the state governments vis-A-vis a weak national govern-
ment. The legal formulations which the Marshall Court established un-
der the apparent authority of the commerce clause were not in a cardinal
sense principles of law. They were not moral-ethical guides with recog-
nizable standings of universality. They were legal formulations for
guiding power politics, and to a lesser extent perhaps for preserving the
independence of the judiciary. They were devised for a nation whose
government at the apex was notably too weak and incapacitated for its
legislative and executive regulations to bind the much stronger govern-
ments in its member states.
The industrial revolution came very late to America, but it came
with such fervor and transforming speed that it nearly overwhelmed the
87. See 4 BEVER=DE, TnE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 397-401 (1919).
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existing political and social institutions. If the steam engine did not re-
make America's social history, it thrust forward its nationalizing pro-
cesses at breakneck speed. The steam engine revolutionized transporta-
tion within the United States; moving down the great rivers from New
York to New Orleans and on tracks laid state-to-state it was no respecter
of the artificial state boundaries. Within a short span of time it was
beyond the capacity of the individual state to structuralize the manifold
problems of the new technology and the varied interest which it created
into a workable system of law. These had to be reviewed in the course
of the adjudication of private rights created by the new technology, first
under state law and then under the laws of the United States.
Some years prior to the successful operation of the steamboat the
New York legislature awarded an exclusive franchise to certain of its
promoters. The franchise granted a complete monopoly over navigation
by fire or steam on all public waters within the boundaries of the state."8
Only propulsion by the winds, which soon had no commercial significance,
remained outside the state franchise. The promoters granted this ex-
clusive franchise were Robert R. Livingston, the famed colonial patriot
and statesman,"9 and Robert Fulton, who promoted himself as an in-
88. The first such act of New York was granted to John Fitch by an act passed
on the 19th of March, 1787. 2 N.Y. Laws 472 (1886). Exclusive grants to John Fitch
in steamboat navigation were also enacted by the legislatures of Pennsylvania, March 28,
1787; New Jersey, March 18, 1786; Delaware, February 3, 1787; and Virginia, Novem-
ber 7, 1787. The various acts were substantially in the language of the Pennsylvania
statute. See WESTCo r, LiFE OF JOHN FITCH 151, 173-76 (1857).
89. Robert R. Livingston was the scion of one of New York's most distinguished
families. Educated at King's College, of the class of 1765, he began his professional
career in 1779 in partnership with John Jay as "one of the ablest of American lawyers,"
according to Jefferson. He was active in the independence movement, and served as a
delegate from New York in the Continental Congress during 1775-1776 and 1779-1781,
and in the Congress of the United States during 1784-1785. With John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson he served on the special committee appointed to draft the Declaration
of Independence, though he neither voted for nor signed the Declaration. In 1781, when
the Congress established a department of foreign affairs, Livingston was made the
secretary of that department; from this office he directed the negotiations for the
Treaty of Peace. He resigned from that office in June, 1783, because of the inadequacy
of the salary, after having submitted his resignation in the preceding December.
The greatest accomplishment of his distinguished career was his participation in the
Louisiana Purchase on May 2, 1803. According to Henry Adams, the Louisiana Pur-
chase was "the greatest diplomatic success recorded in American history." In 1804
Livingston retired to his estate, Clermont, to begin his endeavors with Robert Fulton
in promoting their steamboat franchise. Prior to his retirement from public life in
1804, Livingston also had been active in the public affairs of New York; he served as
the state's first Chancellor from 1777 to 1801, though he did not publish his decisions
and did not distinguish himself in that office; he was influential in the New York rati-
fying convention in support of the Constitution of the United States; he later became
one of the state's leading Republicans, supporting Aaron Burr for the Senate and op-
posing Hamilton's financial plans and Jay's treaty with Great Britain; and in 1795 he
ran for Governor of New York but was defeated by John Jay. From 1804 until his
death in February, 1813, Livingston was active in promoting the Livingston and Fulton
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ventor of the steamboat." In consequence, any boat propelled by fire or
steam, whether it entered the New York waters from Boston, Mobile or
Liverpool, or coastwise from New Jersey, was prohibited from navigat-
ing the public waters within New York. The Connecticut and New Jer-
sey legislatures were stirred to enact retaliatory measures, providing for
the seizure and forfeiture of boats which held an exclusive New York
franchise and which navigated in their public waters.91
A highlight of the extensive New York litigations brought to protect
the exclusive franchise was the historic case involving the Livingston
and Fulton franchise against the Van Ingen interests.92 The case is
significant in constitutional history because of the initiatory nature and
the breadth of the legal issues presented for determination. The exclu-
sive franchise raised broad politico-economic issues which were made
steamboat franchise, both in litigation and in pamphlet warfare. His political influence
helped him to secure the exclusive franchise in 1798, though he was in no position to
satisfy the conditions of the grant. While minister to France during 1801-1804 he be-
came associated with Robert Fulton in steamboat construction and later in the franchise.
See, e.g., Hayes, Robert R. Lizingston, 11 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 320
(1943).
90. Robert Fulton was a resident of Pennsylvania. His professional interests were
numerous; in the beginning he made his livelihood by painting, moving from Pennsyl-
vania to England for that purpose. Later his interests turned to civil engineering and
inventing. Soon he became interested in the steam engine for boat propulsion; he also
constructed a mechanical device to raise and lower canal boats, a machine for sawing
marble, a dredging machine with a power shovel. Then he went to France where he
engaged in submarine and torpedo construction. In October, 1802, Fulton met the United
States minister to France, the Honorable Robert R. Livingston, and entered into a legal
agreement with Livingston to construct a steamboat of twenty tons or more. Early in
1803, Fulton constructed a steamboat which broke up and sank, but later in 1803 a steam-
boat constructed by Fulton successfully navigated the Seine River.
For the purpose of complying with the New York statute Fulton came to the United
States late in 1806 to construct a steamboat which would navigate the Hudson. The
delay was caused by the time consumed in constructing a steam engine in England. On
August 17, 1807, the steamboat, the Clermont, was completed. It was 133 feet long and
was powered by a Watt steam engine installed in the forward part of the boat with the
boiler adjacent thereto, and carried two side paddle wheels, fifteen feet in diameter,
which propelled the boat. The memorable first voyage between New York City and
Albany took five days for the round trip, but the underway time was actually only
approximately sixty-two hours. The average speed for the full run was clos to five
knots.
Fulton was a prophet and an economic politician, and a leading participant in the
revolution wrought by the steamboat but he was not its inventor. He directed the at-
taching of a Watt engine, built in England, to a boat constructed by one Charles Brown,
a New York shipbuilder. In all, at least seventeen steamboats were constructed under
Fulton's direction. See DICKINSON, ROBERT FULToN-ENGINEER AND ARTIsT-HIs LIFE
AND WORKS (1913); Mitman, Robert Fulton, in 7 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
68 (1931) ; SUTCLIFFE, ROBERT FULToN AND THE CLERMONT (1909).
91. Conn. Laws, May Sess. 1822, ch. 28; Act of Jan. 25, 1811, N.J. Laws 1811, 298.
92. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns R. 507 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812). See a resum6
and delineation of the Livingston 'I. Van Ingen case in 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTIUr ION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 231-34 (1953); and in HORTON,
JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CoNSERvATISm 166-76 (1939).
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a part of the legal issues. These broader policy questions moved the
New York Court of Chancellery to turn to the legal history of other
societies for the appropriate legal principles establishing the law of the
case. The purpose of the litigation was to keep all steamboats off the
public waters of New York except those navigating under the exclusive
franchise; the bill petitioned that the Van Ingen interests be enjoined
from using "a steamboat called the Hope, in the navigation of the Hud-
son River," in contravention of the rights of Livingston and Fulton
under the exclusive franchise.9" A detailed resum6 of the background
of the Livingston and Fulton claims was given in the bill.94
The earliest statute granting the exclusive right to navigate steam-
boats on New York waters was enacted March 19, 1787, and was titled,
An Act for Granting and Securing to John Fitch, the sole right and ad-
vantage of Making and Employing, for a limited time, the Steamboat by
him lately invented.95 Mr. Fitch, who had received a similar grant in
Pennsylvania, represented to the legislature of New York that he had
"constructed an easy and expeditious method of impelling boats through
the water by the force of steam."9 In order to promote and encourage
so useful an improvement the legislature granted to Mr. Fitch, "his
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns . . . the sole and exclusive
right and privilege of constructing, making, using, employing, and navi-
gating, all and every species or kinds of boats or water craft, which may
be urged or impelled through the water by the force of fire or steam, in
all creeks, rivers, bays, and waters whatsoever, within the territory and
jurisdiction of this State, for and during the full . . . term of fourteen
years. . . ."" Anyone who transgressed these exclusive privileges
forfeited one hundred pounds for each offense, which was against "the
tenor, true intent and meaning" of the statute, and forfeited the of fend-
ing boat with the steam engine and all its appurtenances. And the subject
of both forfeitures inured to the private benefit of the holders of the
legislative franchise.99
Fitch was not a resident of New York, however, but of Bucks County,
Pennsylvania, and he lacked the organization and means to develop or de-
fend his rights in the New York franchise.99 The colonial patriot, Robert
93. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 514-15 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
94. Id. at 507-14.
95. 2 N.Y. Laws 472 (1886).
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. John Fitch was a recognized inventor and builder of steamboats. He had been
granted letters patent for the steamboat by the United States on August 26, 1791,
and by the government of France in the same year. He devoted the last thirteen years
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R. Livingston, subsequently represented to the New York legislature that
he had bestowed much time and attention on the exciting subject of ap-
plying the force of fire and steam to navigation and after a variety of
experiments had conceived a mode of applying the steam engine to navi-
gation "on new and advantageous principles." He also represented that
he was unwilling to run the risk of making a practical experiment of his
plans at great personal expense until he was encouraged to do so by an
exclusive franchise secured to him by law. The New York legislature,
on March 27, 1798, repealed the act of March 19, 1787, thereby con-
fiscating the exclusive grant made to John Fitch. The sole and exclusive
privileges for navigation by fire and steam on all the public waters with-
in the territorial jurisdiction of New York were then transferred to
Robert R. Livingston."' By subsequent statutes the exclusive rights to
steamboat navigation were extended to the joint enterprise of Robert R.
Livingston and Robert Fulton for a term of twenty years, provided with-
in two years they had propelled a boat of twenty tons capacity through
the waters of the Hudson by steam at four miles per hour.10' It was in
August, 1807, when the Clermont steamed up the Hudson from New
of his life, 1785-1798, to the building of steamboats. Previously he had been, among
other things, in the brass and silversmith business and a surveyor and map-maker of the
lands in the Northwest Territory. Fitch had secured exclusive franchises for steamboat
navigation from New Jersey in 1786, and from Pennsylvania, New York, Delaware and
Virginia in 1787. Fitch launched his first steamboat, a 45-foot boat, on August 22,
1787, on the Delaware River at Philadelphia. In July, 1788, he launched a 60-footer
which was propelled by a steam paddle wheel. With this boat he carried as many as
30 passengers between Philadelphia and Burlington, New Jersey. He built an even larger
boat which was put in regular service on the Delaware River. It was this third and
larger boat, launched in 1790, on which the letters of patent were granted. However,
Fitch's financial backers withdrew from these successful ventures, leaving Fitch stranded
in bankruptcy. He had failed, where Robert Fulton later succeeded in the promotion
of his contributions. Fitch failed to conceive of the economic costs and returns, and of
the promotional necessities, of the steamboat. The public was then apathetic about the
steamboat. Thus Fitch died in bankruptcy, after having initiated the new technology
of applying the steam engine to power mechanisms in the navigation of public waters.
See Mitman, John Fitch, in 6 DICTIONARY OF AmERICAN BIOGRAPHY 425 (1943); WEST-
COTT, LIn OF JOHN FITCH (1857).
100. Act of March 27, 1798, 4 N.Y. Laws 215 (1887). The statute noted that John
Fitch had made no attanpt to execute his plans in the ten years since he had been granted
his franchise, and then revoked the franchise. Privileges of a similar nature were
granted to Livingston for a term of twenty years, with a further important proviso:
Provided nevertheless that the said Robert shall within twelve months from the
passing of this act give such proof as shall satisfy the governor, the lieutenant
governor and the surveyor general of this State, or a majority of them of his
having built a boat of at least twenty ton's capacity, which is propelled by
steam, and the means of whose progress through the water with and against the
ordinary current of Hudson's river taken together shall not be less than four
miles an hour, and shall at no time omit for the space of one year to have a
boat of such construction plying between the cities of New York and Albany.
101. Act of April 5, 1803, 3 N.Y. Laws 323 (Webster 1802).
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York to Albany and returned."°2 The legislature's extreme pleasure at
this happy event was reflected in the act of April 11, 1808, which ex-
tended the exclusive "grant or contract with the state" for an additional
five years."0 3
In a learned and most interesting opinion, Chancellor John Lans-
ing""4 denied the prayer by the Livingston and Fulton interests for an
injunction to keep all steamboats not licensed by the franchise off the
navigable waters of New York.0 5 The main authority for the Chancel-
102. Livingston and Fulton had been granted another two-year extension in the act
passed April 6, 1807, 5 N.Y. Laws 213 (Webster & Skinner 1807).
103. Act of April 11, 1808, 5 N.Y. Laws 407-08 (Webster & Skinner 1807) entitled
An Act for the Further Encouragement of Steam-Boats, on the Waters of this State, and
for Other Purposes. The act said in part:
Be it enacted by the People of the State of New York, represented in Senate
and Assembly, That whenever Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton, and
such persons as they may associate with them, shall establish one or more
steam-boats or vessels, other than that already established, they shall, for each
and every such additional boat be entitled to five years prolongation of their
grant or contract with this state: Provided nevertheless, That the whole term
of their exclusive privileges shall not exceed thirty years, after the passage
of this act.
104. Chancellor Lansing had succeeded Robert R. Livingston on the New York
Court of Chancery in 1801, and was himself succeeded by James Kent as Chancellor in
1814. See Hicxs, MEN AND Booxs FAMous IN THE LAW 146 (1921); WAN, His-
T RY OF TnE AMERICAN BAR 293, 298 (1911). Lansing was also judge of the state su-
preme court, serving from 1790 to 1801 when he was appointed Chancellor. Lansing's
biography is highlighted by his withdrawal from the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia in 1787. On March 6, 1787, Lansing was chosen with Robert Yates and
Alexander Hamilton as the New York delegates to the Constitutional Convention. He
withdrew with Yates from the convention on July 10, 1787, because the convention had
exceeded its instructions from the Congress of the United States; it was in the process
of drafting a new constitution, and Lansing interpreted the instructions given the con-
vention to be limited to that of amending the Articles of Confederation. Later, as an
elected member of the New York ratifying convention, he vigorously opposed ratifying
the new Constitution. See Cushman, John Lansing, in 10 DIcTIoARY oF AmERicAN Bi-
OGRAPHY 608 (1933). Lansing moved that New York's ratification of the Constitution
be conditional with the right to withdraw from the Union unless the amendments pro-
posed by the convention be submitted immediately for action by the Congress, which
motion was defeated. Lansing spoke the thoughts of Patrick Henry of Virginia and of
Governor Clinton of his own state, when he expressed the opinion "that a consolidated
government, partaking in a great degree of republican principles, and which had in
object the control of the inhabitants of the extensive territory of the United States, by
its role operations could not preserve the essential rights and liberties of the people."
2 ELLiOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 220 (1836).
105. The first order of the Chancellor was to refuse to grant the injunction on the
ex parte application of the complainants. The Chancellor directed the issuance of a rule
to the respondents to show cause why a permanent injunction should not issue. In con-
sequence of the Chancellor's refusal to enter at least a temporary injunction ex parte,
the legislature passed the Act of April 9, 1811, An ACT for the nore effectual Enforce-
ment of the Provisions contained in at Act, entitled "An Act for the further Encourage-
ment of Steam-Boats on the Waters of this State, and for other Purposes." 6 N.Y. Laws
286 (Websters & Skinner 1812). The first section of the act made the remedy of for-
feiture "the same remedy, both in law and equity, for the recovery of the said boat
and engine or boats and engines, tackle and apparel, as if the same had been tortiously
and wrongfully taken out of their possession." Section 2 of the act authorized and
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lor's determination not to enforce the private rights of the franchise by
equitable remedies was the Institutes of Justinian. Emperor Justinian
had acknowledged in his ancient code of the sixth century that the com-
mon right to the individual enjoyment of air and water was paramount
to his authority-though his authority was of divine origin-because of
its bestowal by the hand of nature. Chancellor Lansing considered that
a rule of law formulated from such a noted and universal source was
"calculated to impress the mind with its sincerity and truth, and that it
was dictated by the general sense of manldnd."' 5  These general prin-
ciples of law, which had been formulated in order to preserve the sea
and its appurtenances for the common usage without sovereign restric-
tions, had been "uniformly . . extended to rivers in which the tide
ebbs and flows, as arms of the sea,""' though the Chancellor admitted
that rivers which flow "through distinct sovereignties" might not be sub-
ject to the general principles through which the law of nations was given
as a source for such restrictions on the powers of sovereignty."0 8
These legal formulations the Chancellor justified by heaping praise
upon the source from whence they were derived: It was "from the great
antiquity of its sources" that the law of Rome had been infused with "the
required injunction against any further navigating and against removal of the violating
steamboats from the jurisdiction of the state. Such injunctions were to issue against
the captain. The act provided further:
That nothing in this act shall be deemed or construed to extend or apply to the
two boats or vessels commonly called steam-boats, belonging to Hamilton Boyd,
Isaiah Townsend, Robert R. Henry and their associates, or to the captain, mar-
iners and others employed in navigating same, which boats or vessels were lately
launched at the city of Albany, nor to the steam-boat which during the last
summer plied on Lake Champlain, and is said to belong to James Winants and
his associates, or to the captain, mariners or others employed in navigating the
same, but in regard to the said three boats or vessels the said Robert R. Liv-
ingston and Robert Fulton, and their associates or assigns, shall have and enjoy
all the remedies heretofore provided in and by or resulting from any former
law or laws of this state, and the relative rights and remedies of the respective
parties in relation to the three boats or vessels above mentioned, shall be and
remain as if this act had not been passed.
106. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 517 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
107. Id. at 518.
108. Ibid. Chancellor Lansing stated, somewhat equivocally, the application of the
principles of common usage to rivers flowing within a nation-state:
The general principles applied to the sea have as uniformly been extended to
rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, as arms of the sea. Those rivers flow-
ing through territories which bind and confine them contract their public use
to the people of the states bordering on them; which, in practice, has been con-
sidered as a national occupancy, vesting in the people of those states the same
enjoyment as common to all, on a more contracted scale; but whether, when
flowing through distinct sovereignties, they are at all susceptible of exclusive
national appropriation, so as to exclude the nation most remote from the sea
from a free access to it, has been a question of animated discussion both here
and in Europe.
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experience, wisdom, and science of successive ages"; and "from the
sound maxims of justice and jurisprudence it contained, from the able
and learned jurists intrusted with its compilation, as well as its intrinsic
worth, it has been deservedly held in reverence by all the civilized
world. .. ,109 And the Chancellor looked to the authorities of the
common law that had recognized the Roman as the source for legal prin-
ciples. From a reading of Bracton and Sir Matthew Hale, he deduced
that the common law had conformed to the principles and maxims of the
Institutes of Justinian that placed all navigable streams among "those
things which are given to mankind . . . by the law of nature.""11 The
common law, like the Roman, had "consecrated the navigable rivers to
the common use of all, established a common right incapable of aliena-
tion or restraint, and shielded the public, in the exercise of that right,
'from every species of private appropriation.' """ In the common law,
private rights had been given their highest recognition and, in its prin-
ciples, the 'us privatum-instead of the jus publicurn-was drawn from
those immutable laws of nature. Thus, common reason became the basis
of the formulation of private rights as legal limitations upon the powers
of the sovereign and the state. Because of the sovereign's inherent
powers of conserving the public estate-indeed, he was the "Lord Pro-
tector"-certain aspects of the jus publicum, like air and public waters,
were as noninvadeable as they were inalienable by the state's highest
authority.
11 2
In the Chancellor's opinion, the legislative grant to Livingston and
Fulton invaded those communal natural rights which were not susceptible
to the creation of private rights by franchise between the state and the
citizen. In his final justification, the Chancellor became even more crea-
tive in his efforts to make more weighty the great principles of law de-
rived from the laws of nature. Those great principles were now em-
bedded in a new authority that was an equally fundamental source. Sub-
jects of the jus publicum, like the right of navigation on the nation's
public waters, were included among those fundamental privileges and
immunities of the citizens of the several states secured in the Constitution
against invasion or sequestration by a member state.1 ' And the learned
109. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 517 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
110. Id. at 517-18.
111. Id. at 520.
112. Id. at 518-20.
113. Chancellor Lansing in effect says that the grant in this case, which partakes
of the nature of a contract between the state and the holders of the franchise, was
"carved out of the jus ftblicmn of the citizens of the United States." Id. at 521. To
limit the privileges and immunities of the fourth article of the Constitution to the pre-
vention of discrimination by one state against citizens of another state would have had
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Chancellor ended with a final notation: A possibility existed that the
legislative grant invaded the authority of the national Congress to regu-
late commerce." 4
In view of these many difficulties, the Chancellor concluded that
he ought not to grant an injunction which would exclude the non-
enfranchised steamboats from plying the public waters of the state.
Such an injunction would have conflicted with those most fundamental
of all legal principles-those formulated from the laws of nature. No
legislature could have designed such a consequence." 5
The ultimate determination of Livingston v. Van Ingen, as to the
conflict between the private rights in the exclusive franchise and the
common rights in the use of the public waters, was made in the New
York Court of Errors on legal issues drawn solely from the Constitution
of the United States. Counsel for the Van Ingen interests asserted that
the legislative grant made to the Livingston and Fulton franchise was
void under the Constitution because the subject of the grant was includ-
ible in Congress' powers to grant exclusive rights of patent to inventors
and to regulate commerce." 6 Counsel's legal formulations were drawn
out of the assumption that the state, in creating exclusive rights in steam-
boat navigation, had exercised powers which by implication had been
withdrawn from the states by the grant of legislative powers in the Con-
stitution. Number thirty-two of The Federalist was relied on as the sole
the effect of interpreting the Constitution "as to give rights to the citizens of all states
superior to the rights of [the citizens of] that state in which they are to be exercised."
Ibid. In the Chancellor's pen an abridgment of the common rights of all persons en-
forcible within the legal principles of the Constitution was equated to an abridgement of
private rights of a single person. Thus the great Roman principles transmitted through
the Institutes of Justinian had moved through the common law to form the basis for the
law of the American Constitution, so long as these principles could be formulated from
the authority of a particular provision of the Constitution, in this instance the privileges
and immunities clause.
114. In the beginning of his opinion Chancellor Lansing reflected:
There are circumstances in this case which would have induced me to have
availed myself of the aid of one of the judges of the Supreme Court, to decide
on the important and novel questions which were presented, if the forms of the
court and the established modes of proceeding, had admitted of it; but that
resort being beyond my reach, the duty imposed prescribed my line of conduct.
Id. at 515.
115. Id. at 522.
116. Counsel for Van Ingen in opposition to the franchise were John Wells, John
V. Henry, and Abraham Van Vechten, lawyers with state and national reputations.
See WARuRm, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 297-98, 303, 304 (1911). Warren de-
scribed Wells in the following: "Wells convinced juries and judges by his unrivalled
lucidity and the irresistible power of his logic. He was born in 1770, a graduate of
Princeton in 1788, and admitted to practise as counsellor in 1795. Upon Hamilton's
death, in 1804, he succeeded largely to his enormous business among the merchants of
New York." Id. at 303. Van Vechten had been termed "the father of the New York
Bar," being the first lawyer admitted to practice under the New York Constitution.
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authority for these abstract legal propositions. On this particular occa-
sion, Mr. Hamilton, the "illustrious statesman and distinguished lawyer,"
was credited with being the author.1 '
The Federalist was exalted for the purpose of demonstrating that the
subjects of the patent and commerce clauses of the Constitution came
within the category of exclusive powers of the national government. The
category of exclusive powers was to be transformed into an enforceable
legal concept which authorized the invalidation of state regulations in
conflict with it. The legal conclusion was that the state had exercised
powers belonging solely to the national government. If state regulations
included subjects within the national powers, they were limited to those
subjects includible within the concurrent power category. The legal con-
cept of exclusive powers was devised in order to use the judicial process
against the expanding powers of the state governments. But the sup-
porters of the nationalist position faced considerable difficulty in deter-
mining what powers of the national government were exclusive, and in
determining also the point at which the subjects of exclusive national
117. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 538-39 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812). No.
32 of THE FEDERALIST, like the other numbers, was written to answer the attacks against
the Constitution that the states would be destroyed absolutely as governmental units un-
less they were allowed to retain their absolute sovereignty. It was to allay these fears
and to ease the way for adoption of the Constitution in the various state conventions, in
New York and Virginia especially, that the papers were written. The explanatory state-
ments about the Constitution pertained to divisions of legislative powers between the na-
tional government and the governments of the member states, and did not pertain to the
judicial powers. See generally I CROSSICEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 8-11 (1953). The noted author of Number 32 presumed
that the existence of abstract powers in the national government axiomatically carved
the subjects from state powers, even prior to the bringing of subjects into our national
laws by the Congress. Further, when judicial review was initiated, counsel for invali-
dation of a specific execution of state powers alluded to the presumption of exclusive
powers, and declared that it was the role of the courts to enforce this carving away of
state powers without regard to the great need for continuation of those powers in the
states. The author wrote:
An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sovereignty
would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might
remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the
plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State
governments wotild clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they be-
fore had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States.
The author continued in his attempt to elucidate how to determine which powers were
to be exclusive powers. He explained:
This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would
only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an
exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority
to the Union, and in other prohibited states from exercising the like authority;
and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority in
'the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 186 (Lodge ed. 1888).
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powers ended and the states' police powers began."8
Counsel's presentations in behalf of the Van Ingen interests per-
tained mostly to vague theories about the Constitution which in turn were
transformed by counsel into enforceable legal principles. Subjects of
exclusive powers were said to require the unitary regulations that only
the national government could give them. Subjects of concurrent powers
were not withdrawn by the mere granting of powers to the national
government. As to these there was no necessity of unitary regulations.
Federalism then, a process of the interrelation of state with national
powers, was said to be limited to the subjects of concurrent powers.
Subjects relating to patent grants and commerce were shown to be ex-
clusive by omitting them from counsel's listing of the subjects of con-
current powers; there was no close-order analysis to show upon what
criteria the subjects of the patent and commerce clauses necessitated uni-
tary national regulation. Along with the powers to tax-always recog-
nized as concurrent-counsel listed the powers "to coin money and regu-
late its value, and to fix the standard of weights and measures, to estab-
lish post-offices and post-roads," as concurrent, as "they relate to the
common concerns of society and the public good, they may be exercised
by the states, until congress shall legislate upon these subjects. . . .""
But just as soon as the Congress had enacted laws, relative to those ob-
jects, there was an end to the state laws; they were superseded and ab-
sorbed in the supreme law of the land.
As the Congress had enacted legislation providing for copyrights
and patents, state powers over those subjects were at an end. It made
no difference whether the patent powers were deemed concurrent or ex-
clusive. The grant made by the New York legislature to Livingston and
Fulton of the exclusive privileges of navigation on the public waters of
New York was said to constitute a regulation conflicting with the objects
covered in the act of the Congress relating to copyrights and patents.
118. It was assumed that the judicial function was primarily to prevent the states
from regulating the subjects of the national powers. Thus a political concept of con-
stitutionalism, devised to preserve the existence of the government, purported to consti-
tute a rule of law for the enforcing of the provisions of the Constitution against the
functioning of state powers. But in the actual course of judicial administration the na-
tional courts were used for the nationalization of private rights in review of the preroga-
tive of state powers, not primarily for prohibiting the member states from regulating
the subjects or objects of government within Congress' exclusive powers. When con-
fronted with legal doctrines, which were based upon the various abstract theories and
subjectivities about the Constitution, the national courts pretended to act more as a
council of revision than a court of law. But when dealing with the judicial remedies,
and the more substantial grounds for the exercise of the judicial power against the
prerogative of state powers to govern, the national courts reflected more of the indicia
of courts of law in the traditional sense.
119. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 539-40 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
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The state had granted more extensive privileges than the Congress had
granted in the exercise of its patent powers. But in addition, the state
powers over subjects of commerce had previously been alienated to the
national government by the Constitution. The powers of government
over commerce and trade could not be other than exclusive powers; they
were inherent in the sovereignty of the national government like "bor-
rowing money on the faith of the United States." The "powers to regu-
late commerce with foreign states, and between the states, to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy, [were]
naturally and impliedly, exclusive, for if the different states were to
exercise those powers concurrently, it would introduce that confusion
and diversity which the constitution intended to prevent."' 20
Counsel for the Livingston and Fulton interests emphasized, in op-.
position, the practice of the two governments living as one nation under
the Constitution. Accordingly, the making of national law had to be
drawn from practical experience as well as from the making, the language,
and the theories of the Constitution. Counsel showed that the Congress
in the exercise of its delegated powers had selected the subjects to be
withdrawn from the member states. The Congress had suspended state
powers when, and only when, such suspension was made an aspect of a
legislative formulation of national policy. On a number of occasions the
Congress had expressly, or by implication, suspended state powers over
various subjects which the states had previously included within their
regulations. These legislative precedents showed conclusively, it was
contended, that all state powers continued until the Congress legislated
a direct suspension over specified subjects and objects of government
included within a national uniform policy.
Following the adoption of the Constitution, when Congress' powers
over the granting of exclusive patents came into being, the states had
continued their practice of legislative enactments granting exclusive priv-
ileges either in the form of patent or franchise delegations which the
state promised to recognize and preserve for a term of years.' The
120. Id. at 539.
121. The court noted that the state of New York had granted a patent to James
Rumsey just a few weeks before the meeting of the first Congress under the Constitu-
tion. Id. at 550. The Rumsey patent was granted by act passed the 26th of Feb., 1789.
3 N.Y. Laws 71-72 (1887). The patent was granted upon a representation of "a new
and easy method of generating steam in large quantities for the purpose of working
engines by forcing a small quantity of water through one or more incurvated tubes
placed in a furnace which tube or tubes is distinguished by the name of a pipe boiler...."
James Rumsey and his executors, administrators, and assigns were vested with "the sole
and exclusive right of making and using or permitting others to make and use the . . .
engines and improvements . . ." described in the statute for a period of fourteen
years. Violation of Rumsey's exclusive rights was subject to statutory damages in the
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first exercise of Congress' copyright and patent powers was in the first
Congress in 1790."2 A general statute was enacted in 1793 which
authorized the administrative granting of exclusive privileges in inven-
tions for a period of fourteen years, but containing the proviso that the
exclusive grant could be made only upon condition the applicant sur-
rendered all his rights and privileges derived from exclusive grants made
by the legislatures of the member states. 2 ' A similar statutory evolution
had occurred under the naturalization powers of the national government.
Congress had enacted naturalization legislation in the first Congress, 24
amount of one hundred pounds, recoverable by action of debt. Ibid. Rumsey had also
been granted exclusive franchise for steamboat propulsion in the states of Virginia and
Maryland. Rumsey also secured English patents on his steam boiler and steamboat, and
similar patents were granted him in 1791 by the United States. See 1 Bisnor, A His-
TORY OF AMERICAN MANuFACTuRERS 75-77, 594-95 (1864); Mitman, James Rimsey, in
16 Dic'noNARv OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 223 (1943).
122. The first statute of the Congress to pronwte the progress of utseful Arts was
the Act of April 10, 1790, enacted in the Second Session of the First Congress ch. 7, 1
Stat. 109. Petitions for a patent in inventions were to be made jointly to the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of the Department of War, and the Attorney General of the
United States. Letters of patent in declaration of exclusive rights in the invention were
to be granted for a period of fourteen years. Damages for infringement of the grant
were left to assessment by a jury.
123. The original Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, was repealed by the
subsequent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, enacted during the Second Congress, Second Session
ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. Section 7 of the Act of Feb. 21, 1793, contained the proviso placing
the burden upon the patentee to relinquish his exclusive rights under state law:
Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That where any state, before its adop-
tion of the present form of government, shall have granted an exclusive right
to any invention, the party claiming that right, shall not be capable of obtaining
an exclusive right under this act, but on relinquishing his right under such par-
ticular state, and of such relinquishment his obtaining an exclusive right under
this act shall be sufficient evidence.
Apparently the phrase "That where any state, before its adoption of the present form
of government" was not intended as a limitation upon the operation of the act of Con-
gress; in subsequent administration of the act the requirement of waiver was applicable
to state grants made after adoption of the Constitution as well as those made prior to
September, 1788. The Congress did not engage in this roundabout manner as a subter-
fuge, because it was thought the Congress lacked the supreme power to have directly
suspended the governmental powers of the member states from the subject of patents.
The private rights in a patent franchise were considered vested property rights in the
common law which was considered to be as much the law of the United States as in the
member states, and it would have conflicted right reason for the Congress to have ex-
punged the state powers and the grant under those powers. Thus it was thought to be a
compliance with the good faith a government had to honor, for the Congress to hold
out what were thought to be inducements in administrative privileges that were con-
sidered to be superior to those that had previously been granted the patentees in the
special legislation of the member states. Counsel for the Livingston and Fulton franchise
suggested that there were no such limitations on state powers as this implied and that na-
tional privileges were superior privileges. Because the state powers were unlimited they
could have extended the grant of a patent into eternity and to another planet if they
had but desired to do so.
124. The first naturalization act was the Act of March 26, 1790, titled An Act to
establish an unifornm rule of Naturalization, enacted in the Second Session of the First
Congress ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. In the first statute Congress initiated the tradition that an
applicant for United States citizenship may make application "to any common law court
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and the states continued to grant citizenship as if their sovereign powers
over the naturalization of aliens continued after the adoption of the
Constitution.'25 Then by the Act of the 14th of April, 1802, Congress
of record, in any one of the states wherein he shall have resided for the term of one
year at least, and making proof to the satisfaction of such court, that he is a person of
good character, and taking the oath or affirmation prescribed by law, to support the
constitution of the United States, which oath or affirmation such court shall adminis-
ter. . . ." Ibid. The act recognized the application-but not necessarily the continu-
ance-of state power in naturalization in the following proviso: "Provided also, That
no person heretofore proscribed in any state, shall be admitted a citizen as aforesaid,
except by an act of the legislature of the state in which such person was proscribed."
Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 104.
The 1790 naturalization act was repealed by the Act of Jan. 29, 1795, titled, An Act
to establish an uniform rule of Naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed
on that subject. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414. As in the original act, citizenship of the United
States was cognizable to "any alien, being a free white person. . . ." The various dis-
trict courts of the United States as well as the state courts were authorized to affirm
the transference from alien to citizenship status. The Naturalization Act of 1795 in-
itiated the requirement that the alien renounce his prior allegiance to "any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty," and also provided that "no person heretofore proscribed
by any state, or who has been legally convicted of having joined the army of Great
Britain, during the late war, shall be admitted a citizen .. .without the consent of the
legislature of the state, in which such person was proscribed." Act of Jan. 29, 1795,
ch. 20, 1 Stat. 415.
125. An act entitled Alt Act to naturalize the persons therein ntamed, and to prevent
the avoidance of titles in certain cases by reason of alienism, was passed by the New
York legislature on the 28th of Feb., 1789. 3 N.Y. Laws 83 (1887). The New York
statute required that each naturalized person renounce all former allegiance to a "foreign
king, prince, potentate and State," and that each of the one hundred or so persons
naturalized by the act take an oath of allegiance to the state of New York. The act
provided that no titles to property held by the persons named in the act shall be defeated
or 'be subject to escheat because of their former alien status. One of the prime purposes
for state allegiance was to protect titles to property held under the original grants in
the colony from application of the common law rule against alien titles. Thus the
various state naturalization acts were a necessity in order to protect the titles to the
large land holdings held under the English law of the colonies. It was not possible to
await action of the national government; the problem was too acute. Action of the na-
tional government came later under reciprocal treaties with European nations which
gave some protection, enforcible under national law, to the titles of the landholdings
under the English law of the colonies.
The case of Collett v. Collett, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 294 (1792), was decided in the cir-
cuit court of the United States for the District of Pennsylvania, in the April Term,
1792, composed of Associate Justices Wilson and Blair of the Supreme Court and Judge
Peters of the district court. The complaint filed a bill in equity alleging that he was
still "a subject of his Britannic Majesty" and that the respondent was a citizen of Penn-
sylvania. A question was raised on the diversity jurisdiction of the circuit court, as the
respondent averred in his plea, and it was certified as of public record, that the com-
plainant had taken an oath of allegiance to the State of Pennsylvania on the 30th of
April, 1790, under an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania passed the 13th of March,
1789. Complainant contended that the Pennsylvania act became a nullity after the Act
of the Congress of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, the first act under the uniform
naturalization power, and that complainant's oath of allegiance to the State of Penn-
sylvania had also been nullified after the act of Congress. It was contended also that
the naturalization power was exclusive in Congress and that the Pennsylvania act-
passed the 13th of March, 1789-was null and void in its inception.
The circuit court limited its determination to the question of whether the state act
of March 13, 1789, became null and void upon the passage of the Act of the Congress of
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withdrew the subject from the states in the statutory preamble which
declared that "any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to
March 26, 1790, on the ground that the state powers over the subject were suspended
by the Congress from that date. The court answered the question in the negative. It
was determined that the states
still enjoy a concurrent authority upon this subject; but that their individual
authority cannot be exercised, so as to contravene the rule established by the
authority of the Union. The objection founded on the word uniform, and the
arguments ab inconvenienti have been carried too far. It is, likewise, declared
by the Constitution . . . that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States; and yet, if express words of exclusion had not
been inserted . . . the individual States would still, undoubtedly, have been at
liberty, without the consent of Congress, to lay and collect duties and imposts.
Collett v. Collett, supra at 296. It was surmised that "The true reason for investing
Congress with the power of naturalization . . .was to guard against too narrow, in-
stead of too liberal, a mode of conferring the rights of citizenship." Ibid. Thus it was
thought that the member states could not exclude those citizens who had been granted
citizenship by or under a statute of Congress, but they could adopt the same or easier
terms for state citizenship. The court relied on Congress' recognition of the continuation
of state power as expressed in the proviso of the Naturalization Act of 1790: "That no
person heretofore proscribed by any state, shall be admitted a citizen as aforesaid, ex-
cept by an act of the legislature of the state in which such person was proscribed." Ch.
3, 1 Stat. 104. Therefore under the laws of the United States, the complainant was a
citizen of Pennsylvania and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.
Compare Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817), in which Chief Justice
Marshall begins the opinion of the Court with the determination that "the power of
naturalization is exclusively in congress does not seem to be, and certainly ought not to
be controverted," in effect overruling the opinion of Mr. Justice Wilson in Collett v.
Collett, supra, and without any direct citation. Chirac v. Chirac, supra at 269. The
Court's determination in the Chirac case was made comparatively easy by the Act of the
Congress of the 14th of April, 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153, wherein the Congress had taken
over the regulation of conditions for "citizen of the United States" and had by explicit
provision excluded the states from the naturalization of citizens. The act of the Con-
gress referred to would not exclude the giving of some appropriate effect to state citi-
zenship, secured by resident, domicil or some other act or state of mind, but the attribute
of a "citizen of a state" could no longer have the effect of changing a person's status
from alienage to that of citizen of the United States.
As a matter of interest and study the Chirac case involved a number of factors
which affected the transition from state to federal law in the naturalization of citizens.
In 1778, the Congress of the United States of America ratified a treaty between France
and the United States which declared: "The subjects and inhabitants of the United
States, or any one of them, shall not be reputed Aubians (that is aliens) in France,"
and provided:
They may, by testament, donation, or otherwise, dispose of their goods, move-
able or immoveable, in favour of such persons as to them shall seem good; and
their heirs, subjects of the said United States, whether residing in France or
elsewhere, may succeed them ab intestat, without being obliged to obtain letters
of naturalization. The subjects of the most christian king shall enjoy on their
part, in all the dominions of the said states, an entire and perfect reciprocity
relative to the stipulations contained in the present article.
In 1880, the General Assembly of Maryland by An ACT to declare and ascertain the
privileges of the subjects of France residing in this state, laid down the conditions for
making the treaty of 1778 between the United States and France the law of Maryland.
See 1 Md. Rev. Laws 290-91 (Maxcy, 1811).
The 2d section of the Maryland statute gave the subjects of the King of France,
who may sojourn or reside in Maryland, the enjoyment of "all . ..the rights, privileges
and exemptions, of the full and free citizens of the state, without taking any oath, or
giving any promise of allegiance or fidelity . . ." to the state. The 3d section of the
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become a citizen of the United States, or any of them, on the following
Maryland statute contained a proviso which restricted and limited the rights and privi-
leges of the subjects of France, sojourning and residing in Maryland, from the owner-
ship of lands and real estate, by the declaration that the act shall not be construed "to
grant to the subjects of France . . . who shall continue subjects of said majesty, and
not qualify themselves as citizens of this state, any right to purchase or hold lands or
real estate, but for their respective lives or for years, or to invest them with the
privilege of voting in any election . . ." etc. The 4th section provided that if any sub-
ject of the King of France, who had qualified and become a citizen of Maryland, shall
die "seised in fee of any real estate," whether by last will or testament, or by intestacy,
"the devisee or devisees appointed in and by such will or testament," or "the natural
kindred of such decedent," "whether residing in France or elsewhere," were treated as
citizens of the state of Maryland for purposes of taking the property, but subject to the
proviso in the 5th section,
That whenever any subject of France shall become seised in fee of any real
estate within this state, by virtue of any such last will or testament, or by
inheritance . . . his or her estate therein, after the term of ten years be expired,
shall vest in the state, unless the person seised of the same, within that time,
either come to settle in and become a citizen of this state, or infeoff thereof
some citizen of this, or some other of the United States of America.
See Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 259, 262-63, 264-67, 267-69, 269-70 (1817).
Following the adoption of the Constitution and the consequential legislation in the
Congress came the ratification of the historic Convention between the French Republic
and the United States. 8 Stat. 178. Article VII provided, as to reciprocity in the rights
of ownership and grants of property:
The citizens and inhabitants of the United States shall be at liberty to dis-
pose by testament, donation, or otherwise, of their goods, moveable and immove-
able, holden in the territory of the French Republic in Europe, and the citizens
of the French Republic shall have the same liberty with regard to goods, move-
able and immoveable, holden in the territory of the United States, in favor of
such persons as they shall think proper. The citizens and inhabitants of either
of the two countries, who shall be heirs of goods, moveable and immoveable, in
the other, shall be able to succeed ab intestato, without being obliged to obtain
letters of naturalization, and without having the effect of this provision con-
tested or impeded, under any pretext whatever; and the said heirs, whether such
by particular title, or abintestato, shall be exempt from any duty whatever in
both countries . . . and also that in case the laws of either of the two states
should restrain strangers from the exercise of the rights of property with re-
spect to real estate, such real estate may be sold, or otherwise disposed of, to
citizens or inhabitants of the country where it may be, and the other nation
shall be at liberty to enact similar laws.
John Baptiste Chirac, a native of France and naturalized a citizen of the State of
Maryland on 22d of September, 1795 (under the act passed in the 1779 session of the
Maryland legislature, 1 Md. Rev. Laws 362 (Maxcy, 1811)), and naturalized a citizen
of the United States on the 6th of July, 1798, died intestate in July, 1799, owning real
estate in fee which he received after he became a citizen of Maryland, but with no
legitimate heirs except citizens of the Republic of France living in France. The State
of Maryland determined the lands escheatable and transferred them to John Charles
Francis Chirac, the natural son of the intestate. The heirs at law brought an action in
ejectment in the circuit court for the district of Maryland, which court ruled in their
favor on the basis of the Convention of 1800. The death of the deceased had taken place
after the Act of Congress of 1798, in abrogation of all treaties between the United
States and France. Also, the grant to the natural son had been subject to compliance,
by the heirs at law, with the 10-year proviso in the Maryland statute. The main ques-
tion for determination was the applicable law, the statute of Maryland of 1780, enforc-
ing the treaty of 1778, or the Convention of 1800. The Court held all were applicable
to the circumstances of the case, the former to the determination that John Baptiste
Chirac died seised in fee, and the Convention of 1800, for the ultimate determination
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conditions and not otherwise."' 26  This enactment purported to exhaust
the subject, in the sense of suspending state powers over citizenship and
naturalization. Counsel contended that the taking over by the national
government of selected subjects of government from the member states,
as delineated in the patent and naturalization acts of the Congress, showed
conclusively that the suspension of state powers had to await the readi-
ness of the Congress to assume dominion over a particular subject of
government. Because there had been no process of general suspension
or alienation of state powers by the Constitution, the court was not em-
powered to use the patent and commerce clauses of the Constitution as
authority to enforce a judicial invalidation of the exercise of state powers.
Counsel's presentations were succinct and to the point that the com-
merce clause did not constitute authority for the judicial invalidation of
state powers. Counsel pointed first to those assuaging lines in behalf of
state powers in the famous number thirty-two of The Federalist which
were designed to alleviate fears of the consequences which would befall
the governments of the member states after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion. The Federalist author wrote that:
[T]he necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction, in certain cases,
results from the division of sovereign power: and the rule that
all authorities, of which the states are not explicitly divested
in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not
only a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly
admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument; . . . not with-
standing the affirmative grants of general authorities, there has
been most pointed care, in those cases where it was deemed im-
proper that the like authorities should reside in the states. .. "
Counsel's second showing was the more appropriate for making the
national law favorable to the continuation of the Livingston-Fulton
franchise. Authority in the national government over foreign and do-
mestic trade, and trade with the Indians, could not be exclusive because
so many aspects of those powers involved activities affecting the social
and community interests of a state. The states had previously engaged
in extensive regulations dealing with objects of local and community
interests which did not involve the peoples and interests of other states.
that the heirs at law, citizens of France, took the property in fee, limited, according to
the Maryland statute, to a power of sale. Thus the national law was built upon the
state law and both made the law of the United States, as the authority of the state law
had been incorporated in the Convention of 1800.
126. Ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153.
127. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 548 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
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Examples of such regulations listed by counsel included transportation
facilities, such as toll-gates and bridges, ferries and canals, as well as
other facilities "for the accommodation of the public, and the conveni-
ence of social intercourse."12  On the other hand, counsel for the fran-
chise restricted the reach of the legal consequences of such state regula-
tions. He did not represent that New York had the sovereign authority
to enact or to continue such policy regulations independent of Congress'
legislative powers under the commerce clause. It was recognized that
"all these state regulations are valid, subject . . . to any express law of
congress on the same points.' 1
29
The New York Court of Errors was unanimous in its reversal of the
Chancellor. In conclusion, it directed a permanent injunction which gave
full and complete protection to the exclusive navigation rights of the Liv-
ingston and Fulton franchise.' The most noted of the seriatim opinions
was that of James Kent's, then Chief Justice of the New York Court of
Errors.' Kent did not rely on the application of natural law, or on
128. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 554-55 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
129. Id. at 555.
130. The judgment of reversal handed down by the New York Court of Errors
decreed that
[A] writ of injunction issue, restraining and prohibiting the respondents from
using and employing the boat or vessel, called the Hope . . . on any of the
waters of this State, in contravention of the legislative grant and privilege
made to, and vested in, the appellants, as in their bill set forth; and that such
injunction be continued until the final hearing of the cause in the Court of
Chancery; and that the injunction ought then to be made perpetual, so long
as the exclusive right and privilege of the appellants shall continue under the
acts of the Legislature of this State.
Id. at 590.
131. Chief Justice Kent wrote that in his understanding of the equitable principles
of the common law, which he thought were as binding upon the courts of his state as on
the courts of England:
Injunctions are always granted to secure the enjoyment of statute privileges of
which the party is in actual possession, unless the right be doubtful . . . and the
decisions in the English Chancery on this point, were the same before as since
the American Revolution; and we are, consequently, bound by them as a branch
of the common law. . . . [Id. at 585.] The principle is, that statute privileges,
no less than common law rights, when in actual possession and exercise, will not
be permitted to be disturbed, until the opponent has fairly tried them at law,
and overthrown their pretension. And is not this a most excellent principle,
calculated to preserve peace, and order, and morals, in the community . . . ?
[Id. at 587.] It would only be productive of litigation and mischief, to allow
respondents to continue the use of their boats, if the right be against them....
And nothing would be more useless than to withhold an injunction until the
Chancellor had sent the question to be tried at law, when the judges before
whom it is to be tried are members of this court, and have already declared
their opinion. . . . [Id. at 588.] If the laws are valid, it would be of pernicious
consequence not to arrest the further progress of their violation. It is impos-
sible for any act to be committed which attracts more universal notice, and if
wrong and illegal, none which has a more fatal influence upon the general
habits of respect and reverence for the legislative authority. The boats cannot
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Chancellor Lansing's principal authority, the Institutes of Justinian. He
was distinctly unimpressed with the jus publicum limitations upon the jus
privatum as legal limitations upon the authority of the state legislature in
the making of exclusive grants to private persons.182 Kent's opinion may
run but in the face of day, and in the presence, as it were, of the whole people,
whose laws are set at defiance, nor without seducing thousands, by the contagion
of example, into an approbation and support of the trespass. [Id. at 588-89.]
Kent cited both English and American authority for the proposition that injunctions
always issue "to secure the enjoyment of statute privileges of which the party is in
actual possession, unless the right be doubtful." Id. at 586-88. His certainty about the
use of the injunction as an independent remedy preserving private rights while the
statutory remedies of money damages and forfeiture were processed was further sup-
ported by an act of the New York legislature, passed April 9, 1811, which created a
duty on the part of the Chancellor to issue an injunction upon the commencement of an
action in law to secure a judgment. The act provided:
That when any writ, suit or action is brought for the recovery of such for-
feitures, the defendant or defendants . . . in so navigating in contravention of
, * * law, shall be prohibited by writ of injunction from navigating with or
employing the said boat or boats, engine or engines, or from removing the
same or any part thereof out of the jurisdiction of the court, or to any other
place than that which shall be directed for their safe keeping by the court
during the pendancy of such suit or suits, action or actions, or after judgment
shall be obtained, if such judgment shall be against the defendants, or the
matter or thing forfeited.
6 N.Y. Laws 286 (Websters & Skinners 1812).
132. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 572-89 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812). The
other seriatim opinions were written by Joseph C. Yates and Smith Thompson. Id. at
558-62, 563-72. The opinions are critically analyzed with reference to the nationalization
of the commerce clause in 1 CRossKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 231-34 (1953). The three opinions followed a uniform pattern
of content and grounds, showing that there was a general agreement among the judges
that the state court's primary obligation was to enforce the law of its own jurisdiction.
There was likewise a general uniformity as to the unavailability of the delegated powers
of the Constitution as independent authority allowing the Court to review-and thus to
invalidate-what was referred to as the "retention" of state powers, and that in general
the court of a state had no standing to review the validity of a state statute under the
authority of the Constitution. To do so would consitute an administering of the judicial
powers of the national government, which was of no concern to the state court and was
outside its jurisdiction. In general, a question of the validity of state legislation was
restricted to a conflict with an act of the Congress the validity of which likewise was
outside the state court's jurisdiction for it was the exclusive function of the national
courts to interpret and enforce the acts of the Congress.
Justice Yates anticipated the use of the tenth amendment (which provides that "the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people") as the legal authority
in the Constitution for the "enumerated powers" concept as a canon of constitutional
interpretation. For a discussion of this concept of constitutional construction, see Cor-
win, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1950). Yates construed
the patent power (which delegates to Congress the general authority "to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors and
inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries") narrowly
and axiomatically as "limited to authors and inventors only," so as not "to prohibit the
respective states from exercising the power of securing to persons introducing useful
inventions . . . the exclusive benefit of such inventions. . . ." Id. at 560. According
to Yates, all powers were retained by the member states until an exercise of such
powers "interferes with the laws of the United States. . . ." Id. at 561. And whenever
such an interference with an act of the Congress occurred it was a matter that remained
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be characterized as comprehensive; it was almost an esquisse of the Con-
stitution in which he purported to preserve the private property rights
which the laws of the state had created in the legislative enacted monop-
oly. He gave a minimal concern to the abridgment of private rights re-
sulting from the state-enforced monopoly.
Kent's approach was that of a supreme authority within the self-
imposed limitations of the great common law judge, steeped in Blackstoie
and the other great commentaries of the common law. He set a judicial
aura by stating a traditional mode of judicial decision-making. "This
house," he said, "sitting in its judicial capacity as a court, has nothing
to do with the policy or expediency of these laws."'88 Kent's statement
of the question was whether the legislature of the state continued to have
the requisite constitutional authority for granting the exclusive franchise.
The principle of law, and authority for deciding this question, was to be
formulated from the judicial construction of the Constitution. Consti-
tutional interpretation was to be made by applying the rules of construc-
tion that the court had laid down for itself to follow. Rules of construc-
tion-the modus operandi of judicial decision-making-were said to have
the effect of insulating the judiciary from the broad policy questions.
"exclusively with the courts of the United States to interpose...." Ibid. The New
York laws granting exclusive privileges could not interfere with the authority of the
commerce clause because the exclusive privileges were limited to navigable waters with-
in the confines of the state, and if such regulations came within the national power
"almost all subjects of legislation would be swallowed up, and it might, eventually, lead
to the total prostration of internal improvements." Id. at 561. Thus the state court's
final concern was with the legal authority of the privileges and immunities clause, which
in intent and purpose was said to be limited to discrimination against the citizens of
other states.
Justice Smith Thompson, who later was appointed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, applied the same rule of constitutional construction as did Justice Yates,
arriving at the same conclusion that all state powers of government were retained and
continued in the state as before the adoption of the Constitution except in "case of colli-
sion .. .the state laws must yield to the superior authority of the United States." Id.
at 566. The national powers over patents and copyrights and the regulation of com-
merce were enumerated and thus limited powers, leaving the total sovereignty over these
subjects in the member states. Thus the private rights under the exclusive franchise
were paramount until questions of conflicting rights under an act of the Congress were
raised. Thompson stated that "the only restriction upon the state government in the
exercise of the concurrent powers is, that the state must act in subordination to the
general government." Id. at 567-68. The only exclusive powers which Thompson recog-
nized were those not existing in the states prior to the adoption of the Constitution, such
as the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. As to the commerce
power, Thompson went over further in limiting the national government in order to
enlarge the states' powers. If the exclusive franchise could "be considered a regulation
of commerce, it is the internal commerce of the State, over which Congress has no
power. . . ." Id. at 568. As alleged 'by counsel in Elkson v. Deliesselite respecting
South Carolina's internal security power, the exclusive franchise was a subject of in-
ternal commerce and "it never has been, either expressly or impliedly, yielded to the
general government." Ibid.
133. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 572 (N.Y. Ct Err. 1812).
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Initially the presumption in favor of the validity of the state legislation
"must be admitted to be extremely strong."'3  The judicially-created
presumption was stated to be firmly established in this case because simi-
lar legislation had been enacted five times in New York without a trace
of constitutional objection." And the presumption was even more
weighted because the statute was enacted when the first Chief Justice of
the United States was the state's chief magistrate, a man distinguished
"for the scrupulous care and profound attention with which he examined
every question of a constitutional nature."' 6
Kent did not rest his determination on presumption alone. He theo-
rized about the general nature of the Constitution with reference to those
rules of construction which had the effect of giving recognition to the
need for the continuation of wide and expanding powers of the state
legislatures. But the great judge was not of one mind in relation to the
respective powers of the nation's governments; he did not wish to give
support to the dogma-ridden theories of the state rights position. He
recognized that "powers [granted to the general government] whether
expressed or implied, may be plenary and sovereign, in reference to the
specified objects of them. They may even be liberally construed in
furtherance of the great and essential ends of the government.""' . The
question of the statute's validity did not pertain to the scope of national
powers.' "It does not follow," Kent emphasized, "that because a given
power is granted to Congress, the states cannot exercise a similar
power."' 30  If the people of these United States had created "a single,
entire government," the powers of the national government would have
been indefinite and incapable of enumeration, and the govenument then
would have contained all rights of sovereignty. On the other hand, when
a federal government is erected which contains a portion of the nation's
sovereign powers "the rule of construction is directly the reverse, and
every power is reserved to the member that is not, either in express terms,
or by necessary implication, taken away from them, and vested exclu-
sively in the federal head. This rule has not only been acknowledged
by the most intelligent friends of the constitution, but is plainly declared
by the instrument itself."' 40
134. Ibid.
135. Id. at 573.
136. Id. at 574.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid. Kent gave the following example in support of this so-called "rule of
construction :"
Congress has power to lay and collect taxes, duties and excises, but as these
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The consequence of this judicial formulation of national law was a
continuation of the governmental authority of the member states sub-
stantially as before the Constitution. Kent did not theorize the dual-
state sovereignty approach which attempted a reconstruction of the Con-
stitution by narrowing the national powers and continuing state powers
in the form of independent sovereigns. The state powers were to con-
tinue until the Congress had enacted legislation which clearly suspended
those powers, or at least until a clear precedent was established by the
powers are not given exclusively, the states have a concurrent jurisdiction,
and retain the same absolute powers of taxation which they possessed before
the adoption of the Constitution, except the power of laying an impost, which
is expressly taken away. This very exception proves that, without it, the states
would have retained the power of laying an impost; and it further implies, that
in cases not excepted, the authority of the states remains unimpaired.
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 574-75 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812). See contra,
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), as to the
effect of the explicit prohibition against state taxation on imports and exports upon the
meaning of the Constitution, with reference to powers of government, national and state,
and the independent authority to formulate national law in review of state powers. State
taxing powers are of course limited through judicial review of the state's prerogatives
in ways not applicable to the national powers and not conceived of by Kent, and the
states' taxing powers are not, as Kent thought, "concurrent powers" outside the legal
authority of the Constitution except when in conflict with an act of the Congress.
Compare, e.g., Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), with New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572 (1946).
One of the "most intelligent friends" of the Constitution of whom Kent was speak-
ing was Mr. Hamilton, who, according to Kent, drafted the thirty-second number of THE
FEDERALIST. It is doubtful that THE FEDERALIST reflected Hamilton's thinking on the Con-
stitution. Nevertheless, Kent interpreted Hamilton according to that work, in the fol-
lowing:
[H]e admits that all the authorities of which the states are not explicitly de-
vested, remain with them in full vigor, and that in all cases in which it was
deemed improper that a like authority, with that granted to the Union should
reside in the states, there was the most pointed care in the Constitution to insert
negative clauses. He further states that there are only three cases of the aliena-
tion of state sovereignty: 1. Where the grant to the general government is, in
express terms, exclusive; 2. Where a like power is expressly prohibited to the
states; and 3. Where an authority in the states would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant to one granted to the Union; and it must be, he
says, an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can, by implication, alienate
and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 576 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812). Further, according
to Kent, Hamilton was of the same mind during the New York convention held to
adopt or reject the Constitution, for
The same view of the powers of the federal and state governments, and the
same rules of interpretation, were given by him, in the discussions which the
Constitution underwent in our State Convention, and they seem generally, if
not unanimously, to have been acquiesced in by the members of that very re-
spectable assembly. ...
Ibid. These opinions-Kent's interpretation of Hamilton on the Constitution-from one
"who had bestowed intense thought, not only upon the science of civil government at
large, but who had specially and deeply studied the history and nature, the tendency
and genius of the federal system of government . . . may be regarded as the best evi-
dence of the sense of the authors of that instrument, the best test of its principles, and
the most accurate contemporary exposition to which we can recur." Id. at 576-77.
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Supreme Court's formulation of national law which was binding upon
a state court. It was not the function of the New York Court of Errors,
Kent thought, to formulate national law out of the authority of the Con-
stitution which was binding upon all the nation's governments. The
job of formulating national law from the authority of the Constitution
was the peculiar function of the nation's highest tribunal. The supremacy
clause and the tenth amendment were cited as justifying the limited role
of the state court in the peculiar construction he gave the Constitution.
The tenth amendment was cited as justifying the continuation of state
power under the logical but impractical Chief Justice Taney-like con-
struction, that "the powers of the two governments are each supreme
within their respective constitutional spheres."' 41  This proposition con-
flicted with the parallel construction of the supremacy clause by which
the powers of the state were made subordinate to the legislative powers
of the Congress. The supremacy clause was apparently limited by the
court as enforcing an act of the Congress against the authority of the
state.
Kent thought that a constitutional invalidation of the state regula-
tion from the authority of the commerce clause would result in "theoreti-
cal difficulties," which would overtax the court's sagacity "to see whether
the law might not contravene some future regulation of commerce, or
some moneyed or some military operation of the United States."' 42  But
he expressed much too limited a view of the powers of the national gov-
ernment and likewise too broad a view of state powers. The scope of
the commerce powers was limited to activities not wholly within a single
state. He anticipated the reasoning of the Taney Court when he de-
termined that "all internal commerce of the state by land and water re-
mains entirely and . . exclusively within the scope of its original
sovereignty."'43
Kent failed to conceive that the reach of the commerce powers must
be largely a legislative question and not a subject for abstract judicial
determination."" Judicial review to determine the possible scope of the
141. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 575 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812). The state
act was not subject to the formulation of national law, for "The ratification of the Con-
stitution by the Convention of this State, was made with the explanation and under-
standing, that 'every power, jurisdiction and right, which was not clearly delegated to the
general government, remained to the people of the several states, or to their respective
state governments.'" Ibid.
142. Id. at 576.
143. Id. at 578.
144. Kent wrote:
Our safe rule of construction and of action is this, that if any given power was
originally vested in this State, if it has not been exclusively ceded to Congress,
or if the exercise of it has not been prohibited to the states, we may then go on
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national powers had to follow and be related to the judicial enforcement
of an enactment of the Congress.145 But Kent was right when he sug-
gested that the formulation of national law from the authority of the
Constitution was the unique function of the Supreme Court. This was'
recognized in section twenty-five of the Judiciary Act. The state courts
were bound by the law of the state until the national law was formulated
by that higher authority whose law formulations were clearly recognized
as binding upon the governmental authority of all the member states."'
in the exercise of the power until it comes practically in collision with the
actual exercise of some congressional power. When that happens to be the case,
the state authority will so far be controlled, but it will still be good in all those
respects in which it does not absolutely contravene the provision of the para-
mount law.
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 576 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
145. Kent's construction of the Constitution was to exclude the law making func-
tion of the court from the review of the state's prerogative, but this did not mean that
the states were likewise independent of the Congress in the exercise of its power. Thus
the powers of the national and state governments:
[C] annot . . . be supreme over each other, for that would involve a contradic-
tion. When those powers . . . come directly in contact, as when they are aimed
at each other . . . the power of the state is subordinate, and must yield. The
legitimate exercise of the constitutional powers of the general government be-
comes the supreme law of the land, and the national judiciary is specially
charged with the maintenance of that law, and this is the true and efficient
power to preserve order, dependence and harmony in our complicated system
of government.
Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 575 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
146. As Chief Justice of the New York Court of Erros, Kent made it doubly clear
throughout his opinion in the Livingston v. Van Ingen appeal, and likewise as Chancellor
in the subsequent case of Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150 (N.Y. Ct Ch. 1819),
that it was the function of the courts of the state not "to annihilate the legislative power
of the states" but to preserve it. Kent followed the presumptive approach that an in-
dependent law-formulation role in the building of national law, in the process of judicial
review of the state's prerogative, was in derogation and in annihilation of the state's
powers. Thus it could not be a function of the state courts to formulate national law
in review of the functioning of the state's powers, and the Constitution was interpreted
as if there were no law-formulation role in the process of review of the prerogative of
the member states. Essentially it was this approach, from the vantage point of a highly-
berthed state court judge, that brought Kent in conflict with Webster and Marshall in
the subsequent case of Gibbons v. Ogden, though the latter appeared to regret this con-
flict with a personage each held in such reverence. In Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns.
R. 507, 579 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812), Kent wrote the following in support of his proposi-
tion about the Constitution:
It strikes me to be an . . . inadmissible proposition, that the State is devested
of a capacity to grant an exclusive privilege of navigating a steamboat, within
its own waters, merely because we can imagine that Congress, in the plenary
execise of its powers to regulate commerce, may make some regulation inconsis-
tent with the exercise of this privilege. When such a case arises, it will pro-
vide for itself; and there is, fortunately, a paramount power in the Supreme
Court of the United States to guard against the mischiefs of collision.
Likewise under the patent power, according to Kent, the state was authorized to continue
to exercise its sovereign powers to create monopolies in the form of exclusive fran-
chises in steamboat navigation on its own waters, as Kent called them, unless and until
the Congress or the courts of the United States manifested a superior authority that
explicitly bound the state court, in place of the laws of the state of its own creation.
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V. GIBBONS V. OGDEN-BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES
Legal struggles which followed the advancement of steamboat tech-
nology resulted from the legislative grants by New York and other states
of exclusive rights to navigate upon the public waters of the respective
states. Questions arose as to the legal authority of a state to protect an
exclusive franchise by prohibiting the right of entry into the state by
non-licensed steamboats. The Livingston-Fulton franchise, for example,
had granted exclusive rights for navigating by steamboat between points
along the New Jersey coastline and points on Staten Island and Man-
hattan Island.'47 The ultimate legal question was whether the nationali-
zation of private rights embodied in the freedom to navigate the nation's
public waters by steamboat was required in order to overcome the re-
strictions resulting from the enforcement of the exclusive legislative
franchises in the state courts.
The jurisdictional authority for nationalizing private rights to en-
force the freedom of steamboat navigation was thought to turn on
whether invalidation of the state franchise was required and, if so, what
constitutional authority provided the most acceptable foundation for the
Court's invalidation of the state action. The commerce clause, authoriz-
ing national regulation of the various aspects of commerce, and the
various acts of the Congress providing for the enrolling and licensing of
American ships appeared to constitute the more effective authorities for
Id. at 581-83. See also, Parsons v. Barnard, 7 Johns. R. 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810). In
the case of Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 158 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819), Kent spoke
eloquently on this theme, in the following:
If the state laws are not absolutely null and void from the beginning, they re-
quire a greater power than a simple coasting license, to disarm them. We must
be permitted to require, at least, the presence and clear manifestation of some
constitutional law, or some judicial decision of the supreme power of the Union,
acting upon those laws, in direct collision and conflict, before we can retire from
support and defence of them. We must be satisfied that Neptuons muros, inag-
noque emota tridenti Fundamenta quatit. (-Emphasis added.)
147. According to the allegations made in the original bill, which were accepted as
judicial findings of fact, providing the basis for the original injunctive decree against
Thomas Gibbons, granted by Chancellor Kent in the New York Court of Chancery,
Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton, under their exclusive franchise, had granted
by indenture to John R. Livingston and his assigns the exclusive rights "to navigate
from any place within the city of New York, lying to the south of the state prison, to
certain places in the said indenture specified, and lying to the south of Powles Hook
ferry, and particularly to Staten Island, Elizabethtown Point, Perth, and South Amboy,
and the river Raritan up to New Brunswick." On the 5th of May, 1815, John R. Livings-
ton, in turn, granted to Colonel Ogden the exclusive franchise over these waters for a
period of ten years. After the death of Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton, in
February, 1813, and March, 1815, their legal representatives covenanted with Colonel
Ogden and his partner, and their assigns, releasing all rights to operate any boats
which Colonel Ogden operated "on the Hudson River, on the sound between New York
Island and Long Island, or between New York and Elizabethtown Point, or Elizabeth-
town." Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 151-52 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819).
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invalidating the state laws in question. But the judicial authority for
invalidating the state franchise so dominated the litigation that the law
providing for the judicial enforcement of private rights appeared to be
included in the law formulated for decreeing the state act void. 48 Never-
theless, the freedom to own and operate a steamboat on all the nation's
public waters was the real purport of the litigation, and enforcement of
the freedom to navigate by steamboat was included in the Court's decree
following its declaration invalidating the state law.
The fact that the case arose over the right to navigate into the waters
of New York from another state, unhindered by the state laws in ques-
tion, was not a material factor to the judicial determination. If the pri-
vate rights of the entrepreneur in the new steamboat technology were to
be nationalized it was not material whether these rights were exercised
on the navigable waters that lay wholly within the state or on the public
waters that lay between the land boundaries of two states like New York
and New Jersey. 4 ' More significant was the result that the member
148. The constitutional theory and structure question of whether the national judi-
ciary and the Supreme Court in particular have the jurisdiction, authority and responsi-
bility, to formulate and declare law independent of the Constitution, laws and treaties
of the United States is a subject too complex to interpose there, and it would be in-
apposite to the subject under discussion. Compare Warren, New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HsAv. L. REv. 49 (1923), with 2 CRossKEY, PoLi-
TICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITD STATES 818-64, 865-937
(1953). Also the subject is somewhat unreal; the judicial lawmadng of the Supreme
Court and the federal judiciary generally when manned by great judges like William
Howard Taft who served the Sixth Circuit and Learned Hand who served the Second
has followed the formative approach to the growth of law drawn out of the Constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States, in line with the traditions similarly evolved
by the Roman Praetor under the Roman law and the King's courts under the common
law. Law drawn out of the three sources, the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States, to a large extent has kept abreast of society's needs. It may be fair to
say that the national judiciary, with the limited authoritative sources for its lawmaking
has been more formative than the King's courts with the abstract unlimited sources for
their lawmaking, at least when the comparison is made in the late 19th and the 20th
centuries.
149. The decree in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239 (1824), was
drawn with care so as to state broadly with no intrastate limitation the private rights in
the freedom to navigate the waters of the United States. The decree stated in part as
follows: "that so much of the several laws of the state of New York, as prohibit ves-
sels, licensed according to the laws of the United States, from navigating the waters of
the State of New York, by means of fire or steam, is repugnant to the said constitution,
and void." Id. at 240. In North River Steam Boat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713 (N.Y.
Ct. Err. 1825), the Court's decree in Gibbons v. Ogden was construed to be applicable
to the private rights of entrepreneurs to ply the waters of the Hudson River between
New York and Albany with a steamboat licensed under the act of Congress, and the
holders of the exclusive francise in steamboat navigation under the New York statutes
were therefore not entitled to an injunction in equity against the competition that fol-
lowed the Court's decree. In the majority opinion it was made clear that the freedom
of movement by navigation on waters wholly within the borders of a particular state
was controlled by the national power. Chief justice Savage of the New York Supreme
Court wrote as follows:
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states had to comply with the adjudicated national law; thus the case ap-
peared to raise momentous political questions of state power versus na-
tional power. The common law court in building the adjudicative law
of England relied on the authority of constitutional and administrative
powers of the sovereign. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, had
to devise fundamental law from the authority of the Constitution in order
to justify the invalidation of authority in the member states. Invalida-
tion was necessary to bring the pretended sovereignty of the states under
the adjudicated national law. Thus the requirement of invalidating state
authority has sometimes appeared to twist the Court's decision-making
and law-formulation roles into what appears to be a process for the
parcelling out of abstract powers of government."'
This power of regulating commerce led to many difficulties and embarrassments,
as we learn from the history of the times; and to prevent a recurrence of those
commercial difficulties, was one great and leading inducement to the adoption
of the present constitution. Any power, therefore, given to congress, short of
the power to regulate that commerce to which the people of the United States
had access, would not have secured the object so desirable to be attained; and
it never could have been intended that, within the territory of a particular state,
congress should define the rights and privileges of citizens of other states,
while the state legislature should define the rights and privileges of its own
citizens, in relation to the same subject. The framers of the constitution never
supposed that they were splitting the jurisdiction over the subject, and leaving it
liable to most of the difficulties which previously existed. If the several states
may still regulate commerce, within the limits of their states, to the exclusion
of congress, there is nothing left for congress to act on. If the power of con-
gress is limited to voyages commencing in one state and terminating in another,
then its jurisdiction is much abridged, and much of the act regulating coasting
trade should be appealed.
Id. at 751. For a full treatment of the opinions and views expressed in North River
Steam Boat Co. 'v. Livingston see 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 268-80 (1953).
150. Overemphasis on the sources of the Court's authority and the resultant slight-
ing of the circumstances of particular cases, made in some opinions of the Court and in
some, perhaps, in most, of the writings about the Court's work, has served somewhat to
blur the essential fact that the Supreme Court is first and foremost a Court of law,
which means that its fundamental job is to decide a particular case based upon the cir-
cumstances of the record and proof made in the case. Legal principles and standards
providing a basis for a legal determination and remedy are drawn from the various
clauses and principles of the Constitution, from legal precedents, from the laws and
treaties of the United States, and from numerous additional sources. The actual deter-
mination for which the legal principles and legal standard are created, normally results
from the circumstances presented in the case, e.g., from a factual showing that a state
law has unduly invaded the rights of an individual or the economic freedom of a cor-
porate personality. Such a determination is made with rationale and reason that re-
flects the cultural setting of the historical evolution and functional development of the
institutions involved.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court is by no means an "unloosed" governmental
institution created to be an arbiter of powers of government. In a recent case, Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), as an example, the legal determination that
the state law was invalid was drawn from the circumstances shown by the record but
resolved under the authority and in light of the legal history of the commerce clause;
the state limitations on length of trains unduly interfered with the company's freedom
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The litigation culminating in the historic case of Gibbons v. Ogden
actually arose out of a series of quarrelsome associations and inter-
changes between Colonel Aaron Ogden and Thomas Gibbons, rather than
from any ostensible political or legal conflict between the national and
state governments.' Both Ogden and Gibbons were prominent lawyer-
of operating the trains and subjected the railroad's property to confiscation in behalf of
some vague state policy supposed to favor the safety and regularity of employment of
the association of railroad workers. It was the company's freedom of operating its
trains that was judicially enforced. Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion is erroneous,
not because he thought the state law should be enforced, but because he thought the
matter should be placed outside the Court's jurisdiction and authority and withdrawn
from the national legal structure, except as the Congress had made freedom of the
railroad to operate its properties a national policy, a contention just as applicable to
rights under the first amendment.
Apparently, however, Mr. Justice Black has approved of the Court's creation of
legal standards out of the commerce clause in order to enforce some private rights for
some groups, as not being subject completely to the legislative prerogative. See, e.g., his
concurring opinion in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946), where the Court
held that segregation in bus transportation denied the individual's basic freedom of move-
ment from place to place and freedom of association, though the opinion was stated in
the outdated formalism of the state having invaded the Congress powers, apparently
upon the assumption that the Congress-but not the states-had the authority to segregate
in transporation. Mr. Justice Black fails to comprehend that if the Court has no juris-
diction to formulate and enforce legal principles against the injustice of confiscation of
property caused by restrictions against its free and justifiable use and enjoyment, it
likewise has no jurisdiction and process to formulate such principles and to enforce
them against inequality. Moreover, in the deft hands of Mr. Justice Black the funda-
mental law of the Constitution loses its essential character of universality, for it ap-
pears to be restricted to a privileged minority.
151. Colonel Aaron Ogden was born in Elizabethtown (now Elizabeth), New Jer-
sey, in 1756. Graduating from the College of New Jersey (renamed Princeton) in the
class of 1773, a classmate of "Light-Horse" Harry Lee of Virginia and one class ahead
of Aaron Burr, Ogden served in the Revolutionary War as a line officer with the 1st
New Jersey regiment. He later commanded New Jersey infantry divisions in the French
War preparations during 1797-1800, for which he received the title of colonel and later,
in 1813, he declined appointment to major-general in the regular army, a post offered
him by President Madison in the second war with England. After the Revolutionary
War Colonel Ogden studied law with his older brother and became a successful attorney.
A prominent Federalist in New Jersey, he was chosen United States Senator in 1801
and was elected Governor of New Jersey in 1812 on an anti-war ticket. In addition to
his being a leading soldier and prominent lawyer and public person of New Jersey,
Ogden was also a prominent banker and financier in Elizabethtown. But Ogden's dis-
tinctive place in history is his steamboat ferry operation and his partnership with the
great steam engine builder Daniel Dod, whose engines powered Ogden's boats.
In 1812 Ogden acquired the steamboat Sea Horse for use in ferry service in the
New York Bay between Elizabethtown Point, New Jersey, and Staten Island and other
points in the Boy. Ogden's conflict with the New York steamboat monopoly, which
was armed with the New York statutes and the injunctive powers of the New York
Court of Chancery following the case of Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507 (N.Y.
Ct. Err. 1812), caused his bankruptcy. Ogden used his influence in New Jersey to ob-
tain an exclusive franchise for steamboat navigation from the legislature of New Jer-
sey. Act of Nov. 3, 1813, N. J. Laws 1811-1814, 38th General Assembly, 1st Sitting, at 61,
but the New Jersey legislative attempts at reprisal were not very successful. In 1815
Colonel Ogden went to the New York legislature to plead for repeal or qualification of
the New York monopoly. By this time Livingston and Fulton were both dead and those
who succeeded to the interests in the franchise were made uncomfortable by Ogden's
THE MARSHALL COURT
residents of the oceanport village of Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Colonel
Ogden operated his steamboat, the Sea Horse, and later, the Atlanzta, be-
pressuring. A committee of the New York legislature even went so far as to report
favorably on the repeal of the franchise. In the end Ogden was able to force an assign-
ment from John R. Livingston giving him the right to ply the Sea Horse in ferrying
trade between the New Jersey coast and stopping points in New York. But Ogden paid
heavily for the ten year assignment from the New York monopoly interests.
Terms of the assignment were reported in the pleadings in Livingston v. Ogden
and Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 48 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819), when the holders of the franchise
interest sued to enjoin Ogden and Gibbons from plying their respective steamboats in
New York waters. Chancellor Kent denied the motion for the injunction against Ogden
but entered a permanent injunction against Gibbons. John R. Livingston held exclusive
rights of navigation by steamboat in the waters "from any place within the city of New
York lying to the south of the State Prison, to the Jersey shore and Staten Island, viz.,
Staten Island, Elizabethtown Point, Amboy, and Rariton up to Brunswick, but no part or
place north of Powles Hook ferry." Id. at 49. These were the terms of the license
reassigned by John R. Livingston to Colonel Ogden on May 5, 1815, in order to secure
the franchise interests from a threat of legislative repeal. Therefore when Thomas
Gibbons appeared on the scene in 1817 to do battle for steamboat ferrying rights the
Ogden-Dod partnership had already fought and secured the legal rights to carry on
their business between points on the New Jersey coastline and points in New York City.
According to the resume about Thomas Gibbons he was an adventurer of a Rhett
Butler type. The Gibbonses lived on a plantation near Savannah, Georgia. Thomas
Gibbons, who was born in 1757, was reported to have been an active loyalist during the
Revolutionary War, though his father and brothers were patriots and their plantation
was not confiscated. He became a leading lawyer of the state. He is supposed to have
fought a duel with James Jackson over Jackson's attack against him for political cor-
ruption in the Jackson-Anthony Wayne campaign for the Congress in 1791, when there
seemed to have been more votes than registered voters, resulting in the unseating of
Anthony Wayne. See ANnALs oF CONG., 2d Cong. 461 (1849) [1791-1793]. Gibbons
served a number of terms as mayor of Savannah and received appointment from Presi-
dent Jefferson to the District Court of the United States for the District of Georgia.
In 1810 Thomas Gibbons purchased a summer residence in Elizabethtown in order to
escape the summer heat in Georgia and later moved to Elizabethtown permanently. In
1817 Gibbons acquired a small steam ferry named the Stoudinger, and in 1818 he pur-
chased another steamboat, the Bellona. To master the Bellona Gibbons hired a young
Staten Islander, Cornelius Van Derbilt, then twenty-four years of age. Van Derbilt
moved his family to New Brunswick and installed his wife as tavern keeper by the
riverside. Van Derbilt proved himself equal to the task of eluding the agents of the
New York monopoly, and the venture became very profitable.
In the meantime, the personal squabbles between Thomas Gibbons and Colonel Og-
den increased in intensity. Their many difficulties are set out at random in the New
Jersey court records. Thomas Gibbons was indicted for challenging Colonel Ogden to
a duel with pistols but the indictment was quashed. State v. Gibbons, 4 N.J.L. 45
(1818); State v. Dayton, 4 N.J.L. 63 (1818). Colonel Ogden sued Thomas Gibbons in
trespass quare clausam fregit, alleging the illegal challenge, and recovered from Gibbons
five thousand dollars in a jury verdict. Ogden v. Gibbons, 5 N.J.L. 598 (1819), rev'd,
5 N.J.L. 987 (1820). The reason given for the challenge was that Colonel Ogden was
said to have interfered with a domestic dispute between Thomas Gibbons and his wife.
The trouble apparently began when Colonel Ogden purchased a note outstanding against
Thomas Gibbons and sued him for recovery. Thomas Gibbons went to Colonel Ogden's
house with a horsewhip for the purpose of physical combat; Colonel Ogden apparently
left by the back door. Not finding Ogden at home, Gibbons posted the following bill
upon his front door:
To Colonel Aaron Ogden: Sir, As you refused to receive a letter which I sent
you by Gen. Dayton yesterday, I will give it publicly through another channel.
For like Nicanor upon Judas, you made war upon me on the Sabbath day. But
first, of the letter you had received by the hands of Gen. Dayton, which is as
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tween Elizabethtown Point, New Jersey, and points on Staten and Man-
hattan Islands under an exclusive license from the New York franchise
and under an exclusive franchise granted him by the New Jersey legisla-
ture. Thomas Gibbons, on the other hand, operated his two steamboats,
the Stoudinger and the Bellona, in competition with Colonel Ogden with-
out legal authorization from either New York or New Jersey. The liti-
gation that ensued involved the exclusion of Thomas Gibbons' steam-
boats from the New York waters through the judicial protection of the
New York franchise.
15 2
follows: "To Colonel Ogden, Eliz., 30th May, 1816: Sir, I was this day
arrested in a suit at law in your name, in the city of New York, after I was on
board of the steamboat returning to Elizabethtown. As we reside within half
a mile of each other and you never intimated to me or any of my friends any
claims or cause of action against me, I pronounce your conduct rascally. I don't
regard your suit in terroram, but I must teach you to proceed with decency."
Copy of the letter you declined receiving by the hands of Gen. Dayton: "To
Colonel Aaron Ogden, Elizabethtown, 25th July, 1816: Sir, I understand that
you have interfered in a dispute between Mrs. Gibbons and myself, which has
been brought on by John Trumbull and wife. My friend, General Dayton, will
arrange with you the time and place of our meeting. Elizabethtown, 26th
July, 1816. Thomas Gibbons"
Thomas Gibbons added a handwritten postscript to the hand bill as follows: "P. S. As
you have been furnished with such a hand-bill as the above, on the first ulto., I hope you
are prepared to explain yourself for your wanton interference in a case so delicate. If
you stand mute I shall adjudge you as pleading guilty and treat you as a convict." Og-
den v. Gibbons, supra at 598-99.
The only added known fact in the personal conflict over steamboat ferrying and
other matters, financial or otherwise, is that when Thomas Gibbons was unable to pur-
chase the exclusive rights in the New York waters which had been previously purchased
by Colonel Ogden, he purchased secretly the exclusive rights of Daniel D. Tompkins,
then Vice President of President Monroe's cabinet. The Livingston-Fulton interests
rejected Tompkins' claims and the Chancellor ruled against Gibbons' claim in Ogden v.
Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 154-55, 159-65 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819).
152. The ensuing litigation was begun by John R. Livingston, the assignee under
the original franchise of the rights to navigate by steamboat the waters south between
New York and various stopping points along the New Jersey coast. Livingston's bill
was filed on May 3, 1819, in which he sought to enjoin the steam ferryboat operations
of Colonel Ogden as well as those of Thomas Gibbons. Livingston was operating his
steamboat, the Olive Branch, from New York to Brunswick and was competing with
Gibbons' steamboat, the Bellona. Chancellor Kent denied the petition of John R. Liv-
ingston for a permanent injunction against Colonel Ogden for the operation of his
steamboat, then the Atlanta. However, the motion for permanent injunction was granted
against Thomas Gibbons in so far as he or his agent Cornelius Van Derbilt operated
his steamboats on the waters "in the bay of New York, or Hudson River, betveen
Staten Island and Powles Hook." Livingston v. Ogden and Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R.
48, 53 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819). On the following August 14, 1819, Thomas Gibbons filed
a petition for removal of the petition filed by John R. Livingston from the New York
Court of Chancery to the United States Circuit Court, and for an order striking the
name of Colonel Aaron Ogden from the cause because Ogden would not cooperate in
the removal. Chancellor Kent denied the petition for removal on the ground that it was
not timely, holding that petition for removal had to precede appearance, and suggesting
that under the removal act of Congress Gibbons was not entitled to a decision in both
the state and federal courts. Livingston v. Gibbons and Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 94,
97-100 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819). However, the Chancellor denied John R. Livingston's peti-
tion for forfeiture of Gibbons' steamboat, the Bellona, filed a year later, on August 26,
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Colonel Ogden initiated the litigation between himself and Gibbons
by filing a bill in chancery asking for protection of the exclusive license
granted him under the authority of the New York franchise, by perma-
nent injunction and by the confiscation of Gibbons' two steamboats and
all their appurtenances. Chancellor Kent granted the injunction on the
day the bill was filed."' Almost a year later, on August 19, 1819, Thomas
Gibbons filed his answer for review of the decree.' 4  He presented two
grounds for invalidating the New York acts granting the exclusive fran-
chise to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton. The first ground for
invalidating the New York franchise on the authority of the commerce
clause involved essentially the same issues which had been adjudicated
1820, leaving the matter to be taken care of in the suit at law. Livingston v. Gibbons,
4 Johns. Ch. R. 571 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1820). The litigation continued, seemingly without
end. On the 25th of February, 1820, the legislature of New Jersey, upon the petition of
Thomas Gibbons, passed an act titled, A further supplement to the act entitled "An act
to preserve and support the Jirisdiction of this State." Act of Feb. 25, 1820, N.J. Acts,
44th General Assembly, 2d Session 106 (1820). By this act Thomas Gibbons was en-
titled in the New Jersey Court of Chancery to damages by which he was aggrieved
because of the injunction against him in the New York Court of Chancery. On the
6th of May, 1820, Gibbons secured in the Court of Chancery of Nev Jersey a permanent
injunction against John R. Livingston from operating his steamboat, the Olive Branch,
in New Jersey waters and attached and detained the Olive Branch at New Brunswick.
See description of pleadings in Livingston v. Tompkins, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 415, 418-23
(N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1820).
153. Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819). Colonel Ogden's
bill set out the "Prayer for an injunction to restrain defendant, his agents, &c., from
using, employing, and navigating the said tvo steam-boats, or either of them, or any
other steamboat by him . . . on the waters of this state lying between Elizabethtown,
or any place within the bounds of the township, and the city of New York, &c." Id. at
152-53. The injunction was granted as requested.
154. Gibbons admitted the existence of the exclusive franchise granted to Robert R.
Livingston and Robert Fulton by the several acts of the New York legislature and the
deed of assignment to the waters in question to Colonel Ogden from John R. Livings-
ton, but denied the exclusive right claimed by Ogden to navigate the waters from Eliza-
bethtown Point to New York. First Gibbons contended that since his wharf in New
Jersey was not situated at Elizabethtown Point, but at Halsted's Town, a short distance
from Elizabethtown Point, the waters on which he operated were different waters and
therefore not covered by the deeds of assignment held by Ogden. In addition, Gibbons
contended that the deed of assignment did not grant Ogden exclusive rights to navigate
the waters in question, because he, Gibbons, had been assigned from Tompkins:
the right, liberty, and privilege of navigating . . . upon, over, and across the
waters of the bay of New York, Staten Island sound, the outward harbour, in-
cluding Prince's and Gravesend bays, and a part of the Atlantic ocean, and
Jamaica bay; and, also, a right, privilege, and liberty, with all such boats so
propelled [by fire and steam], to touch, stop, and land passengers, and discharge
cargoes, to depart from, and arrive at the city of New York, or any part
thereof....
Finally, Thomas Gibbons stated in his answer that his two steamboats were enrolled and
licensed to engage in coasting trade under the various acts of Congress. The Stoudinger
was enrolled at Perty Amboy, in New Jersey, on the 23rd of October, 1817, and licensed
for one year, and the license was renewed on the 20th of October, 1818, by the collector
of the port of Perth Amboy. The Bellona was enrolled and licensed for one year in like
manner on the 20th of October, 1818. Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 153-56
(N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819).
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finally for New York in Livingston v. Van Ingen."' The second ground,
which the New York Court of Errors had not adjudicated,"', was that
Gibbons had a nationalized right to navigate the nation's public waters,
rivers and lakes included, by virtue of his license under an act of the
Congress which was designed to encourage and protect coasting trade
and fisheries in American-owned ships. 7
Chancellor Kent gave serious consideration to the formulation of
law for the nationalizing of private rights in the freedom of navigation
and the judicial enforcement of those rights by virtue of the coasting
trade license." 8 Gibbons pleaded that under his license his steamboats,
the Stoudinger and the Bellona, "may be lawfully employed and navi-
gated in coasting trade between parts of the same state, or of different
states, and cannot be excluded or restricted therein, by any law or grant
of any particular state, or any pretense to an exclusive right to navigate
the waters of any particular state by steamboats. . ,,""s Kent dis-
155. 9 Johns. R. 507 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
156. Gibbons also alleged that even if the New York franchise was valid, he had
acquired rights under that franchise by reason of an assignment from Daniel D. Tomp-
kins and Noah Brown, assignees of the representatives of Robert R. Livingston and
Robert Fulton. Chancellor Kent disallowed the grant of the franchise to Thomas Gib-
bons because the grant to Colonel Ogden was a prior grant, made originally in 1808 to
John R. Livingston, and assigned to Colonel Ogden on the 20th of December, 1815, and
because the deed to Thomas Gibbons did not grant exclusive privileges to transport pas-
sengers from Elizabethtown and New York and therefore did not interfere with the
exclusive grant to Colonel Ogden. Chancellor Kent did not appear to be troubled by the
transference of exclusive franchise rights under the New York statutes from points
along the New Jersey coast, outside New York's jurisdiction and control, to points in
New York waters. Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 159-65 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819).
157. In Livingston v. Van, Ingen, Chancellor Kent, then Chief Justice of the New
York Supreme Court of Judicature, generally known as the New York Court of Errors,
referred to the application of the supremacy clause when state legislation interfered with
rights or policy under an act of Congress. According to Kent's obiter dicta the suprem-
acy clause did not authorize the invalidation of state power under the Constitution unless
and until there had been a prior determination of an actual conflict caused by the state
act's interference with the administration of an act of the Congress. "Supremacy" could
never connote "exclusive" power in the national government. 9 Johns. R. 507, 577-81
(N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
158. Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305. In the first Congress it was enacted
"That any ship or vessel built within the United States, and belonging wholly to a citi-
zen or citizens thereof . . . shall . . . be registered, and shall obtain a certificate of
such registry from the collector of the district to which such ship or vessel belongs ... "
Such ships were entitled to a license to trade from district to district for a period of one
year, and were to be allowed to pass from port to port free of manifest and the payment
of import duties and tonnage fees. Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, §§ 1, 2, 22, 23, 25-27,
1 Stat. 55; Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 94. The above acts were amended by
the Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305. The registration provisions of the above
acts were amended by the Act of Dec. 31, 1792, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 287. The ultimate legal
issue to be determined was whether the license provisions in the above statutes consti-
tuted a judicially enforcible authorization to ply the nation's coastal waters subject to
the laws of the United States.
159. Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 154 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819). The ton-
nage duties for ships or vessels of the United States as determined under the registry
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allowed Gibbons' legal claims under his federal license and sustained the
effective application of the New York law against the allegation of in-
terference with the rights of free navigation authorized and granted un-
der the act of the Congress. The ultimate conclusion was that the New
York statutes controlled the use and enjoyment of steamboats on all the
public waters of the state.
The Chancellor's mode of determination was posited upon the legal
presumption that the exclusive source of the right to possession and en-
joyment of one's property was to be found in "the laws and regulations
of the state."1 ' Because of this legal presumption the act of the Con-
gress was "never meant to determine the right of property, or the use
and enjoyment of it, under the laws of that state."'' An explicit in-
validation of the law of the state had to be written into the act of the
Congress in order to overcome this legal presumption: viz., "a provision
in the act of Congress, that all vessels duly licensed, should be at liberty
to navigate, for the purposes of trade and commerce, over all the navig-
able bays, harbors, rivers, and lakes within the several states, any law of
the states creating particular privileges as to any particular class of ves-
sels, to the contrary notwithstanding . "162
Because the states had exclusive authority over the private rights of
ownership and enjoyment of property, the private rights in the use and
enjoyment of the steamboats on the waters of the state were neither in-
creased nor diminished by the federal license. The act of the Congress
had merely determined by registration that the ship was American in
character, and had granted certain statutory privileges. 68 The noted
and enrolling and licensing acts cited above were six cents per ton, paid as a license tax
and not as port duties. Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 55, 61. Ships of foreign
registry had to pay tonnage duties of fifty cents per ton for use of such ship or vessel
in coasting trade.
160. Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 157 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819).
161. Chancellor Kent explained that:
The act of Congress (passed 18th of February, 1793, ch. 8) referred to in the
answer, provides for the enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed
in coasting trade and fisheries. Without being enrolled and licensed, they are
not entitled to the privileges of American vessels, but must pay the same fees
and tonnage as foreign vessels, and if they have on board articles of foreign
growth or manufacture, or distilled spirits, they are liable to forfeiture. I do
not perceive that this act confers any right incompatible with an exclusive right
in Livingston and Fulton. . . . The act of Congress referred to, never meant
to determine the right of property, or the use or enjoyment of it, under the
laws of the states.
Id. at 156-57.
162. Id. at 158.
163. Chancellor Kent followed the usual state-of-mind assumptions of the period
that under the Constitution the nation and its member states were separate, independent
governmental entities, as if the provisions of the Constitution were similar to the laws
of nations and more or less a continuation of the Articles of Confederation. To illus-
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Chancellor, in dosing, again expressed a significant thought on the func-
tional role of state courts in the formulation of national law from the
authority of the Constitution. Kent required that the state courts be
presented with something more than an exclusive coasting license before
they could justifiably nullify the laws of the state, in order to formulate
national law that would be binding on all the states. "We must be per-
mitted to require, at least, the presence and clear manifestation of some
constitutional law, or some judicial decision of the supreme power of the
Union, acting upon these laws, in direct collision and conflict, before we
can retire from the support and defense of them," the Chancellor ex-
plained, and he added a coda: "We must be satisfied that Neptunus
muros, magnoque emota tridenti. Fundamenta quatit."'6 4
The permanent injunction against Gibbons' employment of his ships
in the New York waters was affirmed on appeal by the New York Court
of Errors. 6 ' However, the New York steamboat operation had been
trate his position, Kent discussed the copyrights and patents clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, which provides that the Congress shall have power "To promote the Progress of
Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective 'Writings and Discoveries," within this framework:
If an individual be, for instance, in possession of any duly patented vehicle, or
machine, or vessel, or medicine, or book, must not such property be held, used,
and enjoyed, subject to the general laws of the land, such as laws establishing
turnpike roads and toll bridges, or the exclusive right to a ferry, or laws for
preventing and removing nuisances? Must it not be subject to all other regu-
lations touching the use and enjoyment of property, which the Legislature of
the state may deem just and expedient?
Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 157 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819). (Emphasis added.)
164. Id. at 159. With the w obstante the Chancellor delineated that:
[T]he only question that could arise in such a case, would be, whether the law
was constitutional. If that was to be granted or decided in favour of the law,
it would certainly, in all Courts and places, overrule and set aside the state
grant. But, at present, we have no such case, and there is no ground to infer
any such supremacy or intention, from the act regulating the coasting trade.
There is no collision between the act of Congress and the acts of the state, creat-
ing the steamboat monopoly.
Id. at 158. (Emphasis added.)
165. Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 Johns. R. 488 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1820). Counsel for
Colonel Ogden suggested that the appeal to the court of errors was "merely pro forma,
for the purpose of having the cause carried up to the Supreme Court of the United
States." Id. at 505. On appeal the issue emphasized was the alleged "direct collision be-
tween the authority of the United States, and that of . . . [the] state," because "in such
a case, the state laws must yield to the paramount authority of the general government."
Id. at 501-02. The issue was broadened by counsel for Gibbons, who argued that the
New York franchise was in conflict with the treaties of amity and commerce subsisting
between the United States and various countries of Europe. Presumably the New York
legislation was as applicable to a steamboat owned and navigated by a foreign national
as by an American.
The court of errors did not directly answer this latest argument, but followed Chan-
cellor Kent in construing the enrolling and licensing acts of Congress as being restricted
to establishing the national character of ships or vessels so as to impose discriminating
duties upon ships navigated by nationals of foreign countries. Justice Platt explained
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too profitable for Gibbons not to continue the litigation in an effort to
secure its recovery under the national law formulated in the Supreme
Court. III with diabetes, Gibbons dispatched his loyal and faithful ship-
master on the Bellonc, young Cornelius Van Derbilt, to Washington to
employ counsel to appeal the cause to the Supreme Court.6 ' Captain
Van Derbilt engaged his assignment with his usual enthusiasm, and he
made the happy choice of Daniel Webster and William Wirt, then among
the recognized leaders of the bar of the Supreme Court. Webster's repu-
tation was flushed with the acclaim of the Dartmoutlh College case, 6 ' and
the act of the Congress relating to the enrolling and licensing of ships in coasting trade
in the following:
The term "license" seems not to be used in the sense imputed to it by the coun-
sel for the appellant: that is, a permit to trade; or as giving a right of transit.
Because it is perfectly clear, that such a vessel, coasting from one state to an-
other, would have exactly the same right to trade, and the same right of transit,
whether she had the coasting license or not. She does not, therefore, derive her
right from the license; the only effect of which is, to determine her national
character, and the rate of duties which she is to pay.
Id. at 509. Thus the license under the act of Congress (as interpreted by the New York
Court of Errors) gave no right of navigating the nation's waters, and there could be no
conflict between the laws of the two governments. Remaining only was the abstract
question, under the commerce clause, of whether there were judicially enforceable private
rights in the general freedom of movement by navigation, which had been negatived with
such emphasis by the court of errors in Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507 (N.Y.
Ct. Err. 1812). Justice Platt saw no grounds upon which Lizingston v. Van Ingen
could be distinguished, and thus affirmed the court of chancery.
166. See Kendall, Mr. Gibbonis and Colmiel Ogden, 26 Micn. S.B.J. 22, 24 (Feb.
1947). David W. Kendall, Esq., has published an interesting and helpful note on the
personal conflict between the two steamboat owners, out of which litigation arose in
the Gibbons v. Ogden appeal. Some of the most interesting statements included in Mr.
Kendall's note suffer from lack of documentation, yet he writes as if he were writing
from authority and not from fiction, as if he had the authority in hand if he had wished
to use it. One of the more interesting of the undocumented statements records that
young Cornelius Van Derbilt travelled to Washington and selected Webster and Wirt
as counsel to represent his employer in the Gibbons v. Ogden appeal in the Supreme
Court. Mir. Kendall writes as follows: "From this decision, Gibbons immediately ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court the constitutional commerce clause question being raised,
among others. Ill with diabetes, he sent Van Derbilt to Washington to employ counsel,
with the happy result that Daniel Webster, already known for the Dartmouth College
case, and William Wirt, the Attorney General, were employed." Ibid.
167. The Court's opinions in the Dartmouth College case were read on the first
day of the February Term, 1819, on the morning of Tuesday, February 2. Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). In result of his arguments in
this case Webster's reputation had risen and he became known as the "Expounder of
the Constitution." There were also the great constitutional cases of Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819); and Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) which added
lustre to Webster's fame, but none replaced the Dartmouth College case as the most sig-
nificant to Webster's place in constitutional history. See, e.g., Cole, Daniel Webster in
19 DIcrONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 585, 587-88 (1943) ; 1 CuRTis, DANIM WEE-
sTER 169-71 (1872) ; 1 Fuass, DANIEL WEsTER 215, 232, 243-45 (1930) ; 1 WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITEn STATES HISTORY 479-80 (1935). At the time he was
selected for the Gibbons v. Ogden appeal, in the spring of 1820, Webster was living in
Boston, having moved from Portsmouth in the summer of 1816, and was engaged in
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Wirt's reputation was enhanced by his official status as the perennial
Attorney General of the United States and by his appearance before the
Supreme Court in a series of the early constitutional cases.16 But Colonel
Ogden was not outdone in choice of counsel to handle his side of the
appeal. He retained the inimitable and hitherto unrivalled William
Pinckney of Baltimore, who had been associated with Webster and Wirt
as counsel for the Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. M1Varyland.0 9
the practice of law. Though he was then not a member of the national Congress he
engaged in numerous public activities including the state constitutional convention of
1820-1821. 1 FUESs, op. cit. suepra at 197-306.
168. Wirt served twelve continuous years as Attorney General of the United States,
from the fall of 1817, near the beginning of James Monroe's first term of office, until
March, 1829, at the end of John Quincy Adam's term in the presidency. William Wirt
had represented the government in the prosecution of Aaron Burr for treason, had been
co-counsel with Webster and William Pinckney for the Bank of the United States in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and had opposed Webster and
Joseph Hopkinson of Philadelphia in the Dartmouth College case, supra note 167. Wirt,
with Webster, William Pinckney, and Joseph Hopkinson, was acclaimed a leader of the
Supreme Court Bar. He was noted by his contemporaries for his quiet and studied elo-
quence in expression. In addition to his status of public counsellor, William Wirt was
acclaimed by his friend Thomas Jefferson and others for his authorship. His publica-
tions, which were read widely, included THE LETTERS OF THE BRITISH SPY (1803), a
series of essays on the life and times published under the title of THE OLD BACHELOR,
and a well known biographic study of Patrick Henry, titled SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND
CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY (1817). See Abernethy, William Wirt, in 20 DICTIONARY
OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 418-21 (1943); KENNEDY, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM
WIRT, vol. I, 109-23, 161-206, 295-309, 352-59, vol. II, 14-24, 28-93, 152-56, 161-70, 192-96,
207-09, 214-20, 254-329, 334-44, 370-76, 401-06, 425-49 (1848) ; TIOMAS, William Wirt, in
JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE AND OTHER SKETCHES OF CHARACTER 33-46 (1853) ; and
WILLISTON, ELOQUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, VOl. IV, 394-417, vol. V, 454-503 (1827).
169. In addition to William Pinckney, Colonel Ogden selected Messrs. Thomas
Oakley and Emmett, noted counsellors of New York who as loyal professionals had
represented the steamboat franchise interests so often that they must have arranged their
court presentations in cadence. While Pinckney gave sixteen years of his career to the
foreign service and additional years to public service to his state and nation, he appeared
in seventy-two cases before the Supreme Court and many considered him the greatest
advocate of his time. Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed him "the greatest man I ever
saw in a Court of Justice"; Chief Justice Taney once exclaimed of his fellow towns-
man: "I have heard almost all the great advocates of the United States, both of the
past and present generations, but I have seen none to equal Pinckney"; and Justice Story
added to the acclaim for Pinckney: "his eloquence was overwhelming." But William
Pinckney died on February 25, 1822, exhausted by overwork while serving in the United
States Senate, two years before the Gibbons v. Ogden appeal was brought to argument
and decision. It is not being unrealistic to surmise that if William Pinckney had lived
to argue for the steamboat monopoly his eloquence might have convinced at least a ma-
jority of the court to affirm the constitutional theories and statutory interpretation
enunciated by Chancellor Kent in Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507 (N.Y. Ct.
Err. 1812), who incidentally, was as esteemed by the Justices of the Supreme Court of
that day as is Learned Hand of the present day. See, Dolan, William Pinckney, in 14
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 626 (1943); 1 LIFE, LETTERS AND JOURNALS OF
GEORGE TICKNOR 39-41 (1876); PINCKNEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PINCKNEY (1853);
WHEATON, LIVES OF WILLIAM PINCKNEY, WILLIAM ELLERY, AND COTTON MATHER 3-84
(1844).
Thomas J. Oakley and Thomas A. Emmett, whom Colonel Ogden selected as co-
counsel to replace the great William Pinckney, were able counsel and performed out-
standingly in the Gibbo;s v. Ogden appeal, but they lacked the stature of nationally recog-
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Like Wirt, Pinckney had appeared on both sides of the larger question
of whether there was independent sovereignty in the nation's member
states which allowed for the continual enlargement of state powers with
consequential limitations upon the national powers.Y
The appeal in Gibbons v. Ogden was first docketed in the Supreme
nized constitutional lawyers of the Supreme Court Bar, a characteristic significant to the
winning of constitutional cases in the Marshall Court. Oakley had been a Federalist
member of the Thirteenth Congress, 1813-1815, and critic of President Madison's ad-
ministration in the War of 1812. In the interim from 1815 to 1824, when he represented
Colonel Ogden and the franchise in the Gibbons v. Ogden appeal, Oakley practiced law in
Poughkeepsie and served as a Federalist leader in the state assembly. In 1819 he suc-
ceeded Martin Van Buren to the office of the attorney general of the state, from which
politics caused his removal in 1821. In 1826 he was elected as a Governor Clinton Demo-
crat congressman in the Twentieth Congress. In 1828 he was appointed to the bench
in the New York courts where he remained until his death in 1857. Oakley was a mem-
ber of the Kent Club, a leading Saturday night law club for legal and scientific discus-
sions, after which "reports of champagne bottles were preferred to law reports." See
THE DIAxRY OF PHILIP HONE 396 (Nevins ed. 1936). Professor Beveridge characterized
Thomas J. Oakley as a "cold, clear reasoner, and carefully trained lawyer, but lacking
imagination, warmth, or breadth of vision . . . [and] not an adequate substitute for the
masterful and glowing Pinckney." BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 423-24
(1919). See Moore, Thomas Jackson Oakley in 13 DIcTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY
604 (1943) ; WAVRARN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 369, 393-94 (1911).
Thomas Addis Emmett had both sparkle and intellect. Emmett's family were Irish
patriots and prominent physicians. He studied at Trinity College, Dublin, graduating in
1778, and received his doctorate of medicine from the University of Edinburgh in 1784.
He practiced in Dublin and became a state physician with his father. Upon the death
of his lawyer brother in 1789, he abandoned medicine and turned to the law. After
study for a year in the Temple, London, he was admitted to the bar in Dublin in 1790.
Emmett aligned himself with the Society of United Irishmen and very soon landed in
prison, after a brilliant success at the bar. Finally he was released from the prison at
Fort George in Scotland on condition he would leave the British Empire. He landed
in New York with his family in November, 1804. It is a supportable conclusion that
Emmett's presentations in Gibbons v. Ogden were on a higher intellectual and profes-
sional level than were those of either Webster or Wirt, and were considerably above
those of his co-counsel Oakley. Emmett once received the acclaim of the vain William
Pinckney, who had appeared against him in the Supreme Court beginning with the prize
cases of the 1815 Term, and from Justice Story and others for his abilities in advocacy.
See 1 LIFE, LETTERS, AND JOURNALS OF GEORGE TICKNOR 40-41 (1876) ; WHEATON, SOiM
ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE, WRITINGS, AND SPEECHES OF WILLIAM PINCKNEY 500 (1862).
Beveridge's comment on Emmett also was favorable: "Not even Pinckney at his best
ever was more thorough than was Emmett in his superb argument in Gibbons v. Ogden."
4 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra at 427. The thrice-told letter of William Wirt is worth re-
peating here:
To-morrow begin my toils in the Supreme Court, and about to-morrow week
will come on the great steamboat question from New York. Emmett and
Oakley on one side, Webster and myself on the other. . . . Emmett's whole
soul is in the cause, and he will stretch all his powers. Oakley is said to be
one of the first logicians of the age; as much a Phoecion as Emmett is a
Themistocles; and Webster is as ambitious as Caesar. He will not be outdone
by any man, if it is within the compass of his power to avoid it ...
2 KENNEDY, MEmOIRs OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM WIRT 164 (1849). See also Hicks,
Thomas Addis Emmett in 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 145 (1943) ; WARREN,
A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 262, 280-84, 301-03, 368-69, 393, 397 (1911) ; Hall,
Thomas Addis Emmet, 8 GREEN BAG 273-79 (July, 1896).
170. 4 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JoHN MARSHALL 413 n.4 (1919).
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Court on June 7, 1820, but was dismissed in the February term of 1821
because the record had failed to show explicitly whether the affirmance
in the New York Court of Errors was a final decree.' The appeal was
refiled on January 10, 1822, and the case was continued at each succeed-
ing term until finally it was set down for argument at the beginning of
the February term in 1824.172 The long delay of four years was ex-
tremely irksome to lawyer Thomas Gibbons, whose two-steamboat pas-
senger line was inoperative subject to the permanent injunction on the
authority of the New York decree. Gibbons is reported to have written
his chief counsel Webster urging him to do everything in his power to
hasten final decision on his appeal, for "this section of the Union is ex-
tremely agitated from the impositions and actions of that proud state,
New York."' 3  In final desperation he dispatched to his associate coun-
sel William Wirt the following: "I entreat you to press trial or death
will take from me the pleasure of rejoicing in the event."'" 4  Thomas
Gibbons lived to "rejoice in the event" of his anticipated victory. The
Supreme Court reversed the decree of the New York Court of Errors on
March 2, 1824, and remanded the cause for the final determination of
withdrawal of the permanent injunction. Soon after the memorable
event, shipmaster Cornelius Van Derbilt steamed the Bellona alongside
the landings at New Brunswick amid cannon salutes and shouts by "citi-
zens desirous of testifying in a public manner their good will."' 73  Gib-
bons could now employ the Bellona and Stoudinger in navigating the
waters of New York. The private rights of the entrepreneur had been
made a part of the structure of the national law, and with judicial en-
forcement had come the freedom of the individual to enjoy the economic
benefits in the rapidly advancing technology of the steam engine.
Even at this late date, from the vantage point of more than a century
of judicial formulations from the authority of the commerce clause ac-
companied by the critical analyses of able commentators, the decision and
decree in Gibbons v. Ogden continues to be extremely complex. The
complexity follows from the supposed necessity of using the authority
of the commerce clause to invalidate the law of the state in order for the
171. In the February Term, 1821, on the 21st of March, the Court dismissed the
appeal upon the technical ground that the record did not show that the decree of the
New York Court of Errors was a final decree in compliance with § 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Gibbons v. Ogden, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 448 (1821) ; 4
BEVERIDGE, op. cit. suprc note 170 at 413. Presumably the record vas corrected. For a
contemporary note on the Court's motions of its jurisdiction under the 25th section of
the Judiciary Act see Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164, 206-09 n.a (1822).
172. 4 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 171, at 413.
173. See Kendall, Mr. Gibbons and Colonel Ogden, 26 MICH. S.B.J. 22, 25 (1947).
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid.
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Supreme Court to exercise its judicial powers under the Constitution. 7 6
Constitutional adjudication from the authority of the commerce clause
was a two step process. Declaring the act of the state void was the first
step, and constituted jurisdictional authority for the second step. In the
second step there was formulated the national law as the substantive ba-
sis for the judicial enforcement of private rights or personal liberty which
had been abridged by the state authority. Generally, however, the judicial
enforcement of the private rights or personal liberty abridged by the state
authority was made to appear to follow directly from the process of void-
ing the state law. The legal authority for the judicial enforcement of
private rights or personal liberty, while inferred from the authority of the
commerce clause, under which state law was invalidated, was in no sense
limited to the commerce clause or even to the bounds of the Constitution
for that matter. Authority for this more essential adjudicative national
law was related to the institutional development of the common law legal
system of England and the United States, and to the evolving needs of
the American community. Timely needs of the society and the tradi-
tional legal precedents for recognition of private rights have often pro-
vided unstated justifications for invalidating state law upon the consti-
tutional authority of the commerce clause."'7
176. The doctrinal difficulties caused by counsel's presentations and the opinion of
the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden involved the intermixing of national powers with state
powers, as if the presentment of the validity of state powers inevitably involved the
scope and definition of national powers. Actually the scope and definition of national
powers "to regulate" commerce, as shown in the opinion of the court in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), were matters for legislative determination
whenever the Congress was called upon to exercise such powers. The scope and valid-
ity of national powers would not be subject to judeial review except in judicial enforce-
ment of the policy of the national government resulting from the exercise of those
powers. Professor Ribble has delineated Gibbons v. Ogden as determining "what is com-
merce" and "the effect of the federal power on the powers of the states." By making
commerce subject to abstract legal definition the court by formulation of law imposed
abstract limitations upon the powers of the Congress when such powers had not been
exercised and the validity of their exercise was not in issue. See RIBLE, STATE AND
NATIONAL POWER OVER CommERcE 20-52 (1937). Mr. Prentice thought that the legal
questions were just about what they-counsel and the court-said they were, the nature
of the federal commerce power, being exclusive and withdrawn from the states, and
thus very limited and applicable only to coastwise navigation. See PRENTIcE, FEDERAL
POWER OVER CAMERS AND CORPORATIONS 59-100 (1907).
177. Stated differently, the Supreme Court has had to turn to the commerce clause
as well as the authority in judicial review and the supremacy clause in order to secure
the requisite jurisdictional authority which we have demanded of it, and which was not
given it under the laws of the United States "by Article III." The process of judicial
review and the judicial enforcement of private rights is somewhat analogous to the legal
process of declaratory judgment plus mandatory injunction in equity. The jurisdictional
authority of the commerce clause has been available when there was need for the na-
tionalization and judicial enforcement of private rights in freedom of movement, as-
sociation, discrimination, and freedom to do business.
Finally, in their historic and evolutionary pattern, the commerce clause cases involve
something more than judicial review and the judicial enforcement of the commerce
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The great Declaration and the War for Independence separated the
ostensible constitutional ties from the ancestral state with the conse-
quence that the deeper, inostensible cultural ties became more inseparable.
These cultural ties, which included the English common law, provided the
authority for the making of private rights the basis for the formulation
of national law. That the end result of the decision-making process for
deternining national law is referred to as constitutional law should not
confuse us. This merely comprehends that the jurisdictional authority
to make the adjudication was based on the Constitution, treaties and laws
of the United States. Thus the appeal in Gibbons v. Ogden did not
directly involve the scope of the national powers derived from the com-
merce clause. And it was not a part of the law formulation function for
the Supreme Court to make abstract determinations of the scope of na-
tional powers in the sense of a judicial determination not based upon an
act of the Congress. 7 ' What was determined in the obiter dictum por-
tion of the Marshall opinion, concerning the nation's political and legal
structure under the commerce clause, was that the judicial authority could
be drawn from the Constitution as well as from the act of the Congress
for the judicial determination and enforcement of private rights. 7 ' The
legal question presented and determined was that the private rights in the
use of steamboats had to be nationalized in order to secure them against
arbitrary state interference. In Elkison v. Deliesseline the ostensible
authority for the legal formulations in recognition of the universal rights
of the free negro was derived from the commerce clause in the Consti-
tution."8 ' Actually the more basic and compelling judicial authority was
to be found in the legal principles of the common law. In each case na-
tional law was created to make private rights judicially enforcible from
clause. Included also in the mandate is the judicial enforcement of the private rights
against state authority. Later legal standards for violation of the commerce clause re-
quire legal injury to the private rights enforceable in the freedom to do business, to as-
sociate, and to move nationally across state lines. See, e.g., H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
178. It was presumed that the jurisdictional authority of the Court to use the com-
merce clause to invalidate the state franchise did not extend beyond Congress' powers to
regulate commerce. This proposition was open to question, yet it did not follow that
the Congress necessarily had the constitutional authority to create the same exclusive
franchise in New York or a similar franchise in other states. The most the Court
required of itself was to speculate, somewhat vaguely, about Congress' authority to regu-
late, at random, ships and passengers navigating on public waters. Significantly the
court rejected the arguments made by counsel for the franchise that Congress' authority
did not reach random regulations relating to public waters located within the borders
of a single state. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-209 (1824).
179. Id. at 209-22 (1824). See also, FRANKURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 16, 18-
19 (1937).
180. 8 Fed. Cas. 493 (No. 4366) (C.C.D.S.C. 1823).
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unlawful invasions declared to result from the functioning of state
powers. It was not of great import that the authority of the Supreme
Court's lawmaking was an act of the Congress in the one case and the
constitutional provision for the regulation of commerce in the other. The
significant factor in each case was the recognition of the jurisdictional
authority needed to enforce the private rights which had been confis-
cated or abridged by the functioning of the state law. The interference
from the over-extension of state powers created the necessity for the
legal conclusion of abridgment and the nationalizing of private rights in
the freedom of movement by navigation upon the public waters of a mem-
ber state.
Influences on the Court's determination in Gibbons v. Ogden are
not subject to quantitative measurement but they may be speculated upon
nonetheless. The judicial determination was not made solely because the
Court considered that fundamental private rights in the freedom of move-
ment by navigation had been abridged. Neither was it the 'esult of well
defined, suppositional beliefs in a general freedom of commercial inter-
course in opposition to the restrictions of the state created franchise. The
ideas that transformed the British society from the feudal structure, so
happily generalized in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, were still await-
ing later fusion into the cultural patterns of the American community.
Exclusive franchises were the order of the day. Normally they were
enforcible under the state law of vested rights of property, which Chan-
cellor Kent thought to be in the social interest, attracting available pri-
vate capital to the public good.''
The determination of the Marshall court in Gibbons v. Ogden re-
flected the elemental ideas of the constitutional period which were influ-
ential in the creation and adoption of the Constitution. Those ideas were
expressed in the words of the preamble as being the reasons for the Con-
stitution: ". . . in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Jus-
181. In his opinion for the Livingston v. Van Ingen appeal to the New York Court
of Errors, Chancellor Kent expressed himself upon the usefulness of the exclusive
franchise as follows:
And permit me here to add, that I think the power has been wisely applied, in
the instance before us, to the creation of the privilege now in controversy. Under
its auspices the experiment of navigating boats 'by steam has been made, and
crowned with triumphant success. . . . From this single source the improve-
ment is progressively extending to all navigable waters of the United States,
and it promises to become a great public blessing, by giving astonishing facility,
dispatch and safety, not only to travelling, but to the internal commerce of the
country.. . . So far from charging the authors of the grant from being rash
and inconsiderate, or from wishing to curtail the appellants of their liberal
recompense, I think the prize has been dearly earned and fairly won, and that
the statutes bear the stamp of an enlightened and munificient spirit.
9 Johns. R. 507, 585 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812).
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tice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, pro-
mote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity. . . ." It was for the preservation, and perhaps
also for the effectuation of the nationalized political structure that the
Court enforced Gibbons' freedom of navigation on the nation's waters,
for it was thought that the acts of the state in creating the exclusive fran-
chise had the consequence of pulling down the newly-created constitu-
tional structure of the national government."8 2 To preserve the national
government it was necessary to channel the state powers under a rule of
law formulated by the decision-making of the nation's highest Court.
This was reflected in the presentations of counsel Webster and Wirt and
in the portion of the Court's opinion containing the pronunciamentoes
of Chief Justice Marshall on the meaning of the nationalization of the
powers of government, particularly those powers over commerceY"
Each counsel organized his presentations around the concept of ex-
182. See Chief Justice Marshall's rejection of counsel's suggestion of a rule of
strict construction of the national powers incorporated in the Constitution, Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187-88 (1824). In this context Mr. Justice Johnson dis-
cussed the purpose of the Constitution, both as an aid to construction and as a means of
emphasizing the need for preservation of the Constitution:
The great and paramount purpose, was to unite this mass of wealth and power,
for the protection of the humblest individual; his rights, civil and political, his
interests and prosperity, are the sole end; the rest are nothing but the means.
But the principal of those means, one so essential as to approach nearer the
characteristics of an end, was the independence and harmony of the states, that
they may the better subserve the purposes of cherishing and protecting the
respective families of this great republic.
Id. at 223. Thus, according to Mr. Justice Johnson, a crucial purpose underlying the
nationalization of governmental powers was to preserve the member states, by preserving
order and harmony between the member states and between the peoples thereof.
183. E.g., Mr. Webster argued:
A power in the states to do anything and everything, in regard to commerce,
till Congress shall undo it, would suppose a state of things at least so bad as
that which existed before the present constitution. It is the true wisdom of
these governments to keep their action as distinct as possible. The general gov-
ernment should not seek to operate where the states can operate with more ad-
vantage to the community; nor should the states encroach on ground which the
public good, as well as the constitution refers to the exclusive control of Con-
gress.
Thus there had to 'be lines drawn by legal definitions which separated and made inde-
pendent the powers of the national government from the powers of the member states.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 16-17 (1824). See also, Chief Justice
Marshall's adumbration:
In our complex system, presenting the rare and difficult scheme of one general
government, whose action extends over the whole, but which possesses only
certain enumerated powers, and of numerous state governments, which retain
and exercise all powers not delegated to the Union, contests respecting powers
must arise. Were it even otherwise, the measures taken by respective govern-
ments to execute their acknowledged powers, would often be of the same
description, and might, sometimes, interfere. This, however, does not prove
that the one is exercising, or has a right to exercise, the powers of the other.
Id. at 204-05.
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elusive versus concurrent powers. To employ the legal concept of ex-
clusive versus concurrent powers was to determine whether to enforce
national or state powers in a given case. Thus it was natural for counsel
to transform the legal concept into a rule of constitutional law which
would enforce national powers against state powers, or into a rule of
constitutional law which would grant recognition to the continual ex-
pansion of state powers. It is useful, therefore, to explore further into
the origins and meaning of the concept in order to more fully under-
stand counsels' presentations.
The commonly accepted notion that the Constitution created a na-
tional government composed of two categories of powers, exclusive and
concurrent, apparently arose out of the historic conflict over the con-
firmation of the Constitution in the various state conventions. Patrick
Henry attacked the Constitution on the grounds that the powers of the
national government were to be administered and enforced, if need be,
against the people directly."' He used the powers to tax to show that
the power to levy and collect taxes directly against persons, and upon
their property and activities, inevitably would destroy the member states
and the people's liberties."' Most of Patrick Henry's attacks on the
Constitution were based upon his ultimate conclusion that the Constitu-
tion had created what he called a "consolidated" government."' 8 In desig-
nating the national government as consolidated, Henry described a po-
litical structure in contrast to that which existed under the Articles of
Confederation, and in contrast to a system in which there would have
been sharp division of powers between the national government and the
governments of the member states.
Henry's broad charge that the Constitution created a national gov-
ernment was not answered in the Virginia convention by James Madison
184. Henry said:
I would make this inquiry of those worthy characters [not gentlemen] who
composed a part of the later federal convention. I am sure they were fully
impressed with the necessity of forming a great consolidated government, in-
stead of a confederation. That this is a consolidated government is demon-
strably clear; and the danger of such a government is, to my mind, very strik-
ing. I have the highest veneration for those gentlemen; but, sir, give me leave
to demand,-what right had they to say, we, the people? My political curiosity,
exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, who
authorized them to speak the language of, we, the people, instead of, we, the
states. . .?
3 ELLIoT's DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 22 (1836). Later, Mr. Henry argued
that "it is now confessed that this is a national government There is not a single
federal feature in it. . . . The most essential objects of government are to be ad-
ministered by Congress. . . " Id. at 395-96.
185. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 321-28 (1836) ; and
see Mir. Madison's answer, id. at 328-29.
186. See ELLOT, op. cit. supra note 185.
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and his coterie of supporters of the Constitution." 7 It was extensively
dealt with in the thirty-second number of The Federalist papers, how-
ever, where the writers all but propagandized away the independent su-
premacy of the political and legal structure of the national government
under the Constitution.'88 This was understandable, for it was con-
187. In answering his friend, the illustrious George Macon, Mr. Madison concluded
without explanation "[W]ith respect to converting the confederation to a complete con-
solidation, I think no such consequence will follow the Constitution, and that, with more
attention, we shall see that he is mistaken. .. ." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 34 (1836). In general, the arguments in favor of the Constitution took
the form of listings of the ostensible inadequacies of the confederation in regard to con-
trol of internal security, and of the total inadequacy of the confederacy with regard to
foreign affairs. The United States was unable to take its place in the late eighteenth
century world which was controlled by powerful nation states each vying for domination.
See, e.g., Mr. Madison, id. at 86-97.
188. THIE FEDERALIST No. 32 was drafted by Mr. Hamilton and published in the
Independent Journal, Jan. 2, 1788; the original essay also appeared in The Daily Ad-
vertiser, Jan. 3, The New-York Packet, Jan. 4, and The New-York Journal, Jan. 8.
It was designated as number 31 in the newspapers. In this essay, addressed To the Peo-
ple of the State of New York, Mr. Hamilton gave the following instructions:
An entire consolidation of the States, into one complete national sovereignty
would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might
remain in them would be altogether dependent on the general will. But as the
plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the State
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they
before had and which were not by that act exclusively delegated to the United
States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty,
would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted
an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority
to the Union and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like author-
ity; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar authority
in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant. I use
these terms to distinguish this last case from another which might appear to
resemble it, but which in fact be essentially different; I mean where the exercise
of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional interferences
in the policy of any branch of administration, but would not imply any direct
contradiction or repugnancy in point of constitutional authority. These three
cases of exclusive jurisdiction in the federal government may be exemplified
in the following instances . . . The third will be found in that clause, which
declares that Congress shall have power "to esablish an UNIFORM RULE of
naturalization throughout the United States." This must necessarily be ex-
clusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE
there could not be a UNIFORM RULE ...
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the
division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities of which the
States are not explicitly divested in favour of the Union, remain with them in
full vigour, is not only a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly
admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of
the proposed Constitution. We there find that notwithstanding the affirma-
tive grants of general authorities, there has been the most pointed care in those
cases where it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the
States, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States.
The tenth section of the first article consists altogether of such provisions.
This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the convention, and
furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the -body of the act which justifies the
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sidered that nationalization of powers immediately and automatically
withdrew powers of government from the member states. Thus to ad-
mit to Henry's charges meant that the Constitution would not be adopted.
The Constitution's supporters did not comprehend that the existence of
powers in the national government did not require any automatic aliena-
tion or suspension of state powers. And neither did they comprehend
that it was not only unnecessary but impractical to require by judicial de-
termination and decree what they called "alienation of state powers" in
order to construct and secure the nationalized government of the United
States. In the propaganda of The Federalist papers the Constitution was
made out to create at one and the same time both a consolidated and a
federal government-a "mixed" government, the authors said. It was
consolidated to the extent that the states were barred from the objects
of some of the national powers-those referred to as exclusive-and the
government was federal to the extent that other national powers con-
tinued in the member states until withdrawn by legislation enacted by the
Congress-those powers referred to as concurrent. Three definitions or
categories were given to the concept of exclusive powers, the general
acceptance of which Webster equated to "well-settled rules of construc-
tion."lsD Exclusive powers were said to arise from the use of words
in the Constitution comprehending unitary authority in the national gov-
ernment, from explicit prohibitions imposed upon the powers of the
states, and from the nature of the subject matter of powers delegated to
the national government. The main conflict over the concept of exclu-
sive versus concurrent powers arose within the third category, from the
nature of the subject matter.
Presentations made by counsel tended to becloud the essential legal
questions of whether the circumstances of the case required the formula-
tion of national law for the enforcement of private rights. Instead it
appeared as if it were a principal function of the judicial prerogative to
formulate the national law from the authority of the Constitution in order
to divide the whole of the nation's powers of government over commerce
and trade and general welfare between the national government and the
member states.
VI. GIBBONS v. OGDEN-COUNSEI'S PRESENTATIONS
The presentations of Webster and Wirt were devised as legal
grounds for invalidating the state-created franchise. Their presentations
position I have advanced, and refutes every hypothesis to the contrary. [Signed
"Publius."]
The Federalist No. 23, at 186-89 (Lodge ed. 1888).
189. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1824).
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were mostly concerned with theories about the Constitution, emphasizing
the unitary sovereign nature of the national government vis-A-vis the
nation's member states and the unitary nature of the commerce powers
of the national government. They posited their presentations upon an
ultimate conclusion that the powers of government in the Congress were
intended to constitute the unitary powers of a sovereign nation. Such
powers had to be exclusive in the Congress in order to be withdrawn from
the member states. The alienation of commerce powers from the mem-
ber states was required in order to provide for the judicial enforcement
and the nationalization of private rights under the authority of the com-
merce clause of the Constitution. 9 '
'Webster's arguments were formulated more broadly. His argu-
ments were based largely upon the implications which he drew from the
political history and process of structuralizing the national government."9'
The presentations of Mr. Wirt, on the other hand, were restricted to
the application of the supremacy clause to the acts of the Congress, en-
acted under the authority of the patent and commerce clauses of the Con-
stitution. Mr. Wirt did not attempt to extend his arguments to the ad-
judicative formulations of national law from the independent authority
190. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 9-10, 14, 21, 24 (1824). Webster's
main emphasis was one of necessity as to the nature of commerce as powers of govern-
ment; involved was the commerce of the national government, under the sovereignty of
the national government. It was Mr. Justice Johnson who related the powers of the
national government to sovereign powers under the law of nations. Id. at 227. The
somewhat hidden purpose of Webster's arguments ought to be kept in mind; like the
legal argument under the first amendment in the present day, the main purpose of
Webster's arguments was to nationalize judicial authority in the Supreme Court, in
order to require the Supreme Court to enforce the powers of the national government.
If the national powers were exclusive they were invaded by the state franchise, and
the legal rights of lawyer Gibbons also were abridged.
191. The essential purpose of the Constitution, according to Webster, was to right
the wrongs created by state sovereignty over the powers of commerce. There was no
time to wait for legislative acts of the Congress limiting, modifying, and withdrawing
state controls. The withdrawal of state controls had to be axiomatic and immediate
with the existence of the Constitution, and thus the function of the Supreme Court was
to effectuate these enormous consequences in the name of the Constitution by freeing
commerce whenever the member states failed to accept voluntarily the process of abstract
nationalization. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 12-22 (1824). According to
the case reporter, Webster expressed the following, in substance:
We do not find, in the history of the formation and adoption of the constitution,
that any man speaks of a general concurrent power, in the regulation of foreign
and domestic trade, as still residing in the states. The very object intended, more
than any other, was to take away such power. If it had not so provided, the
constitution would not have been worth accepting. He contended, therefore, that
the people intended, in establishing the constitution, to transfer, from the
several States to a general government, those high and important powers over
commerce, which, in their exercise, were to maintain an uniform and general
system. From the very nature of the case, these powers must be exclusive..
Id. at 13-14.
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of the Constitution, or to the adjudicative formulations from the author-
ity of the common law, as did Webster."9 2
It was only in the alternative that Webster relied upon the law to be
formulated from the acts of the Congress for regulating the coasting
trade."0 3 His main contentions initiated a process of interpreting the
various clauses of the Constitution by reference to those historic theories
of constitutional structure which reflected nationalized powers in the gen-
eral government. The judicial authority drawn from such nationalized
powers of government necessarily required the Court to invalidate the
state acts and thus allowed it to reverse the state decree and enforce the
private rights of his client to navigate freely by steamboat over the pub-
lic waters of New York. Understandably, Webster had declined to
argue the cause "on any other ground than that of the great commercial
question presented by it-the then novel question of the constitutional
authority of Congress exclusively to regulate commerce in all its forms
on all navigable waters of the United States . . . without any monopoly,
restraint, or interference created by states' legislation." 94
The conclusive nature of Webster's presentations may be explained
by the fact that the evolution of the Court's role in constitutional adjudi-
cation was in the initial stages. While the breadth of Congress' authority
192. "The Attorney-General . . . in reply, insisted, that the laws of New York
were unconstitutional and void: 1. Because they are in conflict with powers exclusively
exercised, by laws now subsisting and in full force. 2. Because, if the powers be con-
current, the legislation of the State is in conflict with that of Congress, and is, therefore,
void." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 159 (1824). Attorney General Wirt
also argued:
If Congress, in the lawful exercise of its power, says that a thing shall be
done, and the State says it shall not; or which is the same thing, if Congress
says that a thing shall be done, on certain terms, and the State says it shall not
be done, except on certain other terms, the repugnancy has all the epithets
which can be lavished upon it, and the State law must be void for repugnancy.
Id. at 161-62.
193. The reporter has Webster stating, in substance, as follows:
But, he contended, in the second place, that whether the grant were to be re-
garded as wholly void or not, it must, at least, be inoperative, when the rights
claimed under it came in collision with other rights, enjoyed and secured under
the laws of the United States; and such collision, he maintained, clearly existed
in this case. It would not be denied that the law of Congress was paramount.
The constitution has expressly provided for that. So that the only question in this
parZ of the case is, whether the two rights be inconsistent with each other.
Id. at 27.
194. Quoted in 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATEs HisTORY 601-62
(rev. ed. 1947), but without citation of authority. See also HARVEY, REMINIscENcEs oF
DANIEL WEBSTER 140-43 (1877), in which he recalls Webster's reminiscing that he and
Mr. Wirt upon consultation about the case found that their differences on the legal prin-
ciples upon which the case should be argued were such that Mr. Wirt had suggested
that "each argue it in his own way, and we will find out which, if either, is right." Id. at
142. Mr. Webster is quoted as having informed Mr. Wirt that "the clause of the Con-
stitution which ceded to the general government the right to regulate commerce was
that upon which I based my defense." Id. at 141.
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to regulate commerce-whether exclusive or otherwise-was not in issue,
Webster brought the scope of the national powers in issue via the author-
ity of the Supreme Court to interpret tle great clauses in the Constitu-
tion. The ultimate legal issue was whether the circumstances of the case
required the formulation of national law for the judicial enforcement of
private rights in the freedom to navigate by steamboat upon the public
waters of a member state. If such rights were abridged by a member
state, then and only then was the question presented whether there was
authority in the Constitution for the judicial invalidation of the state
acts in order to reverse the state decree. But Webster transposed these
legal issues. The requisite authority to invalidate the state-created fran-
chise dominated his presentations, as if the authority to invalidate the
acts of the state from the authority of the commerce clause absolutely
required the judicial enforcement of private rights as a part of national
law. Actually, judicial determination that the circumstances of the case
constituted an abridgment of private rights by a member state required
the formulation of national law protecting Gibbons' right to navigate
his steamboat upon public waters. Thus, the abridgment of private
rights existing in the freedom of movement by navigation required the
constitutional invalidation of the state franchise, but in general the
breadth of state powers required to be invalidated was limited to the
breadth of the national law required for the judicial enforcement of the
freedom to navigate by steamboat. 9 '
Webster began his formal presentations in Gibboiu v. Ogden by em-
phasizing the special role of the judiciary in preserving the Constitution.
It was to this end that the commerce clause had to be transformed into
a rule of national law. He instructed the Supreme Court "that the power
of Congress to regulate commerce was complete and entire, and, to a cer-
tain extent, necessarily exclusive; that the acts in question were regula-
tions of commerce, in a most important particular; and affecting it in
those respects, in which it was under the exclusive authority of Con-
gress."'98  He was not prepared to say that "all [state] regulations which
might, in their operation, affect commerce" were absolutely necessary to
the nation's sovereignty, and thus had to be exclusive in the Congress
195. It was not because the state regulated commerce and/or invaded the powers of
the Congress that national law had to be formulated in order to subject the state law to
constitutional invalidation. Rather it was because of the consequences of the state-
created franchise upon the freedom and interests of persons from other states. The
circumstances Gibbons brought to the Court were not covered by the privileges and im-
munities clause of article IV of the Constitution, as the residents of New Jersey and
those of New York were treated alike. Thus the commerce clause had to be brought
into play as the nationalizing article of the Constitution.
196. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1824).
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and withdrawn from the states.19 "Nothing is more complex than com-
merce," Webster opined; "no words embraced a wider field than com-
mercial regulation. Almost all the business and intercourse of life may
be connected, incidentally, more or less, with commercial regulations." '
In the main it was "the higher branches of commercial regulations,"
which invaded the nation's sovereign powers, that had to be "exclusively
committed to a single hand."1 9  Thus "the constitution [was] never in-
tended to leave with the States the power of granting monopolies, either
of trade or navigation; and, therefore, that as to this, the commercial
power was exclusive in Congress."2 ' Such regulations of a member
state were destructive of the Constitution and the existence of the na-
tional government created by it.
Webster might have added to his objection that the state franchise
was destructive of the powers of the Congress and the Constitution the
more basic contention that the state regulations restricted the commercial
and general intercourse which, under the law of nations, was intended
to be free except as regulated during a state of war or legitimately under
a treaty made between independent states. Mr. Justice Johnson, who was
cognizant of this more basic contention, used his concurring opinion to
theorize on the relationship of the freedom of commerce to the law of
nations. Johnson insisted that the great objects of government, which
were recognized by the power to regulate commerce, were intended by
the Constitution to include the fullest powers of a sovereign nation-state
as recognized under the law of nations. There could be no division of
such sovereign powers between the national government and the member
states. "The definition and limits of that power," Johnson explained,
"are to be sought among the features of international law ... ""' Thus,
so long as the freedom of movement by navigation remained "unaffected
by a state of war, by treaties, or by municipal regulations, all commerce
among the independent States was legitimate.""2 °  For this principle of
government there was no necessity "to appeal to the oracles of jus com-
mune"; the law of nations had "pronounce[d] all commerce legitimate
in a state of peace, until prohibited by positive law. . . . And since the
power to prescribe the limits to its freedom necessarily implies the power
to determine what shall remain unrestrained, it follows that the power
must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and hence, the grant
197. Ibid.
193. Id. at 9-10.
199. Id. at 14.
200. Id. at 10.
201. Id. at 227.
202. Ibid.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the
State to act upon."2 ' Upon this analysis, the power to regulate those
"higher branches" of commerce, which were said by Webster to be in-
volved in the Gibbons v. Ogden appeal, corresponded to the war and
treaty-making powers of the national government.
What was to be regulated, according to Webster, was "the [unitary]
commerce of the United States" and not "the commerce of the several
states.2 20 4 "Henceforth," after the Constitution, "the commerce of the
States was to be an unit; and the system by which it was to exist and be
governed must necessarily be complete, entire, and uniform. Its charac-
ter was to be described in the flag which waved over it, E Pluribus
Unurn. ' 2° The theory of exclusive powers thus required the Supreme
Court to invalidate the state law from the authority of the Constitution.
The judicial enforcement of the private rights of his client to navigate
by steamboat upon the public waters of New York followed more or less
as a consequence, as a by-product. No special emphasis neded to be given
the abridgment of private rights; what was nationalized was free, under
the authority of the Constitution. The nationalization of commerce se-
cured the freedom of movement by navigation upon public waters.
Webster's constitutional arguments made in the Supreme Court were
like those which he made in the halls of the Congress. They were not
closely reasoned. But his arguments were carefully prepared, and they
evolved into a logical structure. In his arguments in the Gibbons v. Ogden
appeal he maintained a logical pattern of broad generalizations. The
thread of exclusive powers in the national government, with the resulting
alienation of state powers, was maintained through each generalization.
His ultimate conclusion justifying the invalidation of the state franchise,
and the judicial enforcement of Gibbons' right of navigation, was sup-
ported by the language of the Constitution and by the subject matter of
commerce and general intercourse between peoples of the member
states."' Additional support was to be found in the intent and purpose
of the general words of the commerce clause as shown in selected refer-
ences which he made to the political and administrative history proximate
to the creation and adoption of the Constitution. '7 And, finally, much
was made of the disruptive forces inherent in the division of powers
between the national government and the member states and specifically
203. Ibid.
204. Id. at 14.
205. Ibid.
206. Id. at 10-11, 13-14.
207. Id. at 11-13.
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in the continuation of concurrent powers in the states to regulate
commerce.
208
Webster's conclusions constituted an interpretive process for deter-
mining the legal meanings to be given to the language of the Constitu-
tion.2" The workings of the interpretive process were not complex; it
was required only that those "well settled rules of construction" be ap-
plied. "Some powers are holden to be exclusive in Congress, from the
use of exclusive words in the grant; others, from the prohibitions on the
states to exercise similar powers; and others, again from the nature of
the powers themselves."2 1  But it was the nature of matters of great
commercial concern-like the grant of monopolies in trade or com-
merce-which required a unitary system of regulations. This nature of
great commercial concern was to be found in the consequences of the
exclusive franchise; New York had closed her ports to all but her own
citizens, refusing admission even to ships of other nations as well as to
those from the other states.21 ' If it could be assumed that any govern-
ment could regulate with such sweeping consequences, the power should
rest only in the Congress. 2
208. Id. at 15-25.
209. Perhaps it is not inappropriate to suggest that, for Webster, the judicially
administered interpretive process which he advocated and influenced was guided, if not
propelled, by subjective conclusions entertained and arrived at independently of the
language of the Constitution. In addition, the meanings of the Constitution appeared
to be abstracted from the general theories about the Constitution, and were unrelated
to the circumstances of the case and the particular interests of Webster's client.
210. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1824).
211. Id. at 16.
212. There is no question but that the impact of the New York statute conflicted
with general principles of law relating to the freedom to navigate on public waters, in-
cluding the freedom of movement and the basic freedom in the use and enjoyment of
property. The essential problem was not the authority of the Supreme Court to formu-
late these general principles as national law. The freedom of navigation on public
waters being a principle of the law of nations, and thus binding upon the national
governmcnt, was the authority for the formulation and enforcement of such a principle.
The Court's authority to formulate the general principles relating to freedom of navi-
gating upon public waters was thought to depend upon the authority in the Constitution
to invalidate the state acts that conflicted with the general principles of law referred to.
Article IV was inappropriate for such authority unless expanded beyond its literal
wording to include general basic rights as part of national law. In wording, the priv-
ileges and immunities clause prohibited the states from discriminating against citizens
of other states. But the reach of the exclusive franchise was as burdensome on resi-
dents of New York as on residents from other states and on vessels from foreign coun-
tries. Thus the discriminatory consequences of the exclusive franchise were general
and operative upon anyone operating a steamboat upon public waters over which New
York had assumed jurisdiction. While the contract clause may have been violated in
the original grant to Robert Fulton, because of the revocation and confiscation of the
original grant to John Fitch, such a violation did not carry over to Thomas Gibbons
and to other steamboat owners. Preservation of the basic rights of property was not
then a part of the Bill of Rights amendments as authority for the judicial formulations
of national law in this area.
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Next Webster turned to the legislative and administrative history of
the making of the Constitution, proving that the intent and purpose be-
hind the Constitution supported his position. He referred to the unhappy
experiences under the Articles of Confederation, and to what was por-
tended by the events and forces which were reflected in the inevitable
movement toward the creation of a new governmental structure, whose
powers were nationalized and independent of control by the member
states." ' The leading state papers, according to Mr. Webster, showed
that the movement toward the Constitution was driven forward by the
great objects of commerce and revenue, which were "indissolubly con-
nected." '214 The new government was created in order to rescue the
commerce of the nation "from the embarrassing and destructive conse-
quences, resulting from the legislation of so many States, and to place
it under the protection of a uniform law." ' Webster had represented
the interests of New England in the Congress, first New Hampshire and
then Massachusetts, and his discussion of the making of the Constitution
reflected the collective political-economic interests of the merchant and
maritime interests of the new government. 1" The maritime interests
wanted governmental authority nationalized for use in combating the
monopolistic policies of British shipping, and the merchant interests were
anxious for tariff protections for their expanding manufacturing."'
Webster's statement of his reliance upon the steps in the making of
the Constitution was brief. He justifiably presumed that the members
of the Supreme Court were as aware as he of the legislative and adminis-
trative history through which all had lived. He began his listings of the
political and administrative history in support of the nationalization of
power over commerce with those historic resolutions which New Jersey
had attached to her confirmation of the Articles of Confederation. New
Jersey had complained that "the regulation of trade seems to be com-
nitted to the several states within their separate jurisdictions, in such a
degree as may involve many difficulties and embarrassments, and be at-
tended with injustice to some states in the union ... . "21' New Jersey
had urged that "the sole and exclusive power of regulating trade of the
Thus it was thought that the commerce clause and possibly some of the other general
grants of powers in the Constitution had to provide the requisite authority for the for-
mulation of national law in the judicial enforcement of private rights.
213. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824).
214. Ibid.
215. Ibid.
216. 1 FuEss, DANIEL WEBSTER 147, 197-214, 307-38 (1930).
217. JENSEN, THE NEW NATIoN-A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, 399-407 (1950).
218. 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 648 (Ford ed. 1908).
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United States with foreign nations, ought to be clearly vested in the
Congress . . .""' Webster recalled the proposal of New Jersey's re-
vered statesman, Mr. John Witherspoon, whose presentations to the Con-
tinental Congress on the 3rd of February, 1781, stated "that it . . .
[was] indispensably necessary that . . . [the Congress] be vested with
a right of superintending the commercial regulations of every state, that
none might take place that should be partial or contrary to the common
interest."22 Next Webster recalled the report of the Monroe Committee
which was filed in the Continental Congress on March 28th, 1785, by
which it was recommended that the Congress propose an amendment to
the Articles of Confederation for constructing perpetual and exclusive
powers in the Congress to regulate trade, and the powers to be delegated
for the regulations of foreign and domestic trade were to include the
explicit authorization to levy imposts and duties on imports.2"1 Webster
219. Ibid. New Jersey's complaints and recommendations about the need for a na-
tional power over commerce were rejected by the Congress sitting on Thursday, June
25, 1778, by three ayes, six noes, and one divided, which fact Webster did not include
in his argument. 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 651 (Ford ed. 1908).
Possibly he did not consider Congress' rejection pertinent to the legislative and political
history in the making of the Constitution. The action by the Congress may have been
taken, at least partially, because if any such amendments had been enacted no confedera-
tion could have taken place for months or years and quite possibly would never have
taken place. New Jersey made other recommendations in its resolution, such as the
requirement of a constitutional oath to be taken by the Congress of the United States
and the recognition of alien property as common property of all the state, a most touchy
subject. Id. at 648, 649-50. Other states proposed numerous amendments in consequence
of their respective complaints. See, e.g., Maryland, id. at 631-32, 636-37; Massachusetts
Bay, id. at 638; Rhode Island and Connecticut, id. at 638-40; New York, which condi-
tioned its confirmation of the Articles with a proviso that they shall not be binding on
the state until all the other states in the union ratify the same, id. at 640; and Pennsyl-
vania and South Carolina which followed with various complaints and recommendations,
id. at 652-56. See also, id. at 662-71, 681, reporting the confirmations of ten states; 3
BURNETT, LETTERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 317 (1921) ; BURNETT, THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS 317, 472 (1941); JENSEN, THE ARTIcLES OF CONFEDERATION 185-197
(1948).
220. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1824). Mr. Justice Johnson
quoted these words of Witherspoon in his concurring opinion, id. at 224-25. See 19
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 110 (Hunt ed. 1912).
221. Id. at 104. See 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 201-05 (Fitz-
patrick ed. 1933). Late in 1784, Virginia's delegate, James Monroe, was made chairman
of a committee to re-study the question of trade regulation. In March, 1785, the Mon-
roe committee proposed an amendment to the Ninth Article of Confederation, which
would have provided for perpetual power to regulate trade with foreign nations and
between the states, and would have included the power to levy imposts and duties on
exports and imports. These powers were hedged about to meet the objectives of those
opposed to nationalizing the powers of government: citizens of the member states were
to pay no higher duties than foreign citizens, the member states reserved the power
to prohibit the imports or exports of any goods, and all duties were to be collected by
the states and were to go to the national treasury. The proposed amended ninth article
provided as follows:
The United States in Congress assembled shall have sole and exclusive right
and power of determining on peace and war . . . entering into treaties and
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ended his showing of the documentary steps in the making of the Con-
stitution by reference to those historic Virginia resolutions of January,
1786, which he said were "the immediate cause of the convention" of
1787;.22 the "entire purpose for which the delegates assembled at An-
napolis was to devise means for the uniform regulations of trade.
223
"[I]t will always be true, as matter of historic fact," Webster insisted,
that the colonial statesmen had
found no means [to put trade under uniform regulations] but
alliances, of regulating the trade of the States, as well with foreign Nations,
as with each other, and of laying such imposts and duties upon imports and
exports, as may be necessary for the purpose; provided that the Citizens of
the States shall in no instance be subjected to pay higher imposts and duties,
than those impostd on the subjects of foreign powers; provided also that the
Legislative power of the several states shall not be restrained from prohibit-
ing the importation or exportation of any species of goods or commodities
whatsoever; provided also that all such duties as may be imposed, shall be
collected under the authority and accrue to the use of the State in which the
same shall be payable. And provided lastly that every Act of Congress for the
above purpose shall have the assent of nine States in Congress assembled ...
Id. at 201.
In the usual letter addressed to the legislatures of the several states, treaties with
Sweden and the Netherlands were pointed to as making it "necessary that such internal
arrangements should be made, as may strictly comply with the faith of those treaties
and insure success to future negotiations." Id. at 202. The difficulties which followed
thirteen separate legislatures acting as if each contained sovereign powers were noted
at length. It was apprehended that "it will be difficult for thirteen different legisla-
tures acting separately and distinctly to agree in the same interpretation of a treaty, to
take the same measures, for carrying it into effect and to conduct their several opera-
tions upon such principles as to satisfy those powers, and at the same time to preserve
the harmony and interests of the Union. . . ." Id. at 202. For these and other reasons
the Monroe committee explained that it sought "an efficient and perpetual remedy," a
perpetual nationalization of the powers of government over trade and the imposts and
duties levied thereon. See also, id. at 345, 367. The Congress which assembled on Wed-
nesday, July 13, 1785, defeated the proposal of the Monroe committee and it was never
sent to the states. Those persons opposed to additions of powers of government to the
Union were vigorous in their opposition, and those who wished to make necessary na-
tionalizing of powers in effect had to fight a rear-guard action. Monroe wrote Jeffer-
son, on July 15, 1785, when his report was under consideration: "Some gentlemen have
inveterate prejudices against all attempts to increase the powers of Congress, others see
the necessity but fear the consequences." 1 BANCROFT, FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
445 (1882); 8 BURNETT, LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 166
(1936) ; 8 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 296 (Boyd ed. 1953). By letter of July 26,
1785, Monroe wrote to Madison at length on the same subject, setting out the affirmative
and negative positions on the subject. It was argued in the negative, Monroe wrote
"that it was dangerous to concentrate power, since it might be turn'd to mischievous
purposes," that the proposals would "put us more in the power of other nations"; and
"that all attacks upon the confederation were dangerous and calculated even if they did
not succeed to weaken it." Significantly, Monroe stated to Madison, "I wish very much
to have your sentiments on the subject" 8 BURNETT, LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CON-
TINENTAL CONGRESS 171, 172 (1936). For Madison's reply of August 7, 1785, see 2
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 155 (Hunt ed. 1901). See also JENSEN, THE NEW NA-
TION-A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789 403-04
(1950).
222. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 12 (1824).
223. Ibid.
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in a general government; and they recommended a convention
to accomplish that purpose. Over whatever other interests of
the country this government may diffuse its benefits and its
blessings . . . its immediate origin [was to be found] in the
necessities of commerce; and, for its immediate object, the re-
lief of those necessities, by removing their causes, and by estab-
lishing a uniform and steady system.
-2 2 4
Webster's presentations made in opposition to the concept of concur-
rent powers were vague and confused.2" The withdrawal or alienation
of state powers, by the concept of exclusive powers, came directly from
the Constitution, and the point of time for this legal phenomenon was the
point of time of adopting the Constitution-at the stroke of midnight
presumably, September 17, 1788. The concept of concurrent powers was
presented in opposition to this blanket alienation of state powers resulting
from the adoption of the Constitution. By the concept of concurrent
powers the Congress was authorized by the commerce clause to suspend
state powers by the enactment of a national policy over a particularized
subject matter. Suspension of state powers constituted a functional
process of national legislative power which was exercised when the social
needs appeared to require unitary regulations over specific problems.
The crucial difference, obviously, between the opposing concepts of con-
stitutional interpretation was concerned with the authority of the na-
tional judiciary to invalidate the state legislation which had impinged
upon the private rights to be secured by nationalization. Constitutional
interpretation by the concept of exclusive powers over commerce and
trade would have allowed, and indeed it would have required the Supreme
Court to use the authority of the commerce clause to invalidate the state
franchise.
Webster appeared innocently unaware that the functioning of his
exclusive power theory of the Constitution was substantially overcome
by a fait accompli. In the thirty-five years after the adoption of the Con-
stitution the nation's member states had greatly extended their police
power regulations over subjects includable within the national powers to
regulate commerce. -28  State regulations had extended over such sub-
224. Id. at 12-13. The state conventions supported the commercial necessity for
adopting the Constitution and, in New York, Webster noted, the "argument arising from
this consideration was strongly pressed, by the distinguished person whose name is con-
nected with the present question [Robert R. Livingston]." Ibid.
225. See id. at 13-26.
226. Professor Albert S. Abel has published selective, and at the same time ex-
haustive, studies of the widespread activities of the state legislatures in general areas of
commercial regulations in the period between the adoption of the Constitution and the
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jects as the facilities and instrumentalities of transportation, as well as
regulatory protections against disease and plagues and increasing poverty
resulting from the ever expanding wave of European migration to the
newly politically organized America.227 Social demands for such state
regulations were great indeed, for the extent and degree of Congress'
policy regulations and administrative control in those areas were as mini-
mal as in every other endeavor of government.22
decision of the Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden. See Abel, Commerce Regulation
Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transportation Facilities, 25 N.C.L. Rav. 122
(1947); Abel, Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transporta-
tion Enterprises, 18 Miss. LJ. 335 (1947); Abel, Commerce Regulation Before Gibbons
v. Ogden: Trade and Traffic (pts. 1-2) 14 BRoorLYN L. REv. 38, 215 (1947-1948).
227. Much of the state legislation of this period had to do with connecting roads
from and into other states, and with other arteries of transportation such as roads to
ferries across connecting rivers and other bodies of water. See Abel, Commerce Regula-
tion Before Gibbons v. Ogden: Interstate Transportation Facilities, 25 N.C.L. REv. 122,
124-131 (1947).
While the Congress was authorized by the Constitution "To establish post-office and
post-roads," state consent was given for post roads as for any other regulation of land
highways by the national government. See, e.g., the Act of the Maryland legislature of
Jan. 10, 1803, ch. 115, titled, An Act vesting certain powers in the Congress of the United
States to keep in repair post roads in the state, subject to the proviso that Congress shall
have no right in the sale thereof nor divest any rights of turnpike owners. 3 Laws Md.
1802 (Kilty 1817), 1 Laws Md. 482 (Dorsey 1840).
State activities over intrastate and multi-state waterways were similar to that of the
land roads, except they were much more extensive. Statutes pointed to preserving free
navigation or restricting it, to dredging and straightening, to the combined cooperation
of two or more states usually without the aid of the Congress, to the building of the
extremely costly canals, the building of bridges, the granting of ferry licenses, and the
making of harbor improvements. Federal activity was limited to such matters as the
maintenance of some lighthouses which formerly were maintained by one or more of
the member states. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 53; Abel, supra at 131-47.
A general view of the national government's interest in matters of commerce on
public waters was expressed in the House of Representatives: "The States have juris-
diction over all the navigable waters within their bounds; and where two States are
separated by a river or bay, it would then be easy for a negotiation between those two
States to provide security to their citizens from injury on such waters. Let not the
General Government intermeddle with the States' policy ... " ANNALS OF CONG., 4th
Cong. 2d Sess. 1734 (1849) [1796-1797].
Land roads and waterways required the paraphernalia of licensing and rate and
safety regulations. Such regulations ranged widely over relationships of social inter-
course and commerce that were multi-state and international in character. Goods and
passengers were of equal concern and the states were heavily involved in the social and
transportation problems resulting from the waves of immigration. See Abel, Cominerce
Regulation Before Gibbons Iv. Ogden: Interstate Transportation Enterprise, 18 Miss.
L.J. 335 (1947).
228. The Congress engaged in some regulation of public highways crossing state
boundaries, though such control was made subject to the consent of the states through
which such roads were constructed. See, e.g., the Act of April 30, 1802, ch. 40, ad-
mitting Ohio into the Union, 2 Stat. 173. A proviso was inserted in section 7 of the
Ohio statehood act reserving a proportion of the proceeds of the sale of public lands to
be applied "to the laying out and making public roads, leading from the navigable waters
emptying into the Atlantic, to the Ohio . . . such roads to be laid out under the author-
ity of Congress, with the consent of the several states through which the road shall
pass. . . ." Act of April 30, 1802, ch. 40, § 7, 2 Stat. 173.
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How did Webster extricate himself from the legal consequence of
the existing state regulations over the subjects of transportation, trade
and commerce which were highlighted in the presentations of opposing
counsel? Extrication was formulated in part upon a misconception
amounting to something of an intellectual hypnosis about the theoretical
relationship existing between the state and national governments. The
national government and the member states were considered as separate
and independent sovereign entities as if they were like the nation-states
of England and France, which, subject to the law of nations, governed
separate peoples living in separate territories. In order to make more
effective his presentation of the exclusive power concept, Webster at-
tempted to remove from the case the impact of the political and economic
history which had given support to the decisions of Chancellor Kent in
the New York courts. Webster used the dichotomy of independent legal
sovereignties of the national and state governments in order to require
that judicially formulated lines be drawn separating the powers of the
respective governments. The concurrent power theory would have al-
lowed an unlimited authority in the national government which, in the
end, he contended, would cause destruction to the very existence of the
nation's member states as governmental entities.
Thus, Webster turned the arguments of the states rights theories of
the Constitution into a showing of horrible consequences that would be-
fall the nation's member states if the concurrent power concept were ever
adopted, instead of his more nationalistic exclusive power concept, as the
dominating legal concept of constitutional theory and structure.229 In
By the Act of March 29, 1806, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 357, the Congress authorized the lay-
ing out and construction of the historic Cumberland Road. The President was author-
ized to make the decision as to the location of the road, and he was "further authorized
and requested to pursue such measures, as in his opinion shall be proper, to obtain con-
sent for making the road, of the state or states, through which the same has been laid
out." Act of March 29, 1806, ch. 19, § 3, 2 Stat. 358. See also, Act of March 26, 1804,
ch. 34, § 4, 2 Stat. 275 (regulation of post roads and duty of postmaster to make re-
ports if the states do not keep such roads in repair) ; Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 123, 3
Stat. 604 (authorization for appointment of commissioners to lay out the extension of
the Cumberland Road to the Mississippi River through Ohio, Indiana and Illinois) ; Act
of April 21, 1806, ch. 41, 2 Stat. 396; Act of April 27, 1816, ch. 112, 3 Stat. 315; Act
of March 3, 1817, ch. 69, 3 Stat. 377 (authorization of building of military roads under
direction of Secretary of War, for which the Congress did not require the Secretary of
War to secure consent of the member states through which the roads were to be laid.
Parts of the road were to be constructed through territories).
229. Webster's own words were as follows:
[T]he concurrent power of the States, concurrent though it be, is yet subordinate
to the legislation of Congress; and that, therefore, Congress may, when it
pleases, annul the state legislation; but, until it does so annul it, the state legis-
lation is valid and effectual. . . . Here would be a perpetual hostility; one
Legislature enacting laws, till another Legislature should repeal them; one
sovereign power giving the rule, till another sovereign power should abrogate
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order to support his main thesis of exclusive powers, and to secure its
acceptance by certain members of the Supreme Court, Webster appar-
ently felt that it was auspicious for him to contend that those subjects
the states were then regulating, and had been regulating for the years
after the Constitution, were not within the commerce clause authority of
the national government" Webster stated unequivocalily that such ex-
tensive regulations of intercourse between the states and between the
states and foreign countries as were involved in the laws of pilotage,
health and quarantine laws, were not commercial regulations and there-
fore these matters were not subject to regulations by the Congress. 3' In
it; and all this under the idea of concurrent legislation.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 24-25 (1824).
230. "The truth was, he thought, that all these things were, in their general
character, rather regulations of police than of commerce, in the constitutional under-
standing of that term." Id. at 19. Webster recognized that states would continue to
regulate those various subjects.
231. The reporter described Webster's statements on concurrent powers in the
following:
The pilot laws, the health laws, or quarantine laws, and various regulations of
that class which have been recognized by Congress, are no arguments to prove,
even if they are to be called commercial regulations, (which they are not),
that other regulations, more directly and strictly commercial, are not solely
within the power of Congress. There was a singular fallacy, as he humbly
ventured to think, in the argument of very learned and most respectable per-
sons, on this subject. That argument alleges that the states have a concurrent
power with Congress, of regulating commerce; and its proof of this position is,
that the states have, without any question of their right, passed acts respecting
turnpike roads, toll bridges, and ferries. These are declared to be acts of
commercial regulation, affecting not only the interior commerce of the state
itself, but also commerce between different states. Therefore, as all these are
commercial regidationis, and are yet acknowledged to be rightfully established
by the states, it follows, as is supposed, that the states must have a concurrent
power to regulate commerce ...
To sustain the interference of the state, in a high concern of maritime
commerce, the argument adopts a principle which acknowledges the right of
Congress over a vast scope of internal legislation, which no one has heretofore
supposed to be within its powers. . . . [F]or it is admitted, that when Congress
and the states have power to legislate over the same subject, the power of
Congress, when exercised, controls or extinguishes the state power; and there-
fore, the consequence would seem to follow, from the argument, that all state
legislation, over subjects as have been mentioned, is at all times, liable to the
superior power of Congress; a consequence, which no one would admit for
a moment. The truth was, he thought, that all these things were, in their
general character, rather regulations of police than of commerce, in the consti-
tutional understanding of the term. A road indeed might be a matter of great
commercial concern. In many cases it is so; and when it is so, he thought
there was no doubt of the power of Congress to make it. But, generally
speaking, roads, and bridges, and ferries, though, of course, they affect com-
merce and intercourse, do not obtain the importance and elevation, as to be
deemed commercial regulations. A reasonable construction must be given to
the constitution; and such construction is as necessary to the just power of the
states as to the authority of Congress. Quarantine laws, for example, may be
considered as affecting commerce; yet they are, in their nature, health laws. ..
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the alternative, as a subsidiary contention, even if they were characterized
as commercial regulations they could not be solely within the powers of
the Congress because they were not so necessary a part of the nation's
sovereignty as to fall within the concept of exclusive powers. 32
By his advocacy Webster limited unduly the scope of the national
powers, and assumed for judicial adjudication an apparent basis for in-
vading Congress' legislative function of determining the scope of the
powers of the national government.23 3 But it is apparent that he ex-
pressed the following with something less than wholehearted acceptance:
[B]ut if, under colour of it, enactments should be made for other purposes,
such enactments might be void.
Id. at 18-20.
232. As Webster anticipated, opposing counsel, Mr. Oakley and Mr. Emmet showed
how the various member states had actually engaged in extended regulations respecting
stages, turnpike roads, toll bridges, ferries, and like facilities of transportation, the im-
portation of slaves and free negroes from the other states and from foreign countries,
and the quarantine of persons coming into the member state from the other states and
from foreign countries. See especially the arguments of Mr. Emmet, id. at 96-123.
233. The unanimous position of the Marshall Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), regarding the broad powers of the Congress to determine
the scope of the powers of the national government in relation to nationalized policy
over specific subject matter, and the extreme separation of powers limitations upon the
authority and function of the Supreme Court to determine the limits of national powers,
was substantially in conflict with the use of exclusive powers as a legal concept to in-
validate state powers. Under that opinion judicial determination of national powers as
a means to invalidate the exercise of state powers appeared to require a judicial deter-
mination of the scope of national powers. It was stated that the Supreme Court's
authority to limit by the law of the Constitution the actual exercise of national powers
was a limited authority. "We admit, as all must admit," Chief Justice Marshall wrote
for the Supreme Court,
that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be
transcended. But we think that the sound construction of the constitution must
allow the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that
body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to
the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the con-
stitution, are constitutional.
Id. at 421.
Likewise, in substantial conflict with Webster's exclusive power thesis, was the
Supreme Court's opinion in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819),
which determined that the national power to establish uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States was not so exclusive as to withdraw state
powers over the subject matters of debt and personal security. There it was said:
It does not appear to be a violent construction of the constitution, and is cer-
tainly a convenient one, to consider the power of the States as existing over
such cases as the laws of the Union may not reach. But be this as it may, the
power granted to Congress may be exercised or declined, as the wisdom of that
body shall decide. If, in the opinion of Congress, uniform laws concerning
bankruptcies ought not to be established, it does not follow that partial laws
may not exist, or that State legislation on the subject must cease. It is not the
mere existence of power, but its exercise, which is incompatible with the exer-
cise of the same power by the States. It is not the right to establish these
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If all these be regulations of commerce within the meaning of
the Constitution, then, certainly, Congress, having a concurrent
power to regulate commerce, may establish ferries, turnpikes,
bridges, et cetera, and provide for all this detail of interior legis-
lation. To sustain the interference of the State in a high con-
cern of maritime commerce, the argument adopts a principle
which acknowledges the right of Congress, over a vast scope of
internal legislation, which no one had heretofore supposed to
be within its powers. But this is not all; for it is admitted that
when Congress and the States have power to legislate over the
same subject, the power of Congress, when exercised, controls
or extinguishes State power; and therefore the consequence
would seem to follow, from the argument, that all State legisla-
tion over such subjects as have been mentioned, is, at all times
liable to the superior power of Congress, a consequence which
no one would admit for a moment.23'
Webster was confused in his assumption of the separateness and in-
dependence of the one government from the many. He expressed an
apparent concern that regulations by the nation's member states which
came within the national powers would have the effect of transforming
the nation into a confederation. He could not comprehend how the Con-
gress was able to regulate the same and similar subjects which the mem-
ber states had regulated, and he confused constitutional authority with
actual political power. Such a confusion was understandable, however,
because the member states had the greater political support for the ex-
tended exercise of their powers. In order to preserve the national gov-
ernment, Webster thought that it was necessary to carve out exclusive
powers for the national government from which the governments of the
member states were excluded by the fundamental law of the Constitu-
tion. Webster argued:
A power in the States to do anything, and everything, in regard
to commerce, till Congress shall undo it, would suppose a state
of things at least as bad as that which existed before the present
Constitution. It is the true wisdom of these governments to
keep their action as distinct as possible. The general govern-
ment should not seek to operate where the States can operate
with more advantage to the community; nor should the States
uniform laws, but their actual establishment, which is inconsistent with the
partial acts of the States.
Id. at 195-96.
234. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 19 (1824).
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encroach on ground which the public good, as well as the con-
stitution, refers to the exclusive control of Congress.235
Webster equated his theories of the Constitution with law, and they
were supported by what he considered to be the sound administrative
bases for the functioning of the national with the state governments. He
moved from his notions of the sound administrative bases for the func-
tioning of the national with the state governments, to constitutional
theory, and thence to the equating of constitutional theory to legal con-
cept, without distinguishing the one from the other. Most of all Webster
lacked a clear conception of the role of judicial decision making, as dis-
tinct from the comparative legislative policy role of the Congress. Web-
ster appeared to have a limited comprehension of the limitations of an
independent judiciary and the institutional foundation of such limitations.
Chancellor Kent saw more clearly that determining the scope of the legis-
lative powers of the national government was not a matter for judicial
lawmaking to use as a legal basis for the enforcement of private rights
against the confiscation of those rights by a member state. Webster
knew, or he felt, what the result should be-that somehow the Supreme
Court should formulate national law from the authority of the Constitu-
tion in order to enforce the private legal rights in the freedom of move-
ment by navigating upon public waters which the state had violated. But
he was not able to conceive the proper basis for the Supreme Court's for-
mulation of legal principles. His argument in the Dartmouth College case
was much the superior in this regard, for the Supreme Court's role was
more clearly and more directly drawn from the impairment of contract
clause."' In Dartmouth College there was not the necessity to alienate
large areas of government from the member states for transference to
the Congress, and simultaneously, to alienate large areas of government
from the Congress for transference to the member states, in order for
the Supreme Court to secure the requisite authority from the Constitu-
tion to formulate the basic national law for securing private legal rights
from confiscation and abridgment by the member states.3 7
At last Webster turned to the act of the Congress which licensed
American vessels engaged in the coasting trade as authority for the na-
tionalization of the freedom of navigating by steamboat upon public
235. Id. at 16-17.
236. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 551-600 (1819).
237. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, if the College was determined not to be
a "public corporation," the legislative enactment constituted a forfeiture, which as Web-
ster stated could not have been within the authority of a legislature. "To justify the
taking away of vested rights, there must be a forfeiture; to adjudge upon and declare
which, is the proper province of the judiciary." Id. at 558.
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waters. Webster contended that, whether or not the state act was void
because it was in conflict with the Constitution, it was at least "inopera-
tive when the rights claimed under it came in collision with other rights,
enjoyed and secured under the laws of the United States . . . ,3s The
act of the Congress enrolling ships characterized as "ships or vessels of
the United States" and the licensing of such ships to engage in coasting
trade, constituted a nationalization of the right to navigate such ships up-
on all the navigable waters within the confines and control of any state.23
The private rights nationalized in the act of the Congress included the
right to navigate ships of American character upon all public waters,
whether such waters lay within the boundaries of one state or along the
coast outside the borders of any state. The scope of the license "for
carrying on the coasting trade" included any public stream, river, or body
of water usable for movement by navigation.24 Webster concluded that
238. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 27 (1824). In its decree the Su-
preme Court did not accept Webster's apparent distinction that the New York acts "were
to be regarded as wholly void," when in conflict with the law formulated from the
authority of the Constitution, and at least "inoperative" when in conflict with the law
formulated from the authority of the act of the Congress regulating the coasting trade.
In its decree the Supreme Court determined that:
[T]he several licenses to the steamboats the Stoudinger and the Bellona, to
carry on the coasting trade . . . which were granted under an act of Congress,
passed in pursuance of the constitution of the United States, gave full authority
to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States, by steam or other-
wise, for the purpose of carrying on the coasting trade, any law of the State of
New York to the contrary notwithstanding; and that so much of the several
laws of the State of New York, as prohibits vessels, licensed according to the
laws of the United States, from navigating the waters of the State of New
York, by means of fire or steam, is repugnant to the said constitution, and
void ...
Id. at 239-40.
239. The act referred to is the Act of Feb. 18, 1793, entitled An Act for enrolling
and licensing ships or 'vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for
regulating the same, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305. Section 1 provided:
That ships or vessels, enrolled by virtue of "An act for registering and clearing
vessels, regulating the coasting trade, and for other purposes," [Act of Sept. 1,
1789, ch. 11, 1 Stat 55] and those of twenty tons and upwards, which shall be
enrolled after the last day of May next, in pursuance of this act, and having a
license in force, or if less than twenty tons, not being enrolled shall have a li-
cense in force, as hereinafter required, and no others, shall be deemed ships or
vessels of the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels em-
ployed in the coasting trade or fisheries.
240. In the state courts and in the Supreme Court the concern in the Gibbons v.
Ogden litigation was the consequence of the license to engage in coasting trade, not the
scope of the coasting waters. According to Chief Justice Marshall: "The coasting
trade is a term well understood. The law has defined it; and all know its meaning
perfectly." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 214 (1824). Glimpses of the
breadth of the coasting waters were given in the various acts of the Congress dealing
with the enrolling, registry and licensing of coasting trade. The Act of Sept. 1, 1789,
authorized "a license to trade between the different districts in the United States." Ch.
11, § 23, 1 Stat. 61. The Act of Feb. 18, 1793, superseding the above act, licensed a ship
or vessel for carrying on the coasting trade, which was "destined from a district in one
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the provision of the statute had no lesser effect than an act of Congress
which should provide "that all vessels duly licensed should be at liberty
to navigate, for the purpose of trade and commerce, over all the navigable
harbours, bays, rivers and lakes, within the several States, any law of the
States, creating particular privileges as to any particular class of vessels,
to the contrary notwithstanding... ,
Chancellor Kent had not objected to the apparent unlimited scope
given to "coasting waters" as including all public waters that were navig-
able.24 But Webster had to question the great Chancellor in order to
overcome the latter's determination that the licensing provisions added
nothing to the enrolling provisions of the act and thus that the act did not
state, to a district in the same, or an adjoining state on the sea-coast, or on a navigable
river or bay of the United States." Act of March 12, 1812, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 694. An-
allow the licensing of steamboats owned by resident aliens as if the same belonged to a
citizen of the United States, if such steamboats were "intended to be employed only in a
river or bay of the United States." Act of March 12, 1812, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 604. An-
other act supplementing the Act of Feb. 18, 1793, which also was unnoticed in Gibbons v.
Ogden, stated:
That for the more convenient regulation of the coasting trade, the seacoast and
navigable rivers of the United States be, and hereby are, divided into tvo great
districts; the first, to include all the districts on the seacoast and navigable
rivers, between the eastern limits of the United States and the southern limits
of Georgia, and the second, to include all the districts on the sea-coast and
navigable rivers, between the river Perdido and the western limits of the
United States. . . . That every ship or vessel . . . licensed to trade between
the different districts of the United States, shall be, and is hereby authorized
to carry on such trade between the districts included within the aforesaid great
districts, respectively, and between a state in one, and an adjoining state in an-
other, great district, in manner, and subject only to the regulations that are,
now by law required to be observed by such ships or vessels, in trading from
one district to another in the same state, or from a district in one state to a
district in the next adjoining state, any thing in any law to the contrary, not-
withstanding.
Act of March 2, 1819, ch. 48, §§ 1-2, 3 Stat. 492, 493.
241. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 29-30 (1824).
242. The scope of the coasting waters as it affected federal regulation of coasting
trade was a large issue in litigation over whether the New York steamboat franchise
acts were totally void or only partially so after Gibbons v. Ogden. In the case of North
River Steamboat Co. v. John R. Livingston, 3 Cow. 713 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1825), the
minority, by Judge Woodworth, held that the language of the decree handed down in
Gibbons v. Ogden, "that the license to carry on the coasting trade, gave full authority to
navigate the waters of the United States, by steam or otherwise, for the purpose of
carrying on the coasting trade, any law of the State of New York to the contrary not-
withstanding," did not extend coasting trade to the internal waters and the internal trade
of a state. Id. at 729-30. (Emphasis added.) The determination was based also upon
the minority's interpretation of the commerce clause: one, it did not extend to internal
trade, and, two, if it did it would come from incidental powers, as contrasted to ex-
pressed, which could not be exclusive.
The majority, in an able opinion by Chief Justice Savage, viewed the scope of coast-
ing waters and coasting trade, as well as the Constitution and the Supreme Court's de-
cree, more broadly, as applicable to navigable waters within a state and to navigation
and trade between termini within a single state. According to Chief Justice Savage,
commerce among the states means trade "among the people of the states," whether of a
single state or of different states. Id. at 739, 745-53.
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result in legal authority for the nationalizing of private rights which
were judicially enforceable notwithstanding the existence of the state
law in question. According to Chancellor Kent, the state and national
statutes acted differently and independently upon the same subject mat-
ter. The act of the Congress laid down conditions for the characteriza-
tion of the ship, being an American ship it was exempt from the taxes
levied on foreign ships. The state act regulated the private property and
private rights in the use and enjoyment of a steamboat within the state's
geographical limits.
Webster disagreed with Chancellor Kent's requirement that the
Congress had to legislate an explicit invalidation of an existing state law
or an explicit withdrawal of state authority over the subject matter.
Chancellor Kent had insisted that the state court's authority was too
limited to decree an invalidation of state law from the implications to be
drawn from the general purpose of the congressional act.24 Webster
advocated that the presence or absence of a non obstante clause could not
affect the extent or operation of the act of Congress.2" Congress had
no distinct power of revoking state laws."
Webster's answer missed the thrust of Chancellor Kent's determina-
tion as to the exercise of the Supreme Court's power to make an inde-
pendent formulation of national law from the authority of an act of the
Congress before it could be authoritatively determined that the state law
was invalid. And Webster was in error on the workings of the Con-
stitution, for the Congress was able to overrule or suspend state laws
whether or not such laws were directly conflicting with Congress' enact-
ments. For his second answer to Chancellor Kent, Webster advocated
that once the Congress had legislated "over those subjects which are
within its power, its legislation is supreme, and necessarily overrules all
243. See ch. V, supra.
244. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 29-31 (1824).
245. Webster insisted:
Congress has no power of revoking state laws, as a distinct power. It legis-
lates over subjects; and over those subjects which are within its power, its
legislation is supreme, and necessarily overrules all inconsistent or repugnant
state legislation. If Congress were to pass an act expressly revoking or an-
nulling, in whole or in part, this New York grant, such an act would be wholly
useless and inoperative. If the New York grant be opposed to, or inconsistent
with, any Constitutional power which Congress had exercised, then, so far as
the incompatibility exists, the grant is nugatory and void, necessarily, and by
reason of the law of Congress. But if the grant be not inconsistent with any
exercise of the powers of Congress, then, certainly, Congress has no authority
to revoke or annul it. Such an act of Congress, therefore, would be either un-
constitutional or supererogatory .
Id. at 30-31.
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inconsistent or repugnant State legislation."24  His answer, which was
based upon his theory of the separateness of the national government
from the member states, assumed the main question. The ultimate ques-
tion was the legal consequence of the license. Was it the nationalization
of a basic right to navigate by steamboat upon the nation's public waters
with which the state franchise was in conflict? By his contention that
once the Congress had legislated over a subject or area state powers in
the area were automatically withdrawn by the supremacy clause, Webster
failed to recognize that conflict of state law with an act of the Congress
was a matter of practical consequence, not totally of constitutional theory.
Webster failed to conceive of the more weighty contention in his
behalf. The coasting act could have been construed in recognition of the
legal principles of the law of nations: that navigation upon public waters
was free except as a treaty or the Congress had imposed restrictions upon
such freedom, though admittedly the act itself did not create nor formu-
late the principle of law in recognition of the freedom of navigation up-
on public waters. Much of the Constitution and the acts of the Congress
were judicially enforced in recognition of existing principles of law.
However, not all principles of law by which the nation's powers were to
be administered could be written into the Constitution or incorporated in-
to the various acts of Congress, any more than the administration of the
nation's powers by the Congress could be limited to the precise language
of the Constitution. The intellectual insight of Mr. Justice Johnson's
concurring opinion, in which he recognized that private rights in the free-
dom of movement by navigation upon public waters were judicially en-
forceable from principles of law binding upon the national government
as a sovereign nation-state under the laws of nations, manifested a requi-
site understanding of many sources of law which escaped the expanse of
Webster's forensics. 47
246. Id. at 30.
247. Id. at 227-29. For Mr. Justice Johnson the coasting act enacted by the Con-
gress did not add to the freedom of movement through navigation upon public waters as
guaranteed by the Constitution. Mr. Johnson wrote as follows:
If there was any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the
Constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse among the states free
from all invidious and partial restraints. And I cannot overcome the con-
viction, that if the licensing act was repealed tomorrow, the right of the ap-
pellant to a reversal of the decision complained of, would be as strong as it is
under this license. One half the doubts in life arise from defects of language,
and if this instrument had been called an exemption instead of a license, it
would have given a better idea of its character .
Id. at 231-32.
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VII. GIBBONS V. OGDEN-COUNSEL FOR THE NEW YORK FRANCHISE
Counsel argued for affirmance of the New York decree enforcing
Colonel Ogden's exclusive right to operate a passenger steamboat between
Elizabethtown Point, New Jersey, and Staten and Manhattan Islands. 4
The exclusive grant which Colonel Ogden had secured from the New
York franchise could not, by itself, violate the law of the United States.
The question presented was the impact of the exclusive grant upon other
rights, i.e., whether Mr. Gibbons' legal rights under the national law were
violated, abridged, or confiscated by the New York decree. The crucial
issue was the determination of whether Mr. Gibbons had legal rights
under the national law to navigate by steamboat upon the public waters
between the New Jersey coastline and the inhabited islands of New York
Bay. Nevertheless, determination of the Court's jurisdictional authority
from the Constitution to invalidate the New York acts and reverse the
state court decree had to precede the determination of Gibbons' legal
rights under national law, according to the modus operandi of the Mar-
shall Court. Understandably, therefore, counsel for Colonel Ogden de-
signed their presentations in order to deny the Supreme Court the juris-
dictional authority to formulate the law of the United States that would
nationalize the legal rights in Thomas Gibbons.
Counsel for Colonel Ogden made valiant efforts to restrict the scope
of the national powers of the commerce clause.249 The purpose was to
248. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 33-79, 79-159 (1824).
249. Counsel also construed the patent and copyright clause: "Congress shall have
power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, -by securing, for limited
times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The argument was based on the familiar concept
of sovereignty in the states, limited power in the national government. Mr. Oakley
stated the argument as follows:
The power, considered in itself, is supreme, unlimited, and plenary. No part
of any sovereign power can be annihilated. Whatever portion, then, of this
power, was not granted to Congress, remains in the States. Consequently, the
States have exclusive authority to promote science and the arts, by all other
modes than those specified in the constitution, without limitation as to time,
person, or object; and the Legislature is the sole judge of the expediency of
any law on the subject.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1824). From this counsel argued that
the state may control or prohibit the use of the patented object during the existence of
the patent. Therefore "the right of prohibition" could be delegated to the Livingston
and Fulton franchise; and the "mode of exercising that right" was by injunction in
chancery. Id. at 59, 141-56. It was argued that since the Congress had no police powers
under the patent and copyright provision of the Constitution, the power of regulating
the property represented by patent remained in the states. Mr. Emmett argued:
The power of regulating and prohibiting the use of every kind of property must
be somewhere; it is a necessary part of legislative sovereignty, and must be
intrusted to some constituted authority. As to all other kinds of property, it is
undoubtedly in the State Legislatures. Things patented may be dangerous or
noxious; they may be generally useful, and locally injurious; such, for in-
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make it impossible for the Supreme Court to invalidate the New York
decree from the authority of the Constitution. It was assumed without
argument that the jurisdictional authority in the Supreme Court to for-
mulate the national law from the authority of the Constitution was re-
stricted to the scope of the national powers. Counsel, for this reason, in-
sisted that the jurisdictional authority of the Supreme Court in article
III was limited to the grants of Congress' powers in article I of the Con-
stitution. This limitation upon the Court appeared to follow from the
supposed necessity of invalidation of the state acts in order to reverse the
state decree. With this in mind, counsel expended a large portion of
their efforts arguing for the placing of strict limitations upon the scope
of the national powers in the commerce clause. Alternatively, counsel
used Mr. Webster's thesis of drawing negative implications to one's own
advantage. The Supreme Court, counsel reasoned, could not possibly
hold the authority to invalidate the New York decree unless the national
powers in the commerce clause were exclusive and completely withdrawn
from the member states. Since the commerce clause contained no ex-
clusive powers, the Supreme Court had no authority to use the commerce
clause against the powers of the member states. The Court's authority
under the commerce clause was limited to the judicial enforcement and
the nationalization of legal rights from the authority of an act of the
Congress.
Counsel used constitutional theory to show that the scope of the
national powers was severely limited. They cited various maxims about
free and independent states."' It was emphasized as significant that the
member states created themselves by their own act. By the Declaration
of Independence, New York, whose statute was in question, and the
other twelve states became free and independent states; each member state
had full power to conduct war, conclude peace, contract alliances, estab-
lish commerce and commit any other act which a nation-state subject to
the law of nations could commit.25' New York thus was formed a
sovereign and independent nation-state, and by its constitution its legis-
lature was granted plenary powers.
In contrast, the Constitution of the United States created a national
government of limited powers. Counsel followed closely the constitu-
tional theories enunciated by St. George Tucker. Mr. Tucker considered
that the larger, unlimited portion of the nation's sovereignty remained
stance, might be torpedoes in a peaceful and commercial port; fire balloons and
squibs in a populous city .
Id. at 153.
250. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 33-34 (1824).
251. Id. at 33.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in the member states. 52  In light of this dichotomy of constitutional
powers, the sovereignty of the member states moved from a position of
weakness under the Articles of Confederation to a position of collective
strength under the Constitution, from the separate sovereignties of weak,
independent states to a collective sovereignty, divided between the states
and the national government. By this mode of constitutional theory the
national government acted much as an agent of the member states, repre-
senting the collective powers of the states.
In confirmation of Mr. Tucker's analysis of the Constitution, coun-
sel argued that the scope of the national powers was "to receive the most
strict construction that the instrument will bear, where the rights of a
state . . . may be drawn in question." 2 3  Strict construction was to be
a rule of constitutional law, in contrast to a presumption of constitu-
tionality. The essential purpose of the rule of strict construction was to
bind the Supreme Court to narrow limits of the supremacy of the na-
tional law. The rule also was to have political connotations of some
significance. The Constitution was to be reconstructed in accord with
the strongly held notions of Patrick Henry; the independent powers of
the national government were to be narrowly conceived and the expanded
portions of the nation's sovereign powers were to be reserved in the
member states.
Counsel next construed the New York statutes and the New York
decree as operating solely within the state and as not preventing the right
of ingress or egress. The permanent injunction against Mr. Gibbons'
entering upon the public waters of the state by steamboat was construed
by counsel as prohibiting only movement from one part of the state to
another. The owner of steamboats who wished to navigate upon New
York waters had to secure a grant from the New York franchise. "A
member state," counsel argued, "may exercise the same control . . over
land and water within its own jurisdiction; that the right as to barter
rests on the same foundation, that of a sovereign over his domain." ' "
Counsel construed the state regulation as "only an internal regulation of
the use of the waters of the State. . . . These waters are a public high-
way, like any other public road on land, and, as such, are completely sub-
ject to the control of the State laws." '
252. TuciR, View of the Constitutionm of the United States, in BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, Bk. 1, App. D, 140, 154 (Tucker ed. 1803).
253. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 87 (1824) ; TUCKER, op. cit. supra
note 252.
254. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 74 (1824).
255. Id. at 74-75.
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In the same vein counsel turned to the scope of the commerce clause.
It was too limited to reach the area of the state regulation covered by the
New York decree. The authority of the national government could not
reach activities and associations wholly within the borders of a member
state. The commerce clause had to be construed in accord with this
general concept of the Constitution. The Congress was delegated no
powers to regulate the internal commerce which was defined as that
wholly within a state. In light of counsel's construction of the state
statutes and the New York decree the Congress had no authority to regu-
late the freedom of movement by navigating by steamboat upon the pub-
lic waters of New York.
It was argued that Congress' powers were limited to navigation be-
tween New York and foreign countries and New York and another
state.2  But counsel's concept of state sovereignty supported additional
limitations upon Congress' powers to regulate commerce. The word
"commerce" was given a legal definition which resulted in other limita-
tions upon Congress' powers. Commerce was limited to trading. Con-
gress' powers to regulate commerce were said to be limited to "the ex-
change of one thing for another; the interchange of commodities; trade
or traffic."2 "7  As to navigation between New York and foreign coun-
tries and New York and another state, Congress' powers did not reach
passengers. The transportation of passengers into and from a state did
not constitute trading; trading was limited to commodities. According
to the reasoning of counsel, freedom of movement and association be-
tween people of the different states could not be made a concern of the
Congress, and therefore could not be nationalized in the law of the
United States.
Counsel used the concurrent power concept as their final basis for
denying the Supreme Court the jurisdictional authority to invalidate the
New York statutes and to set aside the New York decree. Counsel agreed
with Mr. Webster, since it was to their advantage to do so, that the Court
had no jurisdiction to invalidate the acts of a member state from the
authority of the Constitution except in instances where the national
power had the characteristic of an exclusive power. To the extent that
the commerce clause constituted the exclusive authority in the national
256. Counsel contended that Congress' power over ships or vessels exists "only in
so far as they are instruments of foreign commerce, or of that between the different
States; but in so far as the employment of a ship or vessel in navigating the waters of
any State or States, has no connexion with the commerce which Congress has power to
regulate; neither that employment nor its regulation or prohibition, falls within the
purview of the federal constitution." Id. at 94-95.
257. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 89 (1824).
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government, authority was permanently withdrawn from the police and
public welfare powers of the member states. Thus the authority of the
Court to nationalize legal rights in the freedom of movement by navigat-
ing public waters by steamboat depended on the determination that the
commerce clause had created powers in the national government which
were exclusive.
Understandably, counsel representing the validity of the New York
franchise sought to narrowly restrict those national powers which were
exclusive. Congress' powers to regulate commerce, counsel reasoned,
were not exclusive because they were not made exclusive in express
terms, i.e., were not expressly prohibited to the member states, or were not
necessarily exclusive in their nature." 8 The powers of the national gov-
ernment had to meet one of two tests if they were to be impliedly exclu-
sive because of their nature, constituting what counsel called "strictly na-
tional powers." In order to be "strictly national" the commerce clause
had to involve powers of government which did not previously exist in
the member states and could not possibly exist in the states after the
Constitution, or it had to involve powers which when exercised by a mem-
ber state, had an inevitable and substantial effect without the member
state." 9 The authority to borrow money on the credit of the United
States was given as the first example of an exclusive and strictly na-
tional power; it could not possibly operate in a member state."' Laws of
naturalization and citizenship were given as the second example of ex-
clusive and strictly national powers, not because the Constitution pre-
scribes that such laws must be "uniform," but because "a person becom-
ing a citizen in one State would thereby become a citizen of another, per-
haps even contrary to its laws, and the power thus exercised would
operate beyond the limits of the State."2"1 Thus, according to these tests,
258. Id. at 35.
259. Ibid. "A power exclusive in nature," Mr. Oakley explained was "repugnant
and contradictory to a like power in the states. This repugnancy exists only in cases
where a State cannot legislate, in any manner, or under any circumstances, under a given
power, without conflicting with some existing act of Congress, or with some provision
of the constitution." Mr. Oakley quoted from TxE FEDERALIST No. 32, stating that it
was "laid down by the commentators on the Constitution, that 'the power granted to
the Union is exclusive, when the existence of a similar power in the States would be
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant."' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 39 (1824). Thus, under this chaotic theory the jurisdictional authority of
the Supreme Court to nationalize private rights and personal liberty in the law of the
United States was dependent upon vague notions of "exclusive" or "concurrent" powers.
260. Id. at 36.
261. Ibid. Mr. Oakley's argument as to the exclusiveness of laws of naturaliza-
tion was as follows:
This power was originally in the States, and was extensively exercised by them,
and would now be concurrent, except for another provision in the Constitution,
that "citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities
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powers to regulate commerce belonged to the states before the adoption
of the Constitution and were therefore concurrent powers.
This determination meant that state powers as complete as those of
any other nation-state continued to exist following the adoption of the
Constitution. There was no withdrawal by the Constitution of state
powers over commerce. The exercise of such powers did not constitute
the use of powers denied to the states by the Constitution, and could not
violate the grant of powers to the national government by the Constitu-
tion. The final result of this syllogism was that the Supreme Court had
no jurisdictional authority from the Constitution to void the state acts,
and thus the Court was unable to nationalize the legal rights of Mr. Gib-
bons in the freedom of movement by navigation upon public waters. The
Court was to be prevented from using the commerce clause as constitu-
tional authority in the formulation of national law.
Counsel presented two additional propositions supporting the theory
that Congress' powers to regulate commerce were concurrent. The legis-
lative and administrative history of the Constitution showed that the
commerce powers were nationalized in the Congress, but were not to be
made exclusive and withdrawn from the member states. Counsel em-
phasized that according to the Monroe Committee report to the Congress
and the Madison resolution to the Virginia House it was contemplated
at all times that the member states should retain the authority to prohibit
the importation of any article or person which was thought to be against
the general welfare of the state.112  At the very least, the powers of the
state remained in operation unless and until the subject of the state pro-
of citizens in the several States." It is not held to be exclusive, from the use
of the term "uniform rule." This Court has held, that the use of an analogous
term, "uniform laws," in respect to the associated subject of bankruptcy, does
not imply an exclusive power in Congress over the subject. [Sturges v. Crown-
inshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).]
Ibid.
262. Mr. Emmett reminded the Supreme Court that the Monroe Committee, in the
Congress of the United States on Wednesday, July 13th, 1785, had recommended that
the states be asked to grant the Congress the "sole and exclusive right and power . . .
of regulating the trade of the states, as well with foreign nations as with each other,"
but subject to the proviso "that the legislative power of the several States shall not be
restrained from prohibiting the importation or exportation of any species of good or
commodities whatsoever." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 104 (1824). Mr.
Emmet also cited a similar resolution proposed by Mr. Madison to the Virginia House of
Delegates on Wednesday, November 30th, 1785. Id. at 105-06. Counsel's interpretation
of legislative history of the commerce clause was that the absolute power of a sovereign
nation-state to determine what goods and persons and ships were to enter its borders
was to be preserved in the states. Counsel was willing to go so far as to admit, how-
ever, that "it is, perhaps, the fair construction of the instrument, that even their pro-
hibitory legislation, is under the control of Congress as having paramount authority to
regulate commerce; but valid until Congress shall have made regulations inconsistent
with their laws." Id. at 106-07.
219
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
hibitory legislation actually was made subject to the control of the Con-
gress. Secondly, counsel cited the mass of state regulation by which the
states, relying on their general welfare powers, had actually assumed
concurrent powers over commerce among the states and with foreign
countries. 3  The state acts prohibiting and controlling the importation
of goods and people were extensive. Counsel listed numerous statutes
prohibiting the importation of slaves and other persons of color,26" ' as
263. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 105-28 (1824).
264. In the debates of the Virginia Convention Mr. George Mason stated his well-
known view that the slave trade "was one of the great causes of our separation from
Great Britain," and that:
The augmentation of slaves weakens the states; and such a trade is diabolical
in itself, and disgraceful to mankind; yet, by this Constitution, it is continued
for twenty years. As much as I value a union of all the states, I would not ad-
mit the Southern States into the Union unless they agree to the discontinuance
of this disgraceful trade, because it would bring weakness, and not strength,
to the Union. . . . And should the government be amended, still this detestable
kind of commerce cannot be discontinued till after the expiration of twenty
years ...
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 452-53 (1836). Mr. Madison, the
Constitution's floor leader, answered that the slave traffic was prohibited by "our laws."
Regarding the clause under consideration, which provided that "The migration or im-
portation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit,
shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred
and eight," Mr. Madison instructed the convention that it "was a restraint on the ex-
ercise of a power expressly delegated to Congress; namely, that of regulating commerce
with foreign nations." Id. at 453, 455. Significantly, perhaps, Mr. Madison limited the
application of the exception to Congress' powers over the commerce with foreign coun-
tries, omitting Congress' powers over the commerce "among" the member states.
Mr. Randolph stated the legal consequence of the provision more broadly, as "an
exception from the power of regulating commerce, and the restriction is only to continue
till 1808. Then Congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent future importa-
tions; but does it affect the existing state of slavery?" Id. at 598-99. Prior to the
Virginia debates, on January 22, 1788, in THE FEDERALIST No. 42, as "Publics," Mr.
Madison had referred to the provision as a "restriction on the general government," and
"a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate
for ever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the
barbarism of modern policy. . . ." THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 261 (Lodge ed. 1888).
The immigration or importation of slaves clause of the Constitution could have been
used elliptically, as an exception to Congress' exclusive authority over commerce, which
was to be reactivated by the end of 1808, or as evidence that state powers were to re-
main in the states until the Congress had assumed exclusive control over the slave trade.
Counsel for the franchise used the state acts which prohibited the importation of slaves
as proof of concurrent powers in the states to regulate the right of entry into the state.
With Congress' powers excepted for twenty years, until 1808, it was unthinkable that
the states were denied the authority to prohibit the importation of slaves, especially in
Virginia where the importation from the outside would have driven down the market
price and decreased the capital of Mr. George Mason and other planters. New York's
act prohibiting the importation and exportation of slaves was enacted in February, 1788,
before the adoption of the Constitution. Act of Feb. 22, 1788, ch. 40, 2 N.Y. Laws 675.
A similar act in Connecticut came in Oct., 1788, Conn. Stat. 1796-1802, 399; in Pennsyl-
vania on March 29, 1788, ch. 1345, 13 Stat. 52; in Massachusetts on March 26, 1788, ch.
48, Mass. Acts & Laws 1786-1787, 615; and in Virginia on Dec. 12, 1793, ch. 23, 1 Stat.
239.
Counsel emphasized Congress' recognition of the power of the states to prohibit
slave trade, by the Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 10, which was titled An Act to prevent the
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well as laws of quarantine prohibiting the entry of vessels into the waters
and ports of the states.26 Finally, counsel noted that Congress had
recognized the states' concurrent powers to regulate seaport pilots.26
In the face of this array of authority, counsel reasoned that the
Supreme Court could not have used the commerce clause as the authority
to void the states acts. The Court was limited to a statute of the Con-
gress, in the exercise of its paramount authority to regulate commerce,
for the jurisdictional authority to void the acts of a state prohibiting the
entry of a vessel onto its public waters. Likewise the Supreme Court was
limited to the authority of an act of the Congress when it would na-
tionalize legal rights in the freedom of movement by navigation upon the
public waters of a member state.
VIII. GIBBSONS V. OGDEN-OPINION OF THE COURT
The climax in this stage of constitutional history came with the his-
toric opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.26 The le-
gal development for this historic formulation of national law was long
and tortuous. It was initiated by the Declaration of Independence, which
ostensibly was planned as a political action to cut away the authority of
the British sovereign from the new America, but resulted also in cutting
away the legal structure of the British Constitution. The Great Declara-
importation of certain persons into certain states, where, by the laws thereof, their ad-
mission is prohibited. 2 Stat. 205. The collectors and other officers of internal revenue
were "enjoined vigilantly to carry into effect the said laws of said states" by which
persons of color were prohibited from importation and general admission into the state,
whether or not the person of color was brought in as a slave or came in as a freeman,
a foreign national or citizen of a member state. Counsel asked a question: "How could
Congress do this, if power prohibiting the trade were not unquestionably possessed by
the States, in their sovereign capacity?" Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 112
(1824).
265. Mr. Webster, in opposition to the New York franchise, had classified the
quarantine of ships and passengers from foreign countries and other states as laws of
police, and not as laws of commerce. Counsel for the New York franchise agreed that
quarantine laws were laws of police, but insisted that they were also laws of commerce,
and as laws of commerce, the quarantine laws were subject to the concurrent powers of
the state over commerce. Counsel stated that the quarantine laws were "all obviously
direct regulations of trade, and so is the whole of every quarantine system." Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 116 (1824). Mr. Tucker, who thought that the com-
merce powers were exclusive, emphasized that in 1796 Congress had given recognition to
the validity of quarantine laws in the states. TUCKER, op. cit. supra note 252, at 251. By
the Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, An Act Relative to Quarantine, the President of the
United States was "authorized, to direct the revenue officers and the officers command-
ing forts and revenue cutters, to aid in the execution of quarantine, and also in the
execution of the health laws, of the states, respectively, in such manner as may to him
appear necessary." 1 Stat. 474. The Act of May 27, 1796, was repealed by the more
extensive Act of Feb. 25, 1799, which required cooperation by port collectors with state
quarantine laws. Ch. 12, 1 Stat. 619.
266. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 116-18 (1824).
267. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186-222 (1824).
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tion and the War for Independence reflected social transformations that
marked a release of power in the various segments of a loosely organized
community, necessitating the building of a nationalized legal structure
of private rights.268
Initially the Articles of Confederation did not adequately provide a
legal structure for the effectuation and enforcement of national policy,
particularly in the areas of trade and commerce. 69 Thus it was in the
building of a legal structure for a workable system of commerce under
the Constitution that Gibbons v. Ogden became a focal adjudication in
constitutional history.' The constitutional provisions for the nationali-
zation of the legislative and administrative powers remained largely
dormant and were not used for the formulation of national policy for
building an effective system of commercial and social relationships. One
of the essential ingredients in an effective system of commercial and so-
cial relationships was the freedom of movement by navigating the public
waters, which then constituted the main arteries for commercial and so-
cial relationships. 1 The steamboat stirred expectations of benefits that
might be derived if the freedom to navigate by steamboat upon the na-
tion's public waters were preserved.
Freedom as a concept is developed in law through the nationaliza-
tion of private rights and personal liberty and the judicial enforcement
thereof. The primary question in this process of nationalization for the
Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden was to construct and prove by legal
analyses the foundations of its authority to void the state franchise.
Tentatively the Court relied upon the authority of the commerce clause
for both the remedy to invalidate the state decree and the substantive law
to secure the freedom of movement by navigation in the law of the
United States. As in the use of a prerogative writ in Lord Coke's day,
judicial review served to give court-made law the characteristic of auton-
omy and supremacy over the exercise of governmental powers.
268. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 159-76 (1948).
269. See, e.g., JENSEN, op. cit. supra 107-84, 254-70; JENSEN, THE NEW NATION
350-74 (1950).
270. For general treatment of Gibbomw v. Ogden, see, e.g., 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 250-80 (1953) ; FRANK-
FURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 11-45 (1937); POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49-53 (1956); RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER
OVER CoMMERcE 20-52 (1937) ; 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES His-
TORY 587-632 (rev. ed. 1926).
271. 1 BEERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 259 (1916); FISKE, THE CRITICAL
PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY 61 (1888); 1 MORISON & COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF
THE AMERIcAN REPUBLIC 496-99 (4th ed. 1950) ; RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POWER
OVER COmmERCE 27 (1937).
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Judicial review in order to be effective had to insure that the law of
the United States, as formulated by the Supreme Court, would not be
overridden by the member states. The member states could not be con-
ditioned to comply with the law of the United States except when the
Constitution was violated by the states using powers denied to them by
the Constitution. It was for this reason that Webster's exclusive power
argument was used to require the remedy of constitutional invalidation in
order to effectuate the law of the United States through the judicial en-
forcement of private rights and personal liberty. On the other hand, the
underlying purpose of the concurrent power argument was to deny the
Court the authority to use constitutional invalidation of state laws, in
order to deny the Court the authority to nationalize private rights and
personal liberty.
The Gibbons v. Ogden appeal finally presented the Marshall Court
with the crucial and ultimate question of the Court's authority to use the
commerce clause for the remedy of invalidation in order to effectuate the
substantive law of the United States. In the lower courts Thomas Gib-
bons had claimed that he had legal rights to the use and enjoyment of
property by navigating upon the public waters in New York by virtue of
the license granted by an act of the Congress. 2 The possibility of using
the commerce clause as the authority for the enforcement of such rights
had been foreclosed in the New York courts by the binding precedent of
Livingston v. Van IngenY" In determining that such private rights as
Thomas Gibbons had in navigating New York waters were controlled by
state law and not by the act of the Congress, Chancellor Kent relied upon
the legal concept that the use and enjoyment of private property were
exclusively within state powers."- According to Chancellor Kent the
coasting act of the Congress could not be construed to grant Thomas
Gibbons a license in the nature of a right to navigate the public waters
in New York. And should Thomas Gibbons have been granted explicitly
such rights in the act of Congress by virtue of the coasting license, the
act of Congress would have been subject to constitutional invalidation as
272. Gibbons v. Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 153-54, 156-59 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819);
aff'd, 17 Johns. R. 488, 490-91 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1820).
273. 9 Johns. R. 507 (N.Y. Ct Err. 1812).
274. Gibbons v. Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 157-58 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819):
However unquestionable the right and title to a specific chattel may be, and
from whatever source that title may be derived, the use and employment of it
must, as a general rule, be subject to the laws and regulations of the state....
The only limitation upon such a general discretion and power of control, is the
occurrence of the case when the exercise of it would impede or defeat the
operation of some lawful measure, or be absolutely repugnant to some consti-
tutional law of the Union.
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invading those aspects of the nation's sovereign authority reserved in the
member states.275 In these two historic opinions Chancellor Kent pre-
sented the Marshall Court with a supreme challenge.276
The essence of the Marshall opinion is that the Constitution recog-
nized an existent nation with powers independent of, and not limited by,
the existence of the member states. 7 Thus the normal functioning of
powers of the member states was subject to the adjudication and judicial
formulation of the law of the United States. It was within the judicial
prerogative to determine the provision of the Constitution that was to
be used to constitute the source of authority for the judicial formulation
of the law of the United States. But the exercise of the invalidation rem-
edy would depend more on necessity, e.g., state regulation in the abridge-
ment of basic rights and personal liberty. Thus the Court's authority in
the functioning of the constitutional system could not be dependent upon
Webster's thesis of exclusive powers, requiring the alienation of govern-
mental powers from the member states in order to formulate national
law for the adjudication of a particular case. The abridgement of basic
rights inherent in fundamental freedoms secured by the law of the United
States eventually would be sufficient to support the use of the invalida-
tion remedy.7
275. Chancellor Kent wrote:
Suppose there was a provision in the act of congress, that all vessels, duly li-
censed, should be at liberty to navigate, for the purpose of trade and commerce,
over all the navigable -bays, harbors, rivers and lakes within the several states,
any law of the states, creating particular privileges as to any particular class
of vessels, to the contrary notwithstanding; the only question that could arise in
such a case, would be, whether the law was constitutional. If that was to be
granted or decided in favor of the validity of the law, it would certainly, in all
Courts and places, overrule and set aside the state grant.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 158 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819).
276. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. R. 507, 572-90 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1812) ; Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 150, 156-59 (N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1819). In Livingston v. Vant
Ingen Kent recognized the paramount authority of the Congress to regulate commerce
and that it might cause a collision with the state acts creating the exclusive franchise
in steamboat navigation. But he concluded that Congress' concurrent jurisdiction over
navigable waters of the state went "no further than may be incidental and requisite to
the due regulation of commerce between the states, and with foreign nations." Livings-
ton v. Van Ingen, supra at 579-80.
277. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). The Marshall Court
was not troubled by a constitutional theory and concept of state limitations upon the
national government. The critical question for the Marshall Court was the constitutional
limitations upon the member states. This was critical because it was thought to be a
necessary determinant of authority in the Supreme Court to invalidate state acts, which
in turn would secure the jurisdictional authority to nationalize private rights and per-
sonal liberty in the law of the United States.
278. The freedom from undue discrimination, as well as the substantial burden test,
for example; constitute legal standards drawn from the authority of the commerce
clause which nationalize in some degree the freedom of enterprise and association. See,
e.g., Velton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
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The judicial prerogative was not the result of any particular provi-
sion of the Constitution, such as the commerce clause; authority for its
exercise was the legal and political structure of the national government
as reflected in the Constitution in its totality beginning with the Pre-
amble "We the People . . . ." The Court emphasized that under the
Constitution "the whole character in which the States appear, underwent
a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration
of the instrument by which the change was effected." '279 This equivocal
comment was sufficient, for the Constitution ought to be interpreted in
terms of the objects of the nation's governmental structure, not solely in
relation to the existence of the member states. The Court rejected coun-
sel's contention that the Constitution must be strictly construed. The
purpose for the narrow construction, as the Court stated it, was "in sup-
port of some theory not to be found in the constitution," that "would
deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as
usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general
views and objects of the instrument .. ..280 A narrow construction
was rejected, for it "would cripple the government, and render it unequal
to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the
powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent ... ,
When the Court reached the commerce clause, it was still in the
process of rejecting the state sovereignty presentations made by counsel
for Colonel Ogden in behalf of the New York franchise. The Court
rejected the contention that the power to regulate commerce was narrowly
limited to the transportation of goods between the states, thus leaving he
powers relating to such objects of government in the member states.22
651 (1945). The most difficult job for the Supreme Court, by far, has been to deter-
mine its own function, as a court, to effectuate the judicial power. Its efforts to act as
a constitutional court, determining law solely as divisions of powers of government, has
provided an escape from its essential job; and sometimes the Court has welcomed this
avenue of escape. See, e.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
279. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 187 (1824).
280. Id. at 188. As has been noted supra, in the discussion of the arguments of
counsel for Colonel Ogden and the New York steamboat franchise narrow construction
of the Constitution was presented as a rule of constitutional law. It was posited upon
the states' rights theory of the Constitution: that the nation's total sovereignty was
reserved in the member states excepting a division of total sovereignty between the
enumerated powers of the national government and the member states, and that there
should be a strong presumption raised in opposition to the enumerated powers of the
national government. There were numerous purposes behind the rule, e.g., prohibition
of implied and incidental powers in the national government, limitation of the supremacy
clause of the Constitution to direct collisions of legislation enacted by the national and
state legislatures, and restriction of the use of the Constitution as the principal authority
for constructing the law of the United States.
281. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Whea.) 1, 188 (1824).
282. Id. at 189.
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"What is this power?" the Court asked for emphasis. 83  The power to
regulate is "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.
This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution." ' 4  Then in one of those cres-
cendo passages for which Marshall's opinions are famous the Court pro-
nounced:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress,
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those ob-
jects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as
it would be in a single government, having in its constitution
the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found
in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and dis-
cretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the in-
fluence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in
this, as in many instances, as that, for example, of declaring
war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them
from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must
often rely solely, in all representative governments.282
Thus the Chief Justice established the nationalized structure of the gov-
ernment under the Constitution; its powers were independent of the
member states and were limited, as were the powers of the states, by the
legal formulations of the Court when made from the authority of the
Constitution." 8 The powers to regulate commerce were no more limited
by the existence of the member states than the governmental powers in
the war and treaty-making clauses.287
The independence of the national government having been estab-
lished as the authority for the Court to formulate national law from the
Constitution, it might have been anticipated that Marshall would formu-
late the legal principles of private rights in the freedom of movement by
navigation. Instead Marshall expended a large portion of the Court's
283. Id. at 196.
284. Ibid.
285. Id. at 197.
286. The Court may use the constitutional authority of the due process clause or
one of the other constitutional limitation clauses, instead of the commerce clause, when
Congress unduly constricts freedom of enterprise, association, or other private rights
and personal liberties. The consequence is appropriate and the concept of separation of
powers gives less difficulty. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382 (1950).
287. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
226
THE MARSHALL COURT 227
opinion delineating the scope of the commerce clause.288 It is this part of
Marshall's opinion that has been troublesome in the course of subsequent
constitutional adjudication." 9 In making this delineation, however, the
Court did not contemplate the formulation of principles of law and legal
standards that would move the Court into the political area of determin-
ing division and allocation of governmental powers between the national
government and the member states. 90 The explicit purpose of delineat-
ing the scope of the commerce clause was to reject the state sovereignty
limitations which would foreclose judicial review in the use of the in-
validation remedy and the Court's authority to formulate the law of the
United States.2 '1
Determining the scope of the commerce clause had yet another pur-
pose-to validate the Court's interpretation of the act of Congress as the
source of the national law. In support of the independence of state
sovereignty counsel had ignored the "power to regulate' phrase in the
288. Id. at 197-209.
289. The procedure adopted by Marshall initially in expounding upon the extent
of the Congress' power was
that of taking up the component parts of the commerce clause for separate
interpretation.. . . The method used in Gibbozs v. Ogden may be construed as
giving support to the implication, apparent in some later decisions, that there is
or may be a satisfactory [legal] definition of commerce . . . which definition
may be applied in all questions of state and federal power ...
Obviously some concept or concepts of . . . commerce must be used by
the courts. Danger lies in the assumption that the term has one ready and
consistent meaning and subsequent controversies may be decided by the rigorous
application of propositions giving verbal expression to that meaning.
RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL PowER Ovms COMMERCE 25-26 (1937).
290. In no place does Chief Justice Marshall suggest, nor does he contemplate, that
commerce, or Congress' power to regulate commerce, or commerce with foreign nations,
or commerce among the states, etc., were subject to legal definitions in formulating and
enforcing limitations upon the powers of Congress. His statement that commerce
among the states was properly restricted to commerce "which concerns more states than
one" was expository and in no sense constituted a legal definition limiting Congress'
legislative authority over particular subject matter. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 194, 197 (1824). See Marshall's explanation of the limited function of
judicial review in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819): "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional."
291. With due respect to the many scholarly writings on the commerce clause, it
was not the function of the Supreme Court to use the judicial powers to impose the na-
tional powers upon the member states; it was not the function of the Court to use con-
stitutional interpretation and legal definitions to limit national powers; and it was not
the function of the Court to use state sovereignty and external theories about the Con-
stitution to impose legal limitations upon national powers. Cf. 1 CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 17-292 (1953). The
functioning of the member states provided the circumstances necessitating specific de-
terminations of private rights and personal liberty. Such decisions, in turn, had to bejustified in the formulations of the law of the United States. The jurisdictional author-
ity for this had to come from the written Constitution of the United States. Sovereignty
of the law required the strict compliance of the member states.
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commerce clause and had attempted to narrowly define "commerce" as
trade and the sale of goods. The Court's answer was that such an ap-
proach "would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one
of its significations. '292 The objects includible therein extended to in-
tercourse and associations within the nation and with foreign countries,
comprehending navigation in all its aspects as "one of the primary ob-
jects for which the people of America adopted their government."2 3  A
national policy relating to navigation did not exclude the waters within
the borders of the states.294 "The power of Congress, then, whatever it
may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the sev-
eral states," '295 and the power of the Congress to regulate commerce "com-
prehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union."2 "
Discussion of the scope of the commerce clause was not completed.
The nationalized-independent structure of the government under the Con-
stitution had been explained; the state sovereignty presentations made by
counsel for the New York franchise had been totally rejected ;217 and the
292. Id. at 189.
293. Id. at 190.
294. After concluding that the commerce power comprehends all aspects of naviga-
tion the Chief Justice turned to the general scope of the power. Regarding commerce
with foreign nations, the commerce power was said to "comprehend every species of
commercial intercourse 'between the United States and foreign nations." Id. at 193.
Further, Congress' power to regulate commerce among the several states must be as
comprehensive as the power to regulate commerce among the several states and foreign
countries. The power "cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may
be introduced into the interior." Id. at 194. The power to legislate by use of the
authority of the commerce clause may properly be exercised as to matters occurring
within territorial jurisdiction of the member states, and not merely in regulating com-
mercial activities, but also in promoting and regulating the association of the peoples
of the varous member states and foreign countries. The word "commerce," included "in-
tercourse" and the word "among" meant "commingling," and "intermingled with." This
holding enlarged the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to formulate the law of the
United States which would result in the nationalization of private rights and personal
liberty from the authority of the commerce clause.
In order to allay fears of arbitrary government and destruction of the member states,
Marshall at this point attempted to show that national powers were not unlimited. He
intended to delineate policy lines of authority, later to be drawn specifically by the
Congress and not by the Supreme Court, except in those extreme cases when legal rights
were confiscated or abridged. "Comprehensive as the word 'among' is," Marshall wrote,
"it may very properly be restricted to that commerce -which concerns more States than
one." The action of the national government is limited "to those internal concerns
which affect the States generally. . . . The completely internal commerce of a state,
then, may be considered as reserved for the state itself." Id. at 194-95. See CoRwixN,
TnE CoMMRmcE POWER VERSUS STATE RIGHTS 115-72 (1936) ; RmBLE, STATE AND NA-
TIONAL PowERs OVR COMMERCE 26-27 (1937) ; Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns
More States Than. One, 47 HARv. L. REv. 1335 (1934).
295. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
296. Id. at 197.
297. The only portions of the arguments made by counsel for Colonel Ogden and
the New York franchise which the Court used and accepted as part of its opinion were
the concurrent power presentations to the effect that the member states were adminis-
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Court's authority to review the exercise of state powers under the com-
merce clause had been established. The Court was prepared to exercise
its independent role in the constitutional scheme. Now the Court had to
formulate the bases for the invalidation of state power. At the threshold
of this question the Court faced the presentations made by Webster in
representing Thomas Gibbons in the appeal. Webster had argued exclu-
tering numerous statutes which greatly affected commerce among the states and with
foreign nations. Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
Although many of the powers formerly exercised by the States, are transferred
to the government of the Union, yet the State governments remain, and con-
stitute a most important part of our system. The power of taxation is indis-
pensable to their existence, and is a power which, in its own nature, is capable
of residing in, and being exercised by, different authorities at the same time...
There is no analogy . . . between the power of taxation and the power of
regulating commerce.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 198-200 (1824).
Marshall was wrong when he wrote that the constitutional restrictions on state
power to place duties on exports and imports was solely a restriction on state taxing
powers and not a prohibition against a state's imposing duties on commerce. Id. at 201-
03. Certainly duties on goods imported and exported were considered as matters of
commerce as well as a method of financing government.
Marshall admitted that the state's "inspection laws may have a remote and con-
siderable influence on commerce. . . ." Id. at 203. But he stated that he would not
admit that the source of these regulations was commerce. They were a part of the mass
of regulations based upon the police and general welfare powers of the state.
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces every-
thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general govern-
ment: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States them-
selves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as
well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which
respect turnpike roads, ferries, etc., are component parts of this mass ...
If the legislative power of the Union can reach them, it must be for na-
tional purposes; it must be where the power is expressly given for a special
purpose, or is clearly incidental to some power which is expressly given....
So, if a State, in passing laws on subjects acknowledged to be within its con-
trol, and with a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same
character which Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority from the
particular power which has been granted, but from some other, which remains
with the State, and may be executed by the same means.
Id. at 203-04.
Marshall admitted that acts of the Congress, Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat.
474, and Act of Feb. 25, 1799, ch. 12, 1 Stat 619, which directed revenue officers to
conform to the state's quarantine of ships and cargo laws, recognized that the state laws
were constitutional. But the acts of the Congress did not "imply an acknowledgment
that a State may rightfully regulate commerce with foreign nations or among the
States. . . ." Id. at 205. Finally, Marshall stated the obvious as part of his scheme to
give "constitutional play in the joints." POWELL, VAGAES AND VARIETEs rIN CONSTI-
TJTIONAL INTERPREATION 32 (1955).
All experience shows, that the same measures, or measures scarcely distinguish-
able from each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this does not prove
that the powers themselves are identical. Although the means used in their ex-
ecution may sometimes approach each other so nearly as to be confounded,
there are other situations in which they are sufficiently distinct to establish
their individuality.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 204 (1824).
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sive powers and the concomitant alienation of such powers from the
member states. The purpose behind the application of the exclusive power
characteristics was to lay the foundation for the independent law making
role of the Supreme Court from the commerce clause.29 The Court ac-
cepted the purport of Webster's thesis, but it did not accept his exclusive
power concept as a necessary foundation. The independent role of the
Supreme Court to formulate national law from the authority of various
provisions of the Constitution was drawn out of the historic perspective
of law and judicial adjudication, and not from the peculiar language and
nature of the national powers as compared with the member states."'
Chief Justice Marshall adumbrated Webster's thesis of exclusive powers
solely as a possibility but without its acceptance as a determination. The
Court noted:
It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as
the word "to regulate" implies in its nature, full power over the
thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all
others that would perform the same operation on the same thing.
The regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to
those parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which
are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much
disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating power
designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated.
298. In addition, the concept of "exclusive powers" appeared to reflect not so much
the nature of commerce as the nature of the Constitution. Marshall had stated earlier:
[T]he United States form for many, and for most important purposes, a single
nation. . . . In war, we are one people. In maldng peace we are one people.
In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other
respects, the American people are one; and the government which is alone cap-
able of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects, is the gov-
ernment of the Union. . . . These States are constituent parts of the United
States. They are members of one great empire-for some purposes sovereign,
for some purposes subordinate.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 413-14 (1821).
299. Mr. Justice Johnson applied the concept of man and the universality and
sovereignty of law, prevalent in the eighteenth century, when he wrote: "The law of
nations, regarding man as a social animal, pronounces all commerce legitimate in a state
of peace, until prohibited by positive law." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
227 (1824). The Supreme Court did not consider the New York franchise acts as "posi-
tive law." The conception of law, as the Court knew it, had natural law foundations.
The "positive law," was universal and eternal; it was ideal law derived not from enact-
ments nor from the magistrates, but from the nature of things. The freedom of com-
merce, therefore, was something of an expression of a principle which comprised part
of the ideal law based on the nature of man as a rational, social being. There is at
least "a ring" of Lord Coke's fundamental laws which he used against James I. See
GOUGEa, FUNDAmENTAL LAW iN ENGLISHa HisTOR" 30-47 (1955). There was more than
a slight danger that the nation's member states would tear down the ideal law which
was founded in the legal principles of mankind.
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There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not
satisfied that it has been refuted."' 0
In its final determination the Court formulated the law enforcing
the private rights in the freedom of movement by navigation from the
authority of the act of Congress licensing coasting trade in American
vessels."°' The New York acts were held to be in conflict with the na-
tional law which the Court formulated from the act of Congress. The
act of Congress was construed to support the nationalization of the prin-
ciple of the freedom of navigation and the enforcement of private rights.
The breadth of the Court's function in the formulation of national
law from the act of the Congress was as large, according to the Marshall
Court, as if it had been formulated from the commerce clause.0 2 The
300. Id. at 209.
301. Act of Feb. 18, 1793, clL 8, § entitled An Act for enrolling and licensing
ships or vessels to be employed im the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the
same. 1 Stat. 305 provided:
That ships or vessels, enrolled by virtue of 'An act for registering and clearing
vessels, regulating coasting trade, and for other purposes,' [Act of Sept. 1, 1789,
ch. 11, 1 Stat. 55] and those of twenty tons and upwards, which shall be en-
rolled after the last day of May next, in pursuance of this act, and having a
license in force, or, if less than twenty tons, not being enrolled, shall have a
license in force, as is hereinafter required, and no others, shall be deemed ships
or vessels of the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships or employed in
the coasting trade or fisheries.
The Court construed section 1 "to contain a positive enactment, that the vessels it de-
scribes shall be entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in coasting trade."
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 212-13 (1824).
The Court drew the same inference from § 4 of the Act of Feb. 18, which it said,
"directs the proper officer to grant to a vessel qualified to receive it, 'a license for
carrying on the coasting trade'; and prescribes its form. After reciting the compliance
of the applicant with the previous requisites of the law, the operative words of the
instrument are, 'the license is hereby granted for the said steam-boat, Bellona, to be
employed in carrying on the coasting trade for one year from the date hereof, and no
longer." Gibbons v. Ogden, suprar at 213.
302. Marshall's legal analysis supported both of the two propositions: First, that
the grant of a "license" to engage in coasting trade constituted the nationalization of
a legal right in the freedom of movement by steamboat navigation to and from, as well
as within, the public waters of a member state. The important matter which the Chief
Justice emphasized was that the "license" constituted a legal right but in addition
Marshall gave the broadest possible construction to "coasting waters"; it was well under-
stood by everyone, according to Marshall, that "coasting waters" covered all waters
which were navigable and public wherever situated. Thus the term included navigable,
public waters entirely within the geographic borders of a member state as well as waters
which lay between two or more states and waters which ran through two or more
states. "Coasting waters" were not limited to admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where
the tide ebbs and flows. Secondly, the Court constructed exclusive powers and the
supremacy clause into the circumstance of the Congress having legislated upon the sub-
ject of ships or vessels or navigation.
As to the construction of the act of Congress Marshall wrote as follows:
The word "license," means permission, or authority; and a license to do any
particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted
by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do
whatever it purports to authorize. . . .
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Court's determination was in no sense limited to the language of the act,
or to the apparent intent and purpose of the Congress. The Court was
inclined to the view that when the Congress legislated on a subject it had
taken over the whole area or subject matter."'3 The state powers were
thereby alienated from the whole area or subject matter though it could
not be said that, solely by the act, the Congress had covered the field and
The license must be understood to be what it purports to be, a legislative
authority to the steamboat Bellona, "to be employed in carrying on the coasting
trade, for one year from this date."
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 213-14 (1824). Marshall's construction of
"coasting waters" is shown by the following sentence: "This act authorizes a steam
boat employed, or intended to be employed, only in a river or bay of the United States,
owned wholly or in part by an alien, resident within the United States, to be enrolled
or licensed as if the same 'belonged to a citizen of the United States." Id. at 221.
303. The act of the Congress in question involved commerce which Marshall con-
sidered to be unitary, as if it were a nationalized system, and also involved ships and
navigation and public waters which under general, natural laws and the law of nations
were not a proper subject of a private franchise. Marshall admitted that neither the
enrolling statute nor the licensing of coasting trade statute specified the right to navi-
gate by steamboat, to trade, or to carry passengers. And neither statute mentioned
conflicing state laws, such as inspection and quarantine acts. However, the object of
the license was "to give permission to a vessel already proved by her enrollment to be
American, to carry on the coasting trade." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
215 (1824). In addition, the
whole course of legislation on this subject shows [that] the power of Congress
has been universally understood in America, to comprehend navigation . . .
and . . . no clear distinction is perceived between the power to regulate vessels
employed in transporting men for hire, and property for hire. The subject is
transferred to Congress, and no exception to the grant can be admitted, which is
not proved by the words or the nature of the thing. A coasting vessel employed
in the transportation of passengers, is as much a portion of the American
marine, as one employed in the transportation of a cargo.
Id. at 215-16.
Marshall expounded further:
If the power reside in Congress, as a portion of the general grant to regulate
commerce, then acts applying that power to vessels generally, must be con-
strued as comprehending all vessels. If none appear to be excluded by the
language of the act, none can be excluded by construction. Vessels have al-
ways been employed to a greater or less extent in the transportation of pas-
sengers, and have never been supposed to be, on that account, withdrawn from
the control or protection of Congress.
Id. at 217. And finally:
The laws of Congress for the regulation of commerce, do not look to the prin-
ciple by which vessels are moved. That subject is left entirely to individual
discretion; and, in that vast and complex system of legislative enactment con-
cerning it, which embraces every thing that a Legislature thought it necessary to
notice . . . every act, either prescribing duties, or granting privileges, applies
to every vessel, whether navigated by the instrumentality of wind or fire, or
sails or machinery.
Id. at 219-20. The point can properly be made that Marshall does not distinguish when
he is construing the statute broadly in terms of the subject matter and when he is adding
the weight of the constitutional grant of power over commerce to his concept of na-
tional power. The commerce clause adds to the act of Congress as much so as if the
war and treaty-making powers were involved.
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enacted a broad withdrawal of state powers."'
The Court thought it was immaterial whether the state laws were
passed "in virtue of a concurrent power 'to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States,' or, in virtue of a power
to regulate their domestic trade and police." '  Gibbons' legal rights of
navigation were the same, whether the ostensible authority was the com-
merce clause or an act of the Congress regulating the freedom of naviga-
tion in the coasting trade. In the process of formulating the law from
the act of the Congress, the Court reveals the essential source of the legal
principles in these words: "In pursuing this inquiry at the bar, it has
been said, that the constitution does not confer the right of intercourse
between State and State. That right derives its source from those laws
whose authority is acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world.
This is true. The constitution found it an existing right and gave to
Congress the power to regulate it." ' 6  Regulation included the power to
secure such existing rights. Thus we see that much of the constitutional
law of the United States is the formulation of law for the preservation
of basic freedoms from confiscation and abridgement by the administra-
tion of the governments and subdivisions of the member states."°7
304. Before moving to the supremacy clause and the suspension or alienation of
state powers Marshall took the occasion to answer one of the intensely held theories of
the states' rights position in support of the nation's sovereignty in the member states.
In argument . . . it has been contended, that if a law passed by a State, in the
exercise of its acknowledged sovereignty, comes into conflict with a law passed by
Congress in pursuance of the constitution, they affect the subject, and each
other, like equal opposing powers. But the framers of our constitution fore-
saw this state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the supremacy not
only of [the Constitution] itself, but of the laws made in pursuance of it. The
nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the declara-
tion, that the constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of
that part of the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties,
is to such acts of the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but,
though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, interfere with,
or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution,
or some treaty made under the authority of the United States. In every such
case the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State,
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824).
305. Id. at 210. The Court explained: "In one case and the other, the acts of New
York must yield to the law of Congress; and the decision sustaining the privilege they
confer, against a right given by a law of the Union, must be erroneous.
306. Id. at 211.
307. Much of the fabric of the opinions of the Supreme Court which are based up-
on the fundamental authority of the commerce clause tended to treat the legal rights of
the private complainant as nonexistent, as if the matter involved solely the allocation
and accommodation of the governmental powers between the national government and
the member states. Public policy occasionally played a role in the form of the concepts
of free trade and free markets, as if these were legal concepts. Actually, however, the
constitutional law based upon the authority of the commerce clause is something like
that contemplated by the privileges and immunities clauses under which various legal
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Mr. Justice William Johnson penned an able separate opinion. Re-
iterating his own views of the authority of the Court, he began by stating:
"The judgment entered by the court in this cause, has my entire approba-
tion; but having adopted my conclusions on views of the subject ma-
terially different from those of my brethern, I feel it incumbent on me to
exhibit those views." '  Johnson was rejecting the one-opinion mode
which Marshall had successfully imposed upon the Court.3"9 Thus he
added: "I have, also, another inducement: in questions of great im-
portance and great delicacy, I feel my duty to the public best discharged,
by an effort to maintain my opinions in my own way." 1' Johnson's
concurring essay contains one of the best statements in the bibliography
of the Court on what the constitutional statesmen thought they were
about in creating the Constitution. "The great and paramount purpose
was to unite this mass of wealth and power, for the protection of the
humblest individual; his rights, civil and political, his interests and pros-
perity, are the sole end; the rest are nothing but the means.")311
The Constitution was to preserve the states too, to keep them from
being driven to anarchy and ruin. 12  At the time of the making of the
rights and freedoms involving freedom of movement, association, the enjoyment of one's
property and the like, have been nationalized. In other words, the legal conclusion that
the commerce clause has been violated and the declaration that the particular exercise of
state powers is void because of an illegal discrimination or undue burden against the
free flow of commerce are based upon the showing of an array of restrictions upon the
use and enjoyment of private property, the freedom of movement and association, the
right to live where one chooses, and like private rights and personal freedoms which
have been nationalized. Compare Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870)
and Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), with Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275 (1876) and Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). Cf. Dean
Mills Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Dumond, 336 U.S.
525 (1949); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941).
308. Id. at 222-23.
309. Mr. Justice Johnson was expressing his own views of the constitutional au-
thority of the commerce clause, views which he had expressed previously. At the same
time he was aware of the desire of Chief Justice Marshall that only one opinion of the
Court be handed down for posterity. The famous Marshall opinions upon the Constitu-
tion were a composite, or compromise between the active Justices. Mr. Justice Johnson
was under considerable criticism from Thomas Jefferson and other Republicans for not
returning to the seriatim opinions of the Supreme Court preceding Chief Justice
Marshall. See MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSo N 168-89 (1954).
310. Id. at 223.
311. Ibid.
312. One of the principal purposes of the Constitution, Johnson wrote, "was the
independence and harmony of the States, that they may the better subserve the purposes
of cherishing and protecting the respective families of their great republic. The strong
sympathies, rather than the feeble government, which bound the States together during
a common war, dissolved on the return to peace; and the very principles which gave
rise to the war of the revolution, began to threaten the confederacy with anarchy and
ruin." Id. at 223-24.
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Constitution extensive regulations of commerce existed in each state."'
While it would not have been possible for these regulations to have been
immediately assumed by acts of the Congress, nevertheless Johnson
thought that "those laws dropped lifeless from their statute books, for
want of sustaining power, that had been relinquished to Congress. And
the plain and direct import of the words of the grant, is consistent with
this general understanding.""1 4 Congress' powers over commerce were
those of a unitary sovereign state. "The power of a sovereign state over
commerce . . .amounts to nothing more than a power to limit and re-
strain it at pleasure."3"' The extent of those powers was to be found in
a state of peace under the law of nations, which was part of the law of
the United States."6 There was no drawing of lines of authority be-
tween the state and national powers which would have had the effect of
placing state power limitations on the national government and on the
independent authority of the Supreme Court to effectuate the law of the
United States. 317
Johnson ended his analysis with the following: "And since the
power to prescribe the limits to its freedom, necessarily implies the power
to determine what shall remain unrestrained, it follows, that the power
313. Johnson wrote:
For a century the States had submitted, with murmurs, to the commercial re-
strictions imposed by the parent State; and now, finding themselves in the un-
limited possession of those powers over their own commerce, which they had so
long been deprived of, and so earnestly coveted, that selfish principle which,
well controlled, is so salutary, and which, unrestricted, is so unjust and tyranni-
cal, guided by inexperience and jealousy, began to show itself in iniquitous laws
and impolitic measures, from which grew up a conflict of commercial regula-
tions, destructive to the harmony of the States, and fatal to their commercial
interests.
This was the immediate cause, that led to the forming of a convention.
Id. at 224.
314. Id. at 226.
315. Id. at 227.
316. "The law of nations," which Johnson regarded as an universal law, "regard-
ing man as a social animal, pronounces all commerce legitimate in a state of peace, until
prohibited by positive law." Id. at 227.
317. As a result of prior experience with South Carolina's Seamen Act Johnson
had seen at first hand the severe conflict of state sovereignty with foreign relations.
South Carolina's intransigence had embarrassed the administration of President Monroe.
Johnson wrote accordingly:
[T]he power to regulate foreign commerce is necessarily exclusive. The
States are unknown to foreign nations; their sovereignty exists only with rela-
tion to each other and the general government. Whatever regulations foreign
commerce should be subjected to in the ports of the Union, the general govern-
ment would be held responsible for them; and all other regulations, but those
which Congress had imposed, would be regarded by foreign nations as tres-
passes and violations of national faith and security.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 228-29 (1824). See also MORGAN, JUSTICE
WIMLIAM JoHxsoN 205-06 (1954).
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must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and hence, the grant
of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the
State to act upon." 1 ' Johnson's analysis was partially erroneous, as no
elimination or denial of Congress' powers results from state regulation,
and, except where there was the necessity of nationalizing certain private
rights and privileges in commercial and general social intercourse, there
was no extinguishment of state powers." 9 Johnson considered his writ-
ing as axiomatic-the essence of the matter-and appeared to be labour-
ing to prove a self evident proposition.82
Johnson apparently did not comprehend that the Chief Justice had
relied upon the traditional principles of the law of nations in formulating
the national law from the act of Congress.32' He followed Chancellor
318. Ibid.
319. Johnson's views that the state of New York had no power to restrict com-
merce stemmed from his earlier views on the free right of commerce. "In 1808, he had
defended his decision in the Embargo case [Gilchrist v. Collector, 10 Fed. Cas. 355, 360
(No. 5420) (C.C.D.S.C. 1808)] on the ground of a free right of commerce; it was in-
contestable, he had said, that unless restricted by law, every inhabitant of the nation
had a perfect right to engage in commerce." MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON 191
(1954).
320. At the time of Johnson's death great prestige had attached to the American
judiciary. 1 DE TOCQUEviLLE, DEMocRAcY IN AmERaCA 150-52, 278-80 (Bradley ed. 1945).
Johnson wrote of his legal position pointedly and with clarity, manifesting a sense of
responsibility which he derived from his prestigious position. His was a gospel of
judicial restraint. He assigned to judicial review a limited scope. He insisted that the
Supreme Court should read grants of jurisdiction strictly. But notwithstanding, there
was a universality and a sovereignty of the law which he pronounced. There was a
broad purpose to substantive law, giving it character and furnishing him with criteria
for his decisions.
Possibly Johnson was to a degree overcome by the majesty of the law. He prob-
ably would not have comprehended Professor Thomas Reed Powell, who wrote on more
than one occasion about "Supreme Court Justices who seek to impress upon us in effect
that it is not they that speak but the Constitution that speaketh in them. Somehow this
reminds me of the biographer who wrote of Gladstone that his conscience was not his
guide but only his accomplice." POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 28 (1956).
321. Marshall recognized the law of nations as a part of the law of the United
States, encompassed by the supremacy clause and no longer a part of state sovereignty.
In pursuing this inquiry at the bar, it has been said, that the Constitution does
not confer the right of intercourse between State and State. That right derives
its source from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by civilized man
throughout the world. This is true. The Constitution found it an existing
right, and gave to Congress the power to regulate it.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). Naturally the power to regulate
the rights recognized under the universal law of nations included the power to preserve
and secure such legal rights from confiscation and extinction by acts of the member
states. This the Congress had done:
In the exercise of this power, Congress has passed "an act for enrolling or
licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and
for regulating the same. . . ." It will at once occur, that, when a Legislature
attaches certain privileges and exemptions to the exercise of a right over which
its control is absolute, the law must imply a power to exercise the right. The
privileges are gone, if the right itself be annihilated. It would be contrary to
236
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Kent in limiting the Court's authority to the language of the act and the
apparent purpose of Congress; the statute granted an exemption, not a
license in the sense of a right to navigate by steamboat, though the word
"license" was used in the statute. Johnson wrote: "I cannot overcome
the conviction that if the licensing act was repealed tomorrow, the rights
of the appellant to a reversal of the decision complained of, would be as
strong as it is under this license." '322 His point was well taken; the Court's
decision would have been the same without the act of Congress as with it.
Finally the Court's decree is worthy of note: "[T]hat the several
licenses to the steam boats the Stoudinger and the Bellona, to carry on
coasting trade. . . which were granted under an act of Congress, passed
in pursuance of the constitution of the United States, gave full authority
to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States, by steam or
otherwise, for the purpose of carrying on coasting trade, any law of the
State of New York to the contrary notwithstanding .... "323 The grant
of the exclusive franchise that prohibited the private rights in free navi-
gation was declared repugnant to the Constitution of the United States
"and void." 24  The decree of the New York Court of Errors that af-
firmed the perpetual injunction incorporated in the decree of the Chan-
cellor of New York, James Kent, was declared erroneous and "reversed
and annulled." 2 '
The great steamboat litigation was concluded. The legal structure
had been built assuring judicial protection of commercial intercourse.
For a considerable period there would be greater freedom in navigating
the nation's public waters than in other areas. The commerce clause
would be used as the principal authority for the constitutional invalida-
tion remedy and for the formulation of national law securing private
rights and personal liberty. The theory of exclusive powers was at the
all reason, and to the course of human affairs, to say . . . that the State of
New York cannot prevent an enrolled and licensed vessel, proceeding from
Elizabethtown, in New Jersey to New York, from enjoying, in her course, and
on her entrance into port, all the privileges conferred by the act of Congress;
but can shut her up in her own port, and prohibit altogether her entering the
waters and ports of another state. To the Court it seems very clear, that the
whole act on the subject of the coasting trade, according to the principles which
govern the construction of statutes [which deal with ships and rights of navi-
gation], implies, unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry on the
coasting trade.
Id. at 211-12. This analysis would require the Congress to enact affirmative legislation
explicitly authorizing the states to interfere with ships or vessels and navigation, at least
whenever the Congress had legislated on the subject; the Court construed the act as
though the Congress legislated in contemplation of the general freedom of public waters.
322. Id. at 231-32.
323. Id. at 239-40.
324. Id. at 240.
325. Ibid.
237
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threshold of giving way to the equally erroneous theory of interstate
commerce and negative implication." 6
326. The adjective "interstate" has been imposed upon the commerce clause as a
legal limitation upon the national powers. The Supreme Court has often used "inter-
state commerce" as a legal concept, denoting
a broad type of activity having certain characteristics, fairly ascertainable,
which determine the classification . . . [for the drawing of a line between]
state and federal power. In accord with this idea, the Court has repeatedly
felt free to give a definition of "interstate commerce," which definition con-
tained no reference to the type of regulation before the Court, or to the source of
the regulation, as federal or state. . . . A . . . book or . . . article . . . will
recite instance after instance of activities being held to be or not to be "inter-
state commerce," without any intimation as to whether the case involved state
or federal action, regulation or taxation. Such statements reflect the . . . idea
of interstate commerce as an ascertainable thing, distinguishable [from intra-
state commerce which likewise is assumed to be ascertainable] ...
RiBBLE, STATE AND NATioNAL POWER OVER COMMERCE 126 (1937). Cf. Stafford v. Wal-
lace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Hop-
kins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898). See, e.g., the opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 543 (1935):
"Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions in interstate
commerce."
"Negative implications" of the commerce clause may be a meaningless epithet. Pre-
sumably it suggests that the jurisdictional authority of the Supreme Court to void state
acts from the authority of the commerce clause is based upon a fiction. The Court had
to devise a fiction of preserving national power, or of imposing national powers upon
the states in order to invalidate acts of the state from the authority of the commerce
clause. Yet the constitutional policy of freedom, which is found in the commerce clause,
is no fiction. Cf. Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U.
Cmai. L. REV. 556-59, 583-88, 592-96 (1936) ; Freund, Judicial Review and Federalism, in
SUPREME COURT AND SUPRE E LAW 86, 100 (Cahn ed. 1954). See the opinion of Chief
Justice Stone in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945): "Whether
or not this long-recognized distribution of power between the national and the state gov-
ernments is predicated upon the implications of the commerce clause itself . . . or upon
the presumed intention of Congress, where Congress has not spoken . . . the result
is the same."
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